America, North

STATE

OF THE

British and French Colonies

IN

NORTH AMERICA,

With Reſpect to

Number of PEOPLE, FORCES, FORTS, INDIANS, TRADE and other Advantages.

In which are conſidered,

I. The defenceleſs Condition of our Plantations, and to what Cauſes owing.

II. Pernicious Tendency of the *French* Encroachments, and the fitteſt Methods of fruſtrating them.

III. What it was occaſioned their preſent Invaſion, and the Claims on which they ground their Proceedings.

WITH A

Proper EXPEDIENT propoſed for preventing future Diſputes.

In Two LETTERS to a FRIEND.

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MVSEVM
BRITAN
NICVM

STATE

OF THE

Britiſh and French Colonies

IN

NORTH AMERICA.

SIR,

THE *French* having, ſince their forcible entry into *Nova Scotia*, greatly augmented the cauſe of our complaints, inſtead of removing them, by ſeizing the weſtern part of *Virginia*, a much larger and no leſs valuable country; you deſire to have my ſentiments on their deſigns by their preſent encroachments, and on the means of fruſtrating them, as well as preventing the like for the future: you likewiſe expect from me an account of the ſtate both of the *Engliſh* and *French* Colonies, with reſpect to their extent, number of people, forces, forts, *Indians* and trade. This is a difficult, and perhaps an invidious taſk; fitter to be undertaken by one who, having been long reſident in north *America*, is thoroughly acquainted with the ſeveral nations of *Indians* and the countries which they inhabit, as well as with the affairs of the *Britiſh* colonies. However, as you deſire it, for reaſons of a national conſideration, I ſhall endeavour to oblige

you to the beſt of my power: on which occaſion I ſhall premiſe, that the preſent unhappy ſituation of our *American* colonies, is owing to a ſeries of bad management, as well on this as on the other ſide of the ocean: and altho' I ſhall touch them as gently as poſſible, yet as a remedy cannot be properly applied without knowing the cauſe and circumſtances of the diſeaſe, I promiſe you not to diſguiſe or wilfully miſrepreſent matters, but give them impartially juſt as I find them, on good authority, under certain heads.

I.

Importance of the Ohio *country, and views of the* French *in their preſent proceedings.*

THE patience with which the *French* were ſo long ſuffered to ſettle and fortify themſelves in *Nova Scotia*, without doubt emboldened them to enter and drive us out of the country of the *Ohio:* but heavens be thanked, this ſecond audacious ſtep has opened the eyes of the whole nation, and made ſome people think of *American* affairs more than ever they intended, altho' others remain deeply regardleſs and inſenſible as ever, and perhaps would continue ſo till the nation was no more, were they to live long enough to periſh with it. But their inſenſibility does not make the extreme danger which now threatens our *American* colonies one jot the leſs; and which in threatening them threatens their mother country, ſince, in whatever fate betides them, ſhe muſt herſelf inevitably be involved.

Altho' the *French* are vaſtly increaſed in north *America* ſince the peace of *Utrecht*, and have by far the ſuperiority of the *Engliſh* as to numbers in

in the islands, yet in the *Continent* they are still much inferior to the *English*. Nor is it for want of being sensible of this disparity that they have dared to attack us, tho' so much inferior in number. They know this defect on their own side perfectly well, but depend for their success upon what they know to be more advantageous than a superiority in numbers, and that is, the division which reigns among the colonies, their defenceless state, and slowness in action; as they did not scruple to declare to Major *Washington*, when he went to their forts on the lakes.

Of what great importance the country of the *Ohio* is to our *English* colonies will appear, from considering the vast conveniencies which, by its situation only, (independent of its other advantages mentioned hereafter) it would afford the *French* of securing and improving their own colonies, as well as annoying ours.

This country lying in the middle space between their settlements in *Canada* and *Louisiana* (to which last they pretend it belongs) and at the back also of our middle colonies, would give them an opportunity not only of joining their two very distant plantations, whenever they should be in a condition to do it, but also of preventing us from extending our settlements backward beyond the great mountains towards the *Mississippi*, and of attacking them on that side. It would farther strengthen them and weaken us, by putting it in their power to gain the *Indians* of that large country over to their interest, some of whom, as the *Twigtwees* or *Miyamis*, now in friendship with the *English*, are very numerous and warlike. This would be a very large addition to their strength, and enable them to give great disturbance to the *Indians* in alliance with the *English*,

as well in the northen as the ſouthern colonies while, by their intermediate ſituation, they will prevent their aſſiſting each other beyond the great mountains, by cutting off all communication between them.

Their having poſſeſſion of this country would be of ſtill more pernicious conſequence to us; as by the conveniency of the *Ohio* and its branches, they would have it in their power at any time to attack, to great advantage, either our northern or ſouthern provinces. By means of the *Ohio* they might come with their *Indians* into the country of the five nations, and alſo the provinces of *New York* and *Penſylvania*: while the river of the *Charokees*, one of its branches, which falls into it near its mouth in the *Miſſiſſippi*, would give them an eaſy paſſage into the country of thoſe *Indians*, and both *Carolinas*, which would lie open to their attacks. In reality, were they ſtrong enough, they might at preſent invade us on that ſide by this laſt river, having ſecured admiſſion into it by the forts which they have erected at the mouths of the *Ohio* and the *Wabaſh*.

From what has been ſaid it ſeems but too evident, that if the *French* had this country, they would in time be maſters of all the *Britiſh* colonies. This province is as neceſſary a barrier againſt them in the middle parts of our ſettlements, as thoſe of *Nova Scotia* and *Georgia* are on the north and ſouth; and ſince their deſign is ſo apparently to hem us in, and contract our bounds as much as poſſible, it ſtands us upon to keep them at as great a diſtance as we can. The *French* are very ſenſible, that in caſe we ſhould once become maſters of this important country, by ſettling and fortifying it, that they could never hope to unite their two colonies, at leaſt on this

this ſide of the *Miſſiſſippi*: one of the grand points which they have had in view ever ſince they entered that river and ſettled at *New Orleans* in 1699; and this makes them ſo very earneſt to get the *Ohio* country out of our hands, which, for that reaſon, was it all a rock or ſandy deſart, we ought by no means to permit.

From their manner of proceeding, in forcibly wreſting from the *Britiſh* dominions in *America*, two ſuch conſiderable provinces, and building forts all along our frontiers; it looks as if their intention was not only to cut off our inland trade with the *Indian* nations, but alſo to attack our Colonies on all ſides, when once they have effectually ſurrounded them with a chain of fortifications, if not before: and I fancy, from what I am going to offer in in ſupport of this opinion, that you will be inclined to think there is nothing at all chimerical in it.

Altho' *Lewis* XIV. had in the year 1686, entred into a treaty of neutrality with *England* for *North America*, yet in 1688 he embarked in a project, which, in violation of the ſaid treaty, his ſubjects had formed to ſubdue the *Britiſh* Colonies in that part of the Continent, and to begin with the conqueſt of *New York*.

The chevalier *de Callieres*, who had contrived the ſcheme, poſted into *France* to propoſe it, and ſolicit aſſiſtance. The King approved of the plan, and the Count *de Frontenac*, ſent over Governor to *Canada*, was charged with the command of the expedition. He was to march his troops by land to *New York*, while the Sieur *de Caffiniere* was to ply with his ſhips before the port, till the ſignal ſhould be given for him to enter. Matters were ſo to be ordered, that both forces ſhould appear before the place at the ſame

time: but thro' ſome miſtakes in the execution, they were obliged to give over the deſign for that time; and a dreadful irruption of the five nations, which happened immediately after, would have effectually ruined *Canada*, in caſe they had been ſupported by the *Engliſh*.

But altho' their deſign miſcarry'd that time, they did not lay it aſide; and the late irruption of the five nations only ſpurred them on to execute it, in order to prevent another from the ſame quarter. However, they were fruſtrated a ſecond time in their deſign: for while they were preparing in *Canada* to deſtroy the *Engliſh*, the latter were preparing to ſubdue *Canada*; ſo that they were obliged to keep their forces to defend themſelves.

The next year a new plan was ſet on foot by Mr. *Denonville*, governor of *Canada*, who declared it as his opinion, " that the only way to " terminate the war in *America* (for war was now " proclaimed in *Europe*) was to take *Manhatte*, " (ſo the *French* call *New York*) that it might " be done with ſix frigates and 1200 land ſol- " diers; that 3000 men, conſiſting of the troops " and militia of the country, would eaſily make " themſelves maſters of the fort *Orange* (or " *Albany*): that after the capital was taken, " it would be abſolutely neceſſary to burn it, " and ruin the country as far as *Orange*: that " by means of this poſt, which it would be " eaſy to keep, they ſhould break off all com- " munication between the *Engliſh* and *Iroquois* " (or the five nations,) compel theſe latter to have " recourſe to the *French*, and hinder the *French* " allies from making alliances prejudicial to the " Colony of *Canada*: in fine, that fort *Orange* " would ſerve to keep in awe all the coaſt of

" *New*

" *New England*, which tho' very well peopled, " was quite defenceleſs."

This was the well-concerted plan of the Marquis *Denonville*, which *Charlevoix*, who inſerts the whole in his ſpurious hiſtory of *New France*, imagines could not have failed of ſucceſs, in caſe it had been ſupported, and expreſſes great concern that it was not: but as forces could not be ſpared at that juncture for the expedition, they were obliged to drop the deſign once more.

The reaſons which were alledged in the ſaid plan, for the intended conqueſt, were,

1. To prevent the ravages of the five nations, by reducing their ſupporters.
2. To get the commerce of the *Indians* into their hands, of which the *Engliſh* deprived them.
3. For the benefit of *Canada*, which cannot be ſecure ſo long as the *Engliſh* are its neighbours.
4. Becauſe the intereſt of the *Engliſh* and the *French* are utterly incompatible.

It was upon theſe principles that the *French* undertook, in time of peace, to conquer the *Engliſh* dominions in *America*; and believed theſe arguments would ſufficiently juſtify their proceedings to all the world.

Now, as theſe reaſons will always ſubſiſt, it is plain that they will never forgo their project. The things they complain of are to them inſupportable evils; and therefore they will be ſure to have recourſe to the remedy whenever they think themſelves in a condition to apply it: And conſidering their preſent proceedings, joined to the ſteps they have been taking for ſeveral years paſt preparatory thereto, would not any body believe

that they are actually about executing their long-concerted ſcheme? 'Tis true, one might be apt to douht it, when he reflects on the number of people now inhabiting the *Britiſh* Colonies, and that one of them might be a match for *Canada*. This gives a handle to vain, ignorant, and diſaffected perſons to make ſlight of what has paſt, as if it was not worth the government's taking notice of: but, does not the great and ſudden progreſs which the *French* have already made evince, what a handful of men may do againſt many hundred thouſand, when diſunited, and under no proper regulation?

'Tis true, they have not yet attacked *New York*: but, muſt not every body in the world, who is acquainted with this ſcheme, conclude, that fort *Frederic* at *Crown Point* (or rather *Scalp Point*) on the ſouth end of *Champlain* lake, was built by them for this very deſign? It is only to be wiſhed, that we may be in a condition to reſiſt them before they attempt it: for they never had ſo favourable a juncture as this, when the exceſſive debts of the nation might be thought, in ſome meaſure, to diſable us from reſenting our wrongs, or affording our plantations the requiſite aſſiſtance; and the diſunion which ſubſiſts among the Colonies renders them unable to help themſelves; at a time when we are told they are without forts, without arms, without ammunition, and without money!

Their ſettling at *New Orleans* about nine years after they had formed the ſcheme of conquering *New York*, put it into their heads to go a more ſlow, but ſurer way to work, by inſenſibly encroaching upon our Colonies, and ſurrounding them with forts. Before that time, tho' always very

very troubleſome, they ſeemed to confine themſelves within moderate limits, and had only three forts, excepting thoſe of *Quebek* and *Montreal*, in the neighbourhood of our northern Colonies; namely, thoſe of *Chambly*, 20 miles ſouth-eaſt of *Montreal*, *Frontenac* on the north-eaſt end of lake *Kadarakui* on *Ontario*, and *Denonville* on the ſouth-weſt ſide of the ſame lake, near the falls of *Niawgra*; which ſeemed to be built rather to defend their own frontiers than encroach on thoſe of the *Engliſh*, and the laſt was almoſt as ſoon deſtroyed as built: but from the above-mentioned period, they began to entertain vaſter deſigns. However, they were prevented by the war till after the peace of *Utrecht* in 1713, which is the æra from whence the growing ſtate of *Canada* may be dated; and in proportion as the *French* took care to extend their territories, the *Engliſh* neglected, or rather ſeemed utterly to abandon the care of theirs: as if the great ſtruggle at the treaty of *Utrecht*, in behalf of their *American* dominions, proceeded rather from the glory of having their title acknowledged by *France*, than any real value they had for, or deſign of preſerving, them.

The *French* began their encroachments about 1715, by building fort *Toulouſe* on the river *Alibama*, in or near the country of the *Creek Indians*, and the back of *Carolina*; a place which the *Engliſh* had been in poſſeſſion of 28 years before. Their next attempt was to try the pulſes of the miniſtry, with regard to *Nova Scotia*, by denying our title to it; which they had, in the moſt ſolemn manner and formal terms, given up but ſix years before. Finding them eaſy enough to conſent to a negotiation, inſtead of reſenting the inſult, and the people of the Colonies wholly taken

up

up with their own private intereſts and quarrels, they watched their opportunity; and in 1731, uſurped from the province of *New York* all the lands for above 120 miles to the ſouth of *St. Lawrence*'s river, by building fort *Frederick* at *Crown Point*. In 1750 they ſeized two parts in three of *Nova Scots*, by building forts at *Shegnekto* and *Baye Verte*; ſince when they have built two others at the mouth of *St. John*'s river. In 1726, they encroached on *Penſylvania*, by erecting, or rather reſtoring a fort call'd *Denonville*, near the falls of *Niawgra* above-mentioned. Thoſe forts and that of *de Troite* between the lakes *Erri* and *Hurons* were built, that by their means the *French* might command the *Straits*, on which they ſtand, and open or ſhut them juſt as they themſelves ſhould think fit.

Fort *de Troite* in 1712, the *Outegamis* promiſed to burn, and bring in the *Engliſh*; but they miſcarried. "Had this place been loſt, ſays *Charlevoix*, "and the *Engliſh* taken poſſeſſion, it would quite "have ruined *New France*, as 'tis the center and "fineſt part of all *Canada*, and it would have "been impoſſible to have the leaſt communica-"tion with the ſavages above, or with *Louiſiana*."

This proves what I have obſerved as to the deſigned obſtruction; and ſhews how many ways there were, and opportunities we have had of putting a ſtop to the progreſs of the *French*, and preventing them from uniting their two Colonies.

Theſe forts, therefore, appear to have been built to limit our northern Colonies on the weſt, as *Toulouſe* was, with deſign that it ſhould be our *ne plus ultra* on the ſame ſide of *Carolina* and *Georgia*: laſtly, they have built forts on *Lake Erri*, and driven us out of ours on the *Ohio* near *Logſtown*, in order to let us know that they will not ſuffer us to poſſeſs an inch of ground to the weſt of the *Alliganey* mountains.

By

By theſe limits, which the *French* have preſcribed us by their forts, they have ſtript us of more than nine parts in ten of *North America*, which they may be ſaid now to be in poſſeſſion of; and left us only a ſkirt of coaſt along the *Atlantic* ſhore, bounded on the north by the river *St. Lawrence*, and on the weſt by the *Appalachian* or *Alliganey* mountains, which are no where above 280 miles diſtant from the coaſt, and in ſome parts not more than 120.

In conſequence of theſe proceedings they have already prevented us from extending our ſettlements beyond their preſent bounds; cut off all our intercourſe with the *Indians*; and farther reduced the ſmall ſhare they had left us of the Fur trade, having gotten into their poſſeſſion ſix or ſeven eighths of it before. But if left in poſſeſſion of ſuch great advantages, it is not to be imagined that our good neighbours will ſtop there: they who have unjuſtly uſurped ſo much from us, would not long be content without ſeizing the whole, if it was in their power; and this moſt certainly they intended in a ſhort time to attempt; nor could it have been in the power of the united force of our plantations to withſtand them.

It was, doubtleſs, not without a view to this deſign, that in 1750, Mr. *Chaubert*, a lieutenant in the King's fleet, was ſent to ſurvey the peninſula of *Nova Scotia*, from the gut of *Canſo* quite round the coaſt as far as *Port Royal*, under colour of doing ſervice to Geography and Navigation. It was certainly doing both a very important ſervice; and that gentleman has executed his plan (the more meritoriouſly, as the voyage was undertaken at his own requeſt) with an addreſs which does him extraordinary honour; yet this is a work, which, at a time when the *French* had

had invaded our territories in that very part, the *Engliſh*, I think, ought not to have ſuffered.

Luckily for the Colonies, they have diſcovered their deſign before their chain of forts was completed, and they were ſufficiently prepared for putting it in execution: for doubtleſs their intention was firſt to have deprived us of all *Indian* aſſiſtance, eſpecially in the northern colonies, where they propoſed to attack us, by either cuting off or ſubduing the ſix nations and their allies. This as a memorial before me, written by an *American* about that time, ſets forth, they threatened to do in 1732, the year after they had built their fort at *Crown-point:* ſo much did the gaining that point embolden them, and ſo much had the colonies chiefly concerned reaſon to repent their having ſuffered ſo dangerous an incroachment. After ſubduing the ſix nations, their next motion probably would have been to build a fort or forts in the country of the *Charokees*, as thoſe *Indians* informed the Governor of *Carolina* they had often threatened: then perhaps they might have attempted to erect one at the head of the rivers *Kennebek* and *La Chaudiere*, in a place hereafter-mentioned. But, for fear of alarming the colonies too much, in all probability they would not have thought of ſeizing the *Ohio* in the borders of *Virginia*, till they found matters ripe for execution: for as their end in this was to leave the northern colonies no *Indians* to aſſiſt them, it ſeems to have been deſigned for their laſt ſtep. That they took it ſo prematurely, was doubtleſs to prevent the *Engliſh*; who, they apprehended, or rather were informed, were making preparations for ſettling that country: for it appears now, that the intentions of the colonies on that head were betrayed to the *French*; and the ſecret of the

Ohio

Ohio grant, to the *Indians*. It was this which brought the former ſooner than they intended into thoſe parts; and made the latter deſert or turn againſt the *Virginians*, which occaſioned their defeat in the battle of the great meadows.

As the *French* in 1688 ſet on foot their project during the peace, in expectation of a war ſoon breaking out, they are doubtleſs at preſent in a like expectation: it is likely too that their intent was, as they ſeem to have done, to begin the war in *America*; which according to ſome is the moſt proper place for them to begin it in.

That the *French* were not far off from putting their old ſcheme in execution, might be inferred from the conduct of their geographers; who of late have been more than ordinarily buſy at curtailing the *Britiſh* territories in their maps; by which they lay claim to a great deal more than their countrymen have taken poſſeſſion of. For they cut off from us near one half of *Hudſon*'s river, which belongs to *New York*, and the whole country of the five nations, tho' expreſsly yielded by the treaty of *Utrecht*. Altho' by the original grant of our Kings *Penſylvania* is extended five degrees, or about 260 miles weſt of *Delawar* river, yet they for the general retrench three of thoſe degrees; and ſome make the *Suſquehanna* its weſtern boundary, contracting that province to the breadth of 70 miles, and depriving it of all the weſtern branches of that great river. *Virginia* they limit by the *Appalachian* or *Alliganey* mountains; and curtail 200 miles of it ſouthward, making *Aſhley* river its boundary, under pretence of their ſettlements in 1562: but the late Mr. *Del Iſle* went ſtill farther on a worſe foundation; for in his map of *New France*, publiſhed 1718, he tranſfers the whole province over

to

to his own nation, by making it a part of *Louiſiana*, under the falſe ſuggeſtion that the name of *Carolina* was given to it by the *French* in honour of their King *Charles*; and now at length, to make ſhort work of it, one of their preſent geographers, Mr. *Robert*, has run away with all the *Britiſh* colonies at once, and carried them into *Canada* *, doubtleſs under the lame pretence of *Verazzani*'s diſcovery in 1524, tho' 27 years poſterior to that of the *Cabots*.

Can any thing be more evident from all theſe inſtances, than that the *French* reſolve never to give over their encroachments on our territories, but to gain upon them by degrees, till they have accompliſhed their long concerted deſign of ſwallowing up the whole. In that caſe, what a moſt formidable power would *France* arrive at! "For "when become maſters of all our *American* trade, "our ſugars, tobacco, rice, timber, and naval "ſtores, they would ſoon, ſaith the above-men-"tioned memorialiſt, be an over match in naval "ſtrength to the reſt of *Europe*, and ſo in a "condition to give laws to the whole."

II.

State of the French *and* Engliſh *colonies compared.*

IF a foreigner, unacquainted with the affairs of *America*, was to hear in what manner they have driven us, as it were, into a corner and blocked us up, he would conclude that the *French* are vaſtly more numerous there than the *Engliſh*; whereas the very reverſe of this is the caſe. From an exact enquiry made on the ſpot laſt year, by

* See the Conduct of the *French*, p 45.

a very

a very capable perſon, it did not appear that the whole inhabitants or *French* of *Canada* exceeded 45,000 ſouls, of which 15,000 are fighting men. This tallies with the account given by Colonel *Levingſton* in 1732, as to the laſt article, altho' he obſerved, that the *French* themſelves made their number amount to 18,000. But we are aſſured from another hand, that in 1747, all their militia or ſenſible men, capable of marching, did not exceed 12,000 men, with about 1000 regular troops, and as many *Indians*, who may be prevailed on to march. As for *Louiſiana*, the number of *French* throughout the whole province, which they thus extend from the *Mexikan* gulf to the *Ilinois* river, in about latitude 40 degrees, the ſpace of 800 leagues, is very ſmall: but ſuppoſing it contains 6 or 7000, with auxiliary *Indians*, the province of either *New York* or of *Connecticut* in *New England* has more men in it than both their colonies together: ſo that, on a moderate calculation, the number of *French* in their two ſettlements, tho' greatly increaſed ſince the peace of *Utrecht*, holds a proportion to that of the *Engliſh* in theirs, which very little exceeds one to twenty. "But (as a memorial now be-
"fore me obſerves on this occaſion) union, ſitua-
"tion, proper management of the *Indians*, ſu-
"perior knowledge of the country, and conſtant
"application to a purpoſe, will more than ba-
"lance divided numbers, and will eaſily break
"a rope of ſand."

The *French* have but one town in *Louiſiana*, that is *New Orleans*, near the mouth of *Miſſiſſippi* river; and only three of any note in *Canada*, *Quebeck*, *Montreal* and *Trois-Rivieres*, which lies between the other two, and all ſituated on the river of St. *Laurence*: of theſe three places alſo,

the two firſt only are of any conſideration. *Quebek* the capital lies about 110 leagues from the mouth of the river St. *Laurence*, is pretty ſtrongly fortified with a fort, four redoubts, and as many batteries on the river, but weak towards the land. Its inhabitants are variouſly computed, from 10,000 to 15,000, being more than what are found in the other two, beſides 500 ſoldiers.

Montreal, ſixty leagues higher up the river, is more pleaſantly ſeated, and has three fourths the number of inhabitants, but is not ſo well fortified. Between theſe two towns are included all the ſettlements in *Canada* of any note; that of *Trois-Rivieres*, in the midway, is ſmall and a trifling fortification.

The climate of *Canada* is ſo cold, that the river St. *Laurence* is not navigable from *October* to *May*, by reaſon of ice, and the earth ſo long covered with ſnow, that the inhabitants have great difficulty to maintain their ſmall ſtocks of cattle thro' the winter; and the *Indian* trade, which is all the buſineſs of the country, takes ſuch numbers of men from labour, that they raiſe very little grain more than is neceſſary for their annual ſubſiſtance, which frequently falls ſhort. The forces maintained by the King in this country are diſtributed amongſt the ſmall forts in the inland parts, ſome to the diſtance of above 1000 miles. Beſides thoſe already mentioned, there are four of note. *Fort-ſorel*, where the river of the *Iroquois* or *Richelieu*, which is the diſcharge of *Lake Champlain*, enters St. *Laurence* river, a little below *Montreal*. *Fort Chambli*, before mentioned, half way between *Sorel* and *Lake Champlain*, and 100 north by eaſt from *Crown-point*. Thirdly, fort *Frontenac*, mentioned alſo before, on the lake *Kaderakkui* or *Ontario*, almoſt due north of

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our fort of *Oſwego*, and about 60 or 70 miles diſtant. Laſtly, *Denonvill* fort at *Niagra* and that of *Detroit*, on the canal of communication between the *Hurons* and *Erri* lake. They have a few other ſtackado forts, and one called St. *Ignace*, on the ſouth ſide of the paſſage between the *Hurons* and *Miſhigan* lake, not far from *Tieodonderaghi* or *Miſſilimakinak*, where they had one formerly.

From what has been ſaid with reſpect to *Canada*, the reader may perceive a reaſon why the *French* are ſo earneſt to encroach on the poſſeſſions of their neighbours; and tho' *Louiſiana* might make them ſome amends, yet it lies at ſo vaſt a diſtance, that *Canada*, for many ages to come, can reap but little benefit from it; that is, till the two colonies, by the increaſe of their reſpective inhabitants, ſhall draw cloſer together.

The diſtance by land between the two capitals, going, as they are obliged to do, by lakes and rivers, is at leaſt 700 leagues: altho' the direct diſtance, could it be traveled for woods and moraſſes, would not be above 450. It is a journey by water of three months, from *Quebek* to *New Orleans*; and three times as much from *New Orleans* to *Quebek*, going againſt the ſtream of the *Miſſiſſippi*, and other rapid rivers. In all this ſpace there are no more than a few ſtackado forts, at a great diſtance from each other, and without any ſettlements. The diſtance by ſea is equal to that thro' the continent: for to their colonies they have no more than two inlets, the mouth of the *Miſſiſſippi*, and that of the river St. *Laurence*, near 1000 leagues aſunder; whilſt the *Engliſh* find admiſſion into theirs by an infinite number of rivers, which fall into the Atlantic ocean within that ſpace, and afford them ſo many advantages of trade.

But altho' the *French* colonies are far inferior to the *Engliſh*, with reſpect to number of inhabitants, commodious ſituation, and quality of ſoil; yet they far exceed them in other advantages. In the firſt place, the country to the weſt of *Canada* is the beſt country for furs in all *America*; for beaver or caſtor, the farther ſouth, hath leſs fur, and more hair. This valuable trade they have engroſſed almoſt wholly to themſelves, by having all that immenſe tract of country open to them; while they exclude the *Engliſh*, by incloſing them, and ſhutting up all paſſages excepting one or two, by which the *Indians* can have acceſs to them. As their whole buſineſs almoſt is their trade with the *Indians*, their young men, for ſake of gain, travel and reſide among them: nay, they become acquainted with the woods, whence named *Coureurs de Bois*, or wood-rangers; are inured to hardſhips, become enterprizing, and are as good at buſh-fighting, as the *Indians* themſelves: at home they are muſtered and exerciſed; all excepting eccleſiaſtics and ſome others, may be accounted ſo many ſoldiers, who are better for the ſervice of that country than their beſt veteran troops, and even the *Indians* themſelves. For this reaſon, that ſort of life is encouraged in *Canada*; and it is a qualification for a young man to make a tour on the lakes, as it is in *Europe* to make a campaign.

The country is divided into ſignories, and the lands held in ſoccage, by the tenants, who are thereby obliged, on any occaſion, to take up arms for their defence. The whole being likewiſe under one general command, the people obey with ſuch alacrity, "That (to uſe the words "of a memorial before me) in caſe of any at-"tack, they all fly, on the firſt notice, to the "place

" place of danger, as readily as in a garriſon, " on beating or ſounding a call."

The *French* fortify alſo wherever they come, but above all take care to gain the *Indians*; and are now maſters, ſays the ſame memorial, of all the *Indians* in the eaſtern part of the continent. For this purpoſe they conſtantly keep prieſts, or other emiſſaries amongſt them; and ſo naturally conform themſelves to the *Indian* ways, as ſcarce to be diſtinguiſhed. In fine, they frequently intermarry with them, by which methods they ſtrengthen their intereſt, and endear themſelves to the *Indians*, who are very true to them.

This is the general ſtate of the *French* in *America*, while that of the *Britiſh* colonies is too much the reverſe. Each is a diſtinct government wholly independent of the reſt, purſuing its own intereſt and ſubject to no general command. If we conſider their ſtate as to force, we ſhall find them, for the moſt part, very weak and defenceleſs. Above two parts in three of *Nova Scotia* are in the hands of the *French*, who have ſeized all the north main, and left us only the peninſula: however, we have there *Annapolis*, *Halifax*, and ſome other thriving ſettlements, which begin to put on a very good aſpect.

New England is ſtrong and indifferently well fortified, particularly northward, where it has a chain of forts reaching to *Albany*, which defend a line of 300 miles. Its eaſtern frontier alſo, which was tolerably well ſecured before, has been lately reinforced by the addition of two forts, built laſt ſummer, on the banks of the river *Kennibek*.

New York, the principal frontier againſt *Canada*, is provided with no very ſtrong fort in its capital, and wants ſome to ſecure the entrance of

its harbour. *Albany* has another fort ſtill leſs defenſible, and at 150 miles diſtance. There are two regular companies in *Britiſh* pay in each fort; but they are too far aſunder for mutual defence, or even aſſiſtance.

Theſe are all the forts to be found on the *Britiſh* main to the ſouth of *Port-Royal:* and to the ſouth of *New York*, for 600 miles together, the coaſt is unfortified, excepting by its natural ſhoalineſs till you come to *Charles-Town*; but lower down we find a few poor ones in *Georgia*, the ſouthern frontier of the *Britiſh* territories.

If we conſider the ſtrength of the colonies, in reſpect to military forces, altho' ſo full of people, we ſhall find them almoſt deſtitute of fighting men. In ſome colonies there is no appearance at all of a militia; and in ſome others there may be an appearance of ſuch, but none of ſervice; whatever there are being poorly armed. The ſound of war or enemies, ſays the memorial, eſpecially the *Indians*, is terrible to them. But when we come to enquire for theſe *Indians*, who were ſo numerous formerly in the country, and would have been their ſureſt defence, we ſcarce find any in moſt of the colonies in the parts inhabited by the *Engliſh*; who have made it their buſineſs every where, by degrees, to root them out, either by making war on them, or ſetting their ſeveral nations or tribes at variance among themſelves. It may not be amiſs, therefore, to ſet forth the defenceleſs ſtate of the colonies in this particular.

The inland parts of the northern main of *Nova Scotia*, and the country between that and the river *Kennebek*, bounding *New England*, having never been ſettled by either *French* or *Engliſh*, is poſſeſſed by the ſeveral tribes of the *Abenákki* or *Abnakki*

Abnakki Indians, who were the natural inhabitants of *New England*, and are inveterate enemies to it, on account of former quarrels; which has reduced them to the number of about 640. In the peninsula there are a few tribes of *Mikmaks*, called formerly by the *French Souriquois*.

In *New England* there are but a very few *Indians* left, almost all having been destroyed by the wars, or driven out; part into the country eastward, which are those just now mentioned, and part into the territories of the *French*, to whom they are firmly attached; excepting the tribes who in 1749 came voluntarily, 'tis said, and submitted to the governor of *New York*.

This last province has very few *Indians* belonging to it, unless we reckon for such the *Six Nations*, who are said to be settled within the province, and more properly under its protection: those were formerly a numerous people, 10 or 12,000 strong, but at present it is thought that they do not exceed 1500 fighting men.

New Jersey has very few *Indians*, and none who could be of service in war. *Pensylvania* has 6 or 700; but half of them are *Shawanons*; who to avoid molestation from their neighbours, leaving their habitations along the river which is called by their name in the *French* maps, and falls into the *Ohio*, removed to the river *Susquehanna* in that province: but being menaced by the six nations for mischief done on *Delaware* river, in 1728 returned to the *Ohio*, where many *Delawares* had gone before for sake of hunting; and two years after, by the persuasions of a *French* emissary, put themselves wholly under protection of the *French*; which they signified at their return, by hoisting a *French* flag at their town:

however, at preſent they for the general are, or pretend to be, friends to the *Engliſh*.

In *Maryland* there are a few *Indians* called *Nantikoks*, on the eaſt ſhore; but on the other ſide ſcarce any at all. In *Virginia* they have none in the parts inhabited by the *Engliſh*, but live in ſeparate towns. In *Carolina* they were formerly very numerous; but the *Engliſh*, ſays the memorial of 1732, made it their policy to *play one nation againſt another*, till they all became exceedingly reduced, altho' conſiderable numbers ſtill remain Mr. *Neal* ſays * the *Engliſh* were ſo *wiſe* as to do the ſame by the *Indians* of *New England*. By this falſe ſtep, as well as horrid policy, they have greatly diſtreſſed inſtead of relieving themſelves; for, as the country backwards, as well as forwards, lies open to an invader, in caſe the *French* ſhould pour in their numerous tribes of *Indians* on them, what devaſtation and ruin would be made, for want of other *Indians* acquainted with their way of making war to oppoſe them? So that it is to be feared, that upon ſuch an invaſion, the firſt thing they would have occaſion to repent, would be the deſtruction of their own *Indians*. Beſides, as there are in the ſouthern Colonies three or four blacks to one white, what danger might not be apprehended from theſe poor unhappy wretches, (who, provoked by even a worſe than *Egyptian* ſlavery, have two or three times formed dangerous conſpiracies to deſtroy their maſters,) in caſe of ſuch an invaſion, eſpecially if their maſters were obliged to march to defend their frontiers, and leave their families behind.

'Tis true, the memorialiſt, to palliate the barbarity of his neighbour countrymen, ſays, that theſe *Indians* are, *for the general, an unſteady faithleſs people*: yet acknowledges, "that they may "be

* Hiſt. *New Engl.* Vol. II. p. 2.

" be governed by their intereſt, and may be uſeful " while they can be kept friends." Whoſe fault then is it if they be not friends? And, if " by " their barbarity, inſidious attacks, and ſwiftneſs " in the woods, they are terrible enemies;" are not theſe reaſons why they ſhould be made our friends? What is more in their favour, he owns, " that the *French* fully underſtand their import- " ance; and managing for them in their enter- " prizes, will have very great dependence on " their aſſiſtance." I am ſorry the *Engliſh* do not underſtand their importance, and how to manage them as well as the *French*; but it is a fatal truth, that they either do not, or will not; excepting thoſe of *Penſylvania*, who never experienced any treachery from their *Indians*, but have always lived in harmony with them. And, how comes that? the reaſon is plain; becauſe the inhabitants of that province, who are for the moſt part Quakers, acting ſtrictly up to their own and true chriſtian principles, never deprived them of their lands without paying for them, defrauded them of their goods, or gave them any other groſs provocations, as the *Engliſh* of other provinces have done to their *Indians*.

'Tis true, the *Indians* never forgive very grievous injuries till ſatisfaction be made them. The ſame principles influenced the ancient *Greeks* and *Romans*. It is, indeed, the neceſſary reſult of liberty, and ſo inſeparable from it, that wherever it is wanting in any nation, once poſſeſſed of it, it is a ſure ſign that they have degenerated, and are haſtening to their downfal. But altho' a juſt ſenſe of liberty makes the *Indians* impatient of wrongs, the ſimplicity of their manners, and ſtrict attachment to juſtice, renders them cautious of giving offences. In reality, if we look into the hiſtory

of the Colonies, which comes to our hands, tho' very imperfect, and often partial in favour of the *Engliſh*, we ſhall find that all the conſiderable wars or ſlaughters made by the *Indians* in the Colonies, have been owing to the provocations given them, either by ſeizing their lands, or mal-treating them in trade or otherwiſe.

Capt. *Weymouth*, who ſailed for *Virginia* in 1606, landed on *Long Iſland*, and found the natives more affable and courteous than thoſe to the ſouthward; but the adventurers, thro' greedineſs of gain, over-reaching the *Indians* in their traffick, it begat a jealouſy, which, we are told, was the ſource of the many murders and maſſacres which happened afterwards; of which two had like to have ruined the ſettlement in its infancy, the firſt in 1622, when near 400 *Engliſh* were ſlain, the ſecond in 1639, wherein they loſt above 500. This laſt was on account of lands taken from them. The enterprizes of the *Virginia* ſettlers afterwards, in 1670, for making diſcoveries to the weſt of that province, in the *Ohio* country, greatly alarmed them; and believing their deſign was to extirpate them, they endeavoured to cut them off by way of prevention.

The *Engliſh* were in danger of being deſtroyed at their firſt ſettling in *New England* in 1620, on on account of the villainy of one Capt. *Hunt*, who had carried away 20 of the natives but a little before: however, they became reconciled when convinced that *Hunt* was declared a villain by the *Engliſh*. This ſhews that they are not implacable, but content with reaſonable amends: yet the diſorders of ſome of the firſt ſettlers renewed their diſguſt; and the violences committed by their poſterity, when they grew ſtronger, brought the Colony to the brink of ruin more than once, witneſs

witneſs theſe two dreadful wars of the *Pequots* and King *Philip*, the firſt in 1637, the latter in 1676. About the ſame time the *Engliſh*, who had ſettled in the country, eaſt of *Kennebek* river, drew a war on themſelves, in which many were cut off by the *Amonoſkoggin* and *Penobſkot* Indians. Mr. *Neal* ſays * "they cheated the natives in the moſt "open and barefaced manner imaginable, and "treated them like ſlaves."

The *Indians*, eſpecially thoſe of *Sako* and *Amonoſkoggin* complained, that the *Engliſh* refuſed to pay the yearly tribute of corn agreed on in the late articles of peace: that they not only had taken away their lands, but obſtructed their fiſhing in the rivers, and ſent their cattle into their fields to deſtroy their corn: that the governor had granted away their lands, and that the traders made them drunk and cheated them. "Abuſes, "ſays Mr. *Neal*, which thoſe who trade much "with them, are ſeldom innocent of," † and theſe intollerable grievances were retaliated with the moſt ſhocking cruelties, moſtly on the innocent. As almoſt all the calamities of this kind which have afflicted the Colonies, were brought on them chiefly by the inſolence and knavery of the traders, ought not thoſe people to be laid under the ſtricteſt regulations to prevent ſuch evils for the future?

In 1680, *Carolina* Colony was on the point of being ruined by the council abuſing the *Indians*, "whom in prudence, ſays Mr. *Archdale*, (after-"wards himſelf of the council and governor) they "ought to have obliged, in the higheſt degree; "and ſo brought on an *Indian* war, like that in "the firſt planting of *Virginia*, in which many "*Engliſh* were cut off." Yet this did not hinder others

* Hiſt. *New Engl.* Vol. II. p. 24.
† Hiſt. *New Engl.* p. 53.

others from purſuing more injurious meaſures; for about the year 1700, the practice of ſeizing and ſelling *Indians* for ſlaves became more common than ever in this province; nay, governor *Moor* gave commiſſions to people to kill, deſtroy, and take all *Indians* they could for his own profit, which had like to have brought on another *Indian* war. This Colony ſtill continued to abuſe the *Indians* by fraudulent and compulſive dealing in trade, which, at length, about 1718, provoked the *Spaniſh* Indians to begin a new war, cutting off many *Engliſh* in the out ſettlements; who, tho' aſſiſted by other Colonies, were forced to give up their charter, and put themſelves under the protection of *England* before they could quell them. This war continued till 1732, when peace was made. I could, from good authority, mention ſome pranks committed by the traders of *South Carolina* among the *Cherokees* in 1744, which cauſed a great tumult, and might have proved the loſs of thoſe numerous allies: in ſhort, if we may believe Col. *Beverly*, in his hiſtory of *Virginia*, "the *Engliſh* found the *Indians* (in that "country) as in all other places, very fair and "courteous at firſt, till they got more knowledge "of them, and, perhaps, thought themſelves "over-reached." From all which, I think, it appears but too plainly, that the extirpation of the *Indians*, thro' the Colonies, is to be imputed to the faults of the *Engliſh* rather than thoſe of the *Indians*.

In ſhort, we have ſcarce any *Indians* left within the Colonies who are able to be of any ſervice to us; and of thoſe numerous natives, who ſurround them without, we can reckon on none in the northern parts but the ſix nations and their dependents, who are yet the chief defence of the

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northern Colonies againſt the other *Indians*; and in the ſouthern the *Katawbahs* about 300, the *Cherokees* 3 or 4000, the *Chikeſaws* 300, and the *Creeks* 1000; all the reſt are either in the intereſt, or under reſtraint of the *French*; ſuch as the *Mingos* or *Delawars*, the *Shawanons* and *Twigtwees* or *Miyamis*, who inhabit the country of the *Ohio*.

To the diſadvantages above-mentioned, which the Colonies labour under, let us add another, namely, that of their large rivers and waters, over which there is no paſſage, except by ferrys; ſo that the lands between may be entered, either from the ſea or back parts, and the inhabitants of one part plundered before thoſe of another could be able to aſſiſt them. Of this *North Carolina*, in the late war, felt an inſtance; for, in 1748, two *Spaniſh* privateers running up *Cape Fear* river, plundered the town of *Brunſwick*, and carried off ſix veſſels. Another aſcended *Delawar* river to within a few miles of *Philadelphia*. What miſchief might not have been done, had they been daring fellows?

If we paſs from the continent to the iſlands in the *Weſt Indies*, we ſhall find matters ſtill worſe, for the power of the *French* has grown to a ſurprizing degree, by their encroachments on *Hiſpaniola*, and fortifying their iſlands; which they have in greater number than the *Engliſh*, whoſe ſtrength is every where as much decreaſed. *Martinico*, which, about the beginning of this century, was invaded at pleaſure by the *Engliſh*, is now grown exceeding ſtrong both in forts and fighting men, which laſt are ſaid to be 12000; while *Barbadoes*, the chief of the *Caribbee* iſlands, is as much ſunk in its ſtrength as the other is grown. When *du Ruyter* came againſt it in 1675,

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the inhabitants had 10,000 men in arms, beſides ſufficient numbers to take care of the plantations. "Since then, ſays a memorial before me, by "ſickneſs and their practice of employing as few "whites as poſſible, their militia became reduced "to 6000 and 200 horſe, which for many years "was reckoned their complement; but now [in "1732] they ſcarce exceed half that number, "yet ſtill they continue very opulent and tempt-"ing to an enemy: for, from that iſland alone, "on a conqueſt of it, might be had a booty in "Negroes, which, if tranſported, would yield, "among the *Spaniards*, one million *ſterl.* beſides "all other riches."

"The other *Britiſh* iſles ſeem to languiſh like "it, not thro' poverty, but that fatal canker "luxury, and a lawleſs adminiſtration, which "have too generally proved the forerunners of "deſtruction." —— After obſerving that their forts and magazines are not only neglected but ſuffered to run to ruin, the memorialiſt adds, "that if the iſlands are to be preſerved, without "remarkable providences in their favour, it muſt "be by meaſures very different from thoſe which "have been taken of late years."

The reaſon why ſuch ſtrange diſorders have ſo long ſubſiſted in the Colonies is, by the *Americans* ſuppoſed to be their not having come to the knowledge of the government here, thro' the ignorance of ſome men and craft of others, whoſe intereſt it was to conceal them.

In a memorial, now before me, written about the year 1732, by a gentleman of the northern Colonies, after ſetting forth how improbable it is for the people of *Great Britain* to come acquainted with *American* affairs by the common canals of information, "Upon the whole, ſays he,

" it will evidently appear, if we may judge from " the conduct and management of *American* af- " fairs, that they have been very little under- " ſtood, otherwiſe it is ſcarce poſſible to imagine " that they would be ſuffered to run into their " preſent condition."

This is the ſtate of the *Britiſh* Colonies in *America*; by which it appears that every thing which tends to their ſecurity has been neglected, and every thing which tends to their ruin, or to give the *French* advantage of them, purſued. This has been obſerved by the *French* writers themſelves. *Charlevoix* takes notice *, that the *Engliſh* ſurpaſs all other *Europeans* in the art of eſtabliſhing Colonies: but adds, " that they take " very little care to ſecure them againſt a ſur- " prize, or the attack of an enemy. So that, continues he, " if the *French* had as much perſe- " verance, and were as well ſkilled in preſerving, " as hardy and quick in making their conqueſts " in the new world, the crown of *England* would " not by this time, perhaps, have a ſingle inch of " ground in *North America*." Would not one imagine that the *French* have profited by this author's reflection, and are firmly reſolved to correct the fault which he finds in their former conduct?

However that be, he finds another error in the management of the *Engliſh*, already taken notice of. He ſays, " that being mixed with foreigners " of all nations, they apply themſelves wholly " to the cultivation of lands and their commerce, " which renders them unfit for war: and hence, " continues he, proceeds the contempt which " the ſavages have for them; a handful of whom " hath for a long time kept in awe their moſt " populous and flouriſhing Colonies." He adds, " All

* Vol. II. p. 197.

" All their ſecurity lay in our inconſtancy, our " levity, our negligence and want of harmony " among our commanders. It is by this means, " concludes *Charlevoix*, that they have remained " maſters of ſo many important poſts; out " of which we have driven them as often as " we have attacked them." There has been but too much ground for this bravado ſince that author wrote, whatever there might have been before: what is more, he has had not only the ſatisfaction to ſee his remark confirmed by his countrymen driving us out of almoſt all thoſe important poſts again; but alſo the pleaſure to find that they have mended of the fault with which he accuſed them about thirty years ago of not preſerving their Colonies: for to our ſhame be it ſpoken, they have kept every important place which they had taken, and likewiſe greatly improved their advantages by building forts, not only upon, but far within our frontiers.

This is their glory; this is our diſgrace. The point now in queſtion is how to wipe off the ſtain and retrieve our affairs. The proper way, indeed, to remove the external evils, would be to cure the internal one, which was the cauſe of them: but as there is not time ſufficient for that, while the enemy is already at the gates, our firſt care muſt be to drive them from thence, and recover our loſt trade as well as territories: after which let them apply ſeriouſly to reform abuſes within, and put the Colonies on a footing, which may prevent their falling into the ſame unhappy circumſtances any more. Unleſs the laſt of thoſe two expedients be ſtedfaſtly reſolved on we had as good look on ſtill without concern, and ſuffer the *French* to continue their encroachments! for, to what purpoſe will it be to put the nation to a great

expence,

expence, both of blood and treaſure, only to do what *Charlevoix* upbraids his countrymen with having done, loſe in a little time again what may be with great difficulty acquired? As the *French* have mended of that fault, it is hoped their example will prevail on us to mend too.

III.

Means of fruſtrating the French *deſigns, without going to war.*

TO defeat the deſigns of our good neighbours, we have choice of two methods, either (1) to drive them out of their unjuſt acquiſitions by force of arms, as they have entered, or (2) to ſettle and built forts upon them.

If the firſt courſe be purſued (and ſurely we have provocations enough of all kinds to chuſe what courſe we pleaſe) we cannot do better than follow the rules of their own ſcheme; that is, to take their capital *Quebek*, and finiſh the war at once. Preparatory to which, the proper way would be to ſweep all the country ſouth of the river *St. Lawrence*, clear of the *French*, and demoliſh their ſettlements! This is the ſhorteſt, moſt effectual method, and what will put the nation to leaſt expence. Each place affords almoſt the ſame conveniency of being attacked. We may as eaſily conduct ſhips to *Quebek*, as the *French* can to *New York*. The expeditions of *Kirk*, and *Phips* ſhew this; and then an *Engliſh* army muſt take the very ſame rout thro' the country from *New York* to *Quebek*, which the *French* muſt take from *Quebek* to *New York*.

The

The *Engliſh* always looked on the *French* poſſeſſions in *Canada*, as well as *Acadia*, to be an encroachment on their rights. This appears from Queen *Ann*'s manifeſto, publiſhed in *Canada* in 1711, as well as from the *Engliſh* conqueſt and attempts againſt that country, ſet forth in a late pamphlet.*

An expedition of this nature might be effectuated with fewer ſhips and men, than were furniſhed towards the intended expedition in 1747. "and if rightly calculated, well and truly exe- "cuted, in all human probability, to uſe the "words of a propoſal now before me, on this "ſubject, could not fail of ſucceſs, and would "acquire to *Britain* all ſhe wants on the conti- "nent of *North America*. The whole ſea coaſt "on the *Atlantic* ocean, and fiſhery, from *Florida*, "as far north as it is habitable, as well as all the in- "land country throughout its now unknown ex- "tent, would be hers: every *Indian* would be "cloathed with her manufactures; and every "beaſt be her property: all his majeſty's ſub- "jects, in that part of the world, would dwell in "peace; and, by their natural encreaſe, become "ſuch a nurſery of people to him, and his ſucceſ- "ſors, that from thence they may raiſe a force (per- "haps in leſs than half a century) which, by a "right direction, might be able to put them in "poſſeſſion of any ſouthern colony, now in the "hands of our enemies." After removing the inhabitants to *Europe*, part of the country may be cantoned out in property to the ſoldiers who ſerved in the expedition, or otherwiſe diſpoſed of; fur

* See the Conduct of the *French* with regard to *Nova Scotia*.

and the fur and peltry trade alone, in a few years, would defray the expence of the expedition with intereſt.

In caſe *Canada* was attacked, the ſettled inhabitants or planters, who having been originally *Huguenots*, are ſtill ſuſpected, are obliged to till the ground and undergo other hard labour, would probably join the *Engliſh*. The *French* troops themſelves are ſo miſerably kept, and ſo weary of the country as well as of the drudgery they go through, that with proper encouragement of places to ſettle in they might be brought to deſert to us in great numbers; as they did in the late war, and have done alſo ſince the preſent bickerings began, by 20 or 30 at a time. For this reaſon, in caſe an expedition ſhould at any time be reſolved on, it would be proper to diſperſe manifeſtos among the *French*; promiſing them good lands and the privileges of *Engliſhmen*, if they would come and ſettle amongſt us: ſhould this take effect, it would be an eaſy way of putting an end to the war, and the *French* colonies at once.

The *French* commanders at *Quebek*, to prevent the deſertion of their ſoldiers, have at times propoſed to the colonies not to receive deſerters; or elſe to give them up afterwards in exchange for other priſoners: but they have always wiſely rejected a meaſure which tended only to benefit the *French* and hurt themſelves. Indeed no propoſal made by the *French* ought to be accepted till it be firſt maturely weighed and conſidered; for it is a maxim with them never to make any by which they do not gain abundantly more than they loſe.

The *Engliſh* in *America* have loſt many opportunities of taking *Canada*, and driving the *French* quite out, when they were not the ſixth part ſo

ſtrong as they are now. In 1688, when their whole force was ſcarce 2000 men, the *Six Nations*, (then only five) to be revenged on the *Marquis de Nouville*, who had invaded the *Senneka*'s country the year before, ſurprized the iſland of *Montreal*, which they entered on the ſouth ſide, they burnt all the plantations, and maſſacred above 1000 *French* people, beſides carrying away 26 priſoners, the greater part of whom were burnt alive. The five nations loſt no more than three men in this expedition, who got drunk and were left behind. In *October* following they invaded *Montreal* a ſecond time, and having deſtroyed the lower part of the iſland, carried away many priſoners. If only *New York* had performed her engagements at this time to the five nations; or they had underſtood the method of attacking forts, 1688 would have been as memorable in *America* for the deſtruction of *Canada*, as it is in *Great Britain* for the baniſhment of arbitrary power.

The revolution which happened at the time when the five nations triumphed over *Canada*, ſeemed to be a favourable conjunction for them. It is but reaſonable to think, that having been too powerful for the *French* when aſſiſted by all the weſtern *Indian* nations, and the *Engliſh* ſtood neuter, that now when thoſe nations had made peace with them, and the *Engliſh* joined in the war, the *French* would not be able to ſtand one campaign: but the party diviſions which enſued, at a time when harmony might have been expected, occaſioned by the bad choice of governors ſent over, loſt them that opportunity alſo *. There were ſeveral other opportunities of diſtreſ-

* *Colden*'s Hiſt. of the Five Nations, p. 91, 94.

ſing,

ſing, and perhaps of diſabling, if not of quite ſubduing the enemy, had the ſouthern colonies, as by treaty obliged, aſſiſted, between that year and the peace of *Ryſwick* in 1697, during which time the five nations continued the war alone againſt *Canada*, and often ravaged its borders as far as the river St. *Laurence*, keeping the *French* all the while in continual alarms and inexpreſſible terror. They had ſo great an antipathy to them at that time, that tho' greatly reduced by the war they would have had the *Engliſh* to continue it till they had completed the conqueſt of *Canada*, in which they affirmed there was no manner of difficulty. But the colonies were then blind to their intereſt, and thoſe times are no more. If we would drive out the *French* at this time of day, we muſt employ a very large force, and expect great oppoſition.

'Tis true great forces, even more than neceſſary were employed in the expeditions of 1690 and 1710, the firſt under Sir *William Phips*, the ſecond under General *Nicholſon*; yet both miſcarried, one by very ſilly, the other by very bad, if not, as ſome will have it by very wicked management: for the force which was in the fleet, in the opinion of the beſt judges, was ſufficient not only to have taken *Quebek*, but to have driven the *French* out of all their ſettlements in *America*. The *New England* hiſtorian ſays, this expedition failed "by the treachery of thoſe who were at "the head of it;" and Mr. *Harley* in his letter to Queen *Anne*, accuſes the managers with ſetting it on foot partly to put 20,000 pounds in their pockets; which ſecret he ſays was diſcovered on the fleet's return. With reſpect to *Phips*'s conduct, *La Hontan*, who was then at *Quebek*, ſays,

" It was ſo bad, that he could not have done leſs " than he did if he had been hired by the *French* " to ſtand ſtill with his hands in his pockets: " that if they had come directly againſt the town " it would have ſurrendered, having had only " 12 great guns, very little ammunition, and " few forces: but they were ſo dilatory in their " conſultations at a diſtance, that the *French* had " time to reinforce the place, which Sir *William* " bombarded with four veſſels and did damage " to the value of five or ſix piſtoles." The miſcarriage was owing likewiſe to his ſetting out too late in the year, and the 2500 land forces, from *Albany*, who were to attack *Montreal* in order to divide the *French* forces, not proceeding.

How the late expedition, ſet on foot in 1746, would have ſucceeded in caſe it had gone forward, there is no poſſibility of determining: but in all probability the reduction of *Canada* was not really intended at this time, by the government here. However, ſome amends would have been made for the great expence which this ſtratagem put the nation to, in caſe the colonies had taken the *French* fort at *Crown-point*, as was intended, with the forces which they had raiſed: but as it owed its foundation to miſunderſtandings among the governments; ſo the ſame cauſe prevented its being demoliſhed, when there was a fair opportunity for doing it: and this muſt generally be the caſe till there is a union eſtabliſhed among them, at leaſt for their mutual defence.

If the ſecond method be choſen, in order if poſſible to prevent an open war, our buſineſs will be to follow the example of the *French* in this alſo; and build forts on our own frontiers as well as they, and at a ſmall diſtance from theirs (in the ſame manner as they have done at *Shegnikto*

in

in *Nova Scotia)* in all places where they have incroached on our territories: but this muſt be done under cover of ſtrong forces; for to be ſure they will not ſuffer it, if they can poſſibly prevent it. But ſuppoſing the thing poſſible to be effected without coming to blows, we muſt not ſtop here, but muſt go on ſettling and building ſtrong forts in all the countries which we lay claim to, and intend to keep: barely making ſettlements will not do, as ſome have imagined, however able we may be to out-ſettle them. The weakneſs of this notion has been proved to our coſt; ſince we find the *French* have in one ſeaſon, broken up above 160 families of ſettlements and reſidents which we had in the weſtern parts of *Virginia*, along the *Ohîo* and other rivers, and even taken the fort which we had raiſed. But it is not to be imagined that they would have ventured to attack thoſe ſettlements had they been well ſecured by forts erected in proper places; much leſs have made ſo great a progreſs in ſo ſhort a time.

If therefore we would ſecure our *American* dominions againſt the *French*, we muſt *out-fort*, as well as *out-ſettle* them. Our colonies are in a worſe condition by far than is generally believed, or can well be conceived, unable to hurt their invaders or defend themſelves; while the *French* have forts every where, and we have forts, in a manner, no where.

The number of forts neceſſary to be built for ſecuring the colonies muſt be eſtimated by the number of forts already built by the *French* on our frontiers, and the places proper for fortifying, which they have left unoccupied, which are indeed very few; ſo induſtrious they have been to

anticipate us in an article of ſuch infinite concern to our plantations.

As the country of the *Ohîo* is in ſo much danger of being wreſted from us; and its being well ſecured of ſo much importance to all the colonies in general, north, ſouth and middle, as hath been already ſet forth: if ever it comes into our hands again, it ought to be well fortified by building forts in convenient places along the river, eſpecially at each extremity; that is, one at the mouth of the *Ohîo* on the *Miſſiſſippi*, and another at *Niawgra* near the lake *Ontario*: this laſt will prevent the communication of *Louiſiana* with *Canada* by that lake and the *Erri*, and oblige the *French* to abandon their forts on the ſouth eaſt ſide of this laſt lake, by rendering them uſeleſs, as well as ſave us the expence of erecting a fort at *Tierondoquot*, on the lake of *Ontario*, about 60 miles to the eaſt of the *Niawgra* ſtrait: a place which they have long had their eye upon for building a fort, and which we might be under a neceſſity of fortifying in caſe the *French* remain at *Niawgra*, in order to prevent their taking poſſeſſion of it, as they did once already in 1687, altho' it was but for a ſhort time: and this doubtleſs was the reaſon which made governor *Clarke* of *New York* ſo earneſt to have that place fortified.

In effect a *French* fort there would prove no leſs dangerous to *New York*, than that at *Crown-Point*; as it would give them admiſſion into the country of the *Sennekas*, the moſt powerful of the ſix nations: among whom they have already gotten ſome footing by means of the *Niawgra* fort and their prieſts; and whoſe defection, conſidering their influence, might be a means of our loſing the friendſhip of the other five.

The

The fort at the mouth of the *Ohîo*, ought to be ſtrongly built and garriſoned, and a conſiderable ſettlement made about it: after this ſettlements might be gradually carried on between the *Miſſiſſippi*, and the *Alliganey* mountains, backwards and forwards, at the ſame time. Nor can too much encouragement be given to ſettle this country, eſpecially on the ſide of the *Miſſiſſippi*, as quick as poſſible, by allowing people liberty to ſettle how and where they pleaſe, without making large grants to any company; an obſtacle which has hindered ſettling more than any other thing, and on many accounts proved greatly detrimental to the colonies; by raiſing the price of lands to an exorbitant degree, which beſides the dangerous evil of enriching a few and impoveriſhing many, has been attended with one ſtill more pernicious, that is of weakening the colonies by leaving near half of ſome of them unpeopled.

This fort and ſettlement would effectually exclude the *French* from paſſing into the weſtern parts of *Virginia*, by the *Ohîo* and its branches: But as they have two forts on the *Wabaſh*, one at its mouth on the *Ohîo*, and another about the middle of that river, it would be proper to have two others built in oppoſition to them: the ſecond in the part where it draws near the river of the *Ilinois* or *Chiktaghiks*. Should we go a little farther and erect another on this laſt river, in the neighbourhood of the former, it would entirely cut off their communication this way between *Louiſiana* and *Canada*; and oblige them to go ſo far about, as to diſcourage them, with all their ſanguine views and perſeverance, from ever hoping to compaſs their ſo much deſired project of joining their two colonies, on this ſide of the *Miſſiſſippi*.

The country to the ſouth of the *Ohio*, would be in good meaſure ſecured by the fort built at the mouth of it, which will hinder their paſſage into the *Hogehege*, or river of the *Charokees*, dividing the country of theſe *Indians* on the north from *Virginia*. However, more effectually to ſecure it, and at the ſame time cover the country of the *Charokees*, it would be proper to build one at the falls a little below the place where the *Peleſipi* or *Clinches* river joins it, in the north weſt borders of the *Charokees*; and another eſpecially, in the heart of the country poſſeſſed by thoſe people, who have long applied with great earneſtneſs to the governor of *Carolina* for that purpoſe, repreſenting the danger which otherwiſe there was of the *French* doing the ſame: and it is well, if thro' this unpardonable neglect, the *French* in caſe they ſhould be forced out of the back parts of *Virginia*, do not in their return to *New Orleans*, put that deſign in execution: as to be ſure they will in caſe they keep poſſeſſion of what they have already uſurped, in order to prevent any attempts on our ſide to ſecure that country to us. By a like pernicious remiſſneſs, or ſomething elſe, were they ſuffered ſince the year 1715 to build the fort *Toulouſe* on the river *Alibamous*, not far from the country of the *Creek Indians*, and the borders of *Georgia*; which frontier, tho' not yet ſufficient fortified, has balked their views of carrying on their chain of forts on that ſide to the Atlantic ocean, which before that colony was founded they thought themſelves ſure of effecting whenever they pleaſed, and therefore made the leſs haſte to accompliſh it.

Theſe forts might ſerve at preſent to fortify the ſouthern provinces of our *American* dominions; with regard to our northern, the firſt thing which

demands our attention is the ſecurity of *New York* and its province. This will be, in good meaſure, done by the fort to be built at *Niawgra*, and that already built at *Oſwégo*, in the country of the ſix nations, at the ſouth eaſt end of the lake *Kadarakai* or *Ontario*, almoſt due ſouth of the *French* fort of *Frontenac*, on the north eaſt corner of the ſame lake about 70 miles diſtant. But this fort, which is the only one we have for defence of our back ſettlements for many hundred miles, till we come to *Georgia*, ought to be much enlarged, ſtrongly fortified, and furniſhed with a pretty numerous garriſon, as it is of great conſequence by its ſituation, to both the ſecurity and trade of our northern colonies; it being our north weſtern frontier and the only place or opening left by which the *Indians* can come to us with their furs. For this reaſon, till ſuch time as our neighbours ſhall be obliged by either fair means or foul to allow them a free paſſage thro' the lakes, it will be neceſſary to build a veſſel or two, capable of mounting guns, for the conveniency of carrying them backwards and forwards acroſs the lake; which expedient will go a great way to fruſtrate the deſign of the *French* and recover our trade.

And here it is worth obſerving that this fort of *Oſwégo*, built by governor *Burnet* in 1727, by favour of the *Indians*, ſtood unmoleſted all the laſt war; and altho' the garriſon uſually conſiſts of no more than an officer and 23 men, has been of more ſervice and benefit than all the reſt, altho' now it muſt be in imminent danger. This is a demonſtrative proof of the great importance and advantage of ſuch forts, on the number of which ſmall garriſons, properly placed, the intereſt

tereſt and ſupport of the *French* almoſt wholly depend.

However more effectually to ſecure *New York*, a ſtrong fort ought to be built in view of the *French* fort at *Crown-Point*. By means of this poſt they may be enabled to intercept, or at leaſt diſturb the trade from *Albaney* up the *Mohoks* river, a branch of *Hudſon*'s, to the ſix nations, by ſending a force on that ſide; and could they deſtroy the commerce of thoſe *Indians* with the province of *New York*, they would oblige them to depend wholly on *Canada*; a thing which they threatened to have done in 1732.

During the late *French* war from 1744 to 48, *Crown-Point* was the rendezvous of the *Canada*, *French* and their *Indians*, from whence they attacked *New York* and the north weſt corner of *Maſſachuſet*'s bay. From this place in 1745 they deſtroyed *Saratoga* ſettlement on *Hudſon*'s river, about 30 miles above *Albaney*. In which parts during that and the two following years they killed and captivated above 300 of our people *; deſtroying moſt of the inhabitants and plantations on the north eaſt branch of that river. In former wars the attack on *New England* was from the north eaſtward, in the war of 1746 it was from *Crown-Point*. *New York* government in former *French* wars did not ſuffer, but in this laſt they ſuffered much †; that is, they were puniſhed for ſuffering that fort to be built. Beſides building this counter fort, *Albaney* ought to be put in the beſt poſture of defence imaginable, in order to ſecure it againſt any attempts on that

* *Dougl.* Summary, *North Amer.* vol. ii. p. 246.
† The ſame, Vol. i. p. 316.

ſide.

ſide. This quarter requires the ſtrongeſt barriers, becauſe the *French* have declared it to be the chief object of their views; and it lies ſo near *Quebek* the center of all their ſtrength in *Canada*, from which they have a moſt convenient paſſage all by water, excepting a ſmall ſpace of about 12 miles by land.

Mr. *Callieres* who firſt propoſed the project for the conqueſt of this city, to induce *Lewis* XIV. to comply with their earneſt deſires, ſays in his Memoirs to the *French* miniſters, "That this "conqueſt would make the king maſter of one "of the fineſt ports in *America*, which they "might enter at all times; and a moſt beautiful "country, in a mild and fertile climate!" No wonder ſo inviting a deſcription as this, ſhould ſet the *French* of *Canada* a longing for *New York:* but ought not that longing of theirs to make us more earneſt to preſerve it?

By theſe fortifications *New England* will be pretty well ſecured on the weſt ſide, as it will on the eaſt by thoſe already built, and the two now building on the river *Kennebek*, one by the province, the other by the proprietors of the *Kennebek* purchaſe; whoſe generous example it is hoped will animate others to do the like, and not let them ſtop, till they have erected a fortreſs on the very banks of St. *Laurence* river, which is within their limits. Mean time, as the laſt of the two new forts, has been founded ſo high as the *Takonnek* falls, and the north part of *New England* lies wholly expoſed to the ravages of an enemy; it is not to be doubted but that they will not delay to build a third at the head of the *Kennebek* itſelf, in the carrying place; not above four miles over, where it locks with the river called by the *French La Chaudiere*; which falls into the St. *Laurence* four

four or five leagues to the ſouth weſt of *Quebek*. This fort ſhould be ſtrongly built, and furniſhed from *Britain* with a garriſon of 500 ſtout men: unleſs this be done, the building thoſe two forts will only ſerve to put the *French* in mind of doing it. And from their conduct it may be judged, that a ſmaller occaſion would ſerve them for a pretence.

The building a fort here is the more neceſſary on three accounts; (1) as it will bridle the *Abenaki Indians* in the intereſt of the *French*, and hinder them from ever attempting any thing againſt *New England*; this having always been the place of rendezvous for both on ſuch occaſions. It will alſo prevent their going on the *Ohio* expedition; and thoſe reſtraints, by degrees, be a means of their coming over to our intereſt. (2) As it lies near the heads of the rivers *St. Francis* and *St. John*, as well as of the *Kennebek* and *La Chaudiere* before-mentioned: ſo that it will have the command of four very important rivers, two of which fall into the *St. Laurence*; the *Chaudiere* towards *Kebek*, and the *St. Francis* towards *Montreal*. (3) As it will help to cover not only the northern borders of *New England*, but alſo thoſe of *New York*, from which it will not be far diſtance. I may venture to ſay, that the good effect of this fort will extend as far as *Annapolis Royal*, and the town of *Halifax* in *Nova Scotia*; by cutting off all ſupplies of men and ſtores to the *French* in that country, by *St. John*'s river, which will oblige them to abandon their forts lately built at the mouth of it. The *Kennebek* company in full expectation of this deſirable event, have already given land to 100 men and their families, to ſettle the country thereabout, under pro-

protection of the two forts newly built upon that river.

How different is the practice in ſome colonies to this generous publick-ſpirited conduct of the *Kennebek* proprietors! The aſſembly of *New York*, in their addreſs to governor *de Lancey*, the 20th of *Auguſt* laſt, complains, "that other colonies "make themſelves ſtrong and defenſible, by ſet-"tling in townſhips, or ſome other cloſe order. "While our frontier lands are granted away in "patents almoſt without bounds or number, re-"gardleſs of ſettlements, or the publick welfare." And in a ſtate of the *Britiſh* ſettlements, now in view, we are told, that even "the lands between "*New York* itſelf and *Albany*, on both ſides of "*Hudſon*'s river, by an abuſe which ought to be "remedied, *viz. the old exorbitant grants*, are but "thinly inhabited; altho' lands for ſettlement in "that colony are *extremely* wanted, and thoſe "tracts would ſoon be purchaſed, if they could "be had at any tolerable rates."

This unpeopled ſtate of the country is of ſo much the worſe conſequence, ſince in caſe the *French* ſhould attack *Albany* and *New York* at the ſame time, one by ſea and the other by land, conformably to their plan, from whence, could *Albany* be reinforced? the country has not men to ſupply it, nor could *York*, in ſuch a caſe, be able to ſpare any. On this occaſion the memorial of 1732, obſerves, "that when the preſent ſtate of *New York* "and the power of thoſe neighbours [the *French*] "is well underſtood, it will too evidently appear, "that they will, on a rupture, be under unhap-"py circumſtances; and with them the other co-"lonies muſt be deeply involved." Such en-feebling grants therefore are of pernicious ten-dency every where, but no where ſo much as in

pro-

province of *New York*; which being the key of all the other colonies, and moſt expoſed to our northern neighbours, who for theſe reaſons covet it, all means which can be thought of conducive either to its improvement or ſecurity, ought to be applied; and every the leaſt obſtacle to either ought to be removed.

After the words cited from the aſſembly's addreſs, they juſtly remark, "we can erect forts and "block-houſes, but to what end? woods and "uncultivated tracts are not the objects of ſecu-"rity. Induſtry is to be protected, and mens "perſons to be defended; otherwiſe little good "will accrue to the publick, be the expence what "it will." 'Tis true, there can be no proſpect of ſettling a country while ſuch diſcouraging grants are in the way: but were thoſe obſtacles removed, under the protection of ſuch forts as have been propoſed, in a very ſhort time we might hope to ſee this part well inhabited, and conſequently the ſtrongeſt barrier (as it ought to be) in the *Engliſh American* dominions againſt the *French*.

With regard to *Nova Scotia*, including the country to the eaſt of *Kennibek* river, it will require ſeveral forts and ſettlements to ſecure it, not only at the mouths of the three principal rivers *Penobſkot*, *La Croix*, and *St. John*'s, at which laſt there are two *French* forts: but alſo at certain poſts along thoſe rivers, particularly this laſt; which beginning not far from the head of the *Kennibek*, and paſſing with a circular courſe, encompaſſeth the greater and moſt valuable part of all the country; ſo that thoſe forts will keep both *French* and *Indians* in awe; as they will have an eaſy communication by water among themſelves, and with the ſettlements on the other rivers, travelling only a little way by land.

Above

Above all, care muſt be taken to build a ſtrong fort at *Shegnikto* on ſome elevated ground to the north of the *French* fort, which may both command and exceed it in force; for the preſent fort is ſo weak, and ill ſituated, that the garriſon would be obliged to ſurrender almoſt at the firſt ſhot; ſo that in caſe of a war we ſhould have no chance there. Nor will this be enough: it will be neceſſary for ſecuring it to have two forts more; one at *Bay Verte* to prevent our neighbours from invading the country at pleaſure, that being their landing place from *Canada*; and one of the two ways by which they enter and correſpond with *Nova Scotia*.: *St. John*'s river, as before-mentioned, is the other, by which (ſays *La Hontan*) the inhabitants of thoſe two countries may hear from each other in 16 or 17 days, tho' not in a month by ſea.

The ſecond fort ought to be erected at the entrance into *Shegnikto* baſon or harbour; for, ſhould the *French* build one there, they would exclude all acceſs to it by ſea.

But, as the erecting ſo many forts at once in this province (of *Nova Scotia*) may be thought too expenſive a work, it may be ſufficient for the preſent, only to build ſome along the river *St. John* and thoſe at *Shegnikto*.

By ſuch a number of forts and ſettlements as I have mentioned, may the *Britiſh* territories be effectually ſecured, the *French* kept at a diſtance, and our trade in good meaſure recovered by paſſages opened for the *Indians* to come and trade with the colonies; which will likewiſe be at liberty to extend their ſettlements on all ſides, in ſpite of any oppoſition which the *French* can give them; or rather without danger of any from them: for, by means of theſe forts a much ſtronger line of cir-

circumvallation will be formed againſt them, than they at preſent have againſt us.

You will ſay, perhaps, that I have cut out a fine expenſive work for the colonies. It will be expenſive, there is no doubt of that: but, what can be done, ſuppoſing fewer forts will not be ſufficient to ſecure them? If therefore the burthen falls heavy, they may thank their own miſmanagements. Had forts been gradually built on their frontiers, and as they extended their out ſettlements, after the example of the *French*, a thing which ought to have been done, the charge would not have been felt. As this has been neglected, that muſt be done at once, which ſhould have been done at different times. Beſides, the expence is greatly augmented by their having ſuffered the *French* to build upon them, every where. At firſt a few forts erected in proper places would have ſerved the purpoſe, and their neighbours finding the poſſeſſions ſecured, might never have thought of diſturbing them: But ſeeing the countries lie open, and the colonies careleſs thro' a vain ſecurity, or worſe, covetouſneſs, they were invited to enter, and puniſh their neglect in the manner they have done.

The *French* too unwilling either to quit the poſſeſſion of what they have gotten, no matter how unjuſtly, or loſe the great expences which they have been at to build ſo many forts, will doubtleſs diſpute every inch of ground as long as they can, and when driven out of one place fortify another, with a view, if poſſible, to tire us out.

No wonder, then, that the expence to the colonies of ſecuring themſelves, ſhould be very great; but if it was to be the double of what it may be, they ought not to repine, but undergo it with chearfulneſs, ſince they have brought it all upon

upon themſelves; in ſhort, if they would preſerve their poſſeſſions, they have no other alternative, but either to erect a ſufficient number of forts, or go to war. If this method ſucceeds, it will not only be much better than a war, which is attended with numerous hazards and calamities, but we ſhall be great gainers by it, ſince we ſhall ſave the expence of a war, whereas an expenſive war, altho' ſucceſsful, would not ſave us this expence. For forts would then be as neceſſary to preſerve the colonies, as they are now. It will ſignify nothing to drive the *French* out of a country, if we do not ſecure it; for, as they never give up the thoughts of what they have once poſſeſſed, they will certainly return to it whenever they find an opportunity. Witneſs their frequent returns into *Nova Scotia*, as often as they have been forced out. That method then is moſt elegible, which would ſave us one of thoſe expences. However, we had better be at both, than loſe ſuch valuable colonies, which are the principal fund of wealth to *England*.

After all, the expence will not be ſo very great as may at firſt ſight be imagined. I have been informed by gentlemen, knowing in theſe matters, that ſuch forts might be built at the rate of a thouſand pounds each, one with another. So that ſuppoſing their number amounted to 30 or even 40, what is that expence to put the colonies in a good poſture of defence? But perhaps, at preſent, or at firſt, it may be ſufficient to ſecure the northern borders of our colonies, from the mouth of the river *Ohio* to the head of the *Kennebek*, and then about nine forts might do; two on the *Ohio*, one at its mouth in the *Miſſiſſippi*, and the other at the mouth of the *Wabaſh*: a third higher-up on the *Wabaſh*, a fourth at *Niawgre*, a

fifth at *Crown Point*, and a ſixth at the head of the *Kennibek*; a ſeventh at the mouth of *St. John*'s river, and an eighth at *Shegnikto*: to theſe let us add a ninth in the country of the *Charokees*. Thus for about 10 or 11,000 pounds, allowing the ſurplus towards building ſome ſtronger than ordinary, may the colonies be tolerably well defended with forts againſt any attempts of the *French* to hinder them from compleating their deſign of gradually fortifying their frontiers effectually: which ought to be done as ſoon as poſſible, beginning at the ſame time at the two extremities of the *Northern* line, where the ſtrongeſt forts of all ought to be built, under the protection of ſtrong bodies of forces.

To ſupport what has been advanced concerning the expence of building forts, I ſhall cite the words of an *American* gentleman well verſed in the affairs of the colonies, in a letter written a few years ago to his friend in *London*. "The "charge, ſays he, of building forts neceſſary for "the above purpoſes, if eſtimated by the ex- "pence and ſize of thoſe of *Europe*, or thoſe on "the ſea-coaſts of the principal towns in *America*, "which may be attacked by ſhips and cannon, "may make theſe propoſals ſeem impracticable. "Therefore, it may be proper to ſhew what the "forts already built there coſt the *Engliſh* and "*French*, with how many men they are uſually "garriſoned, from which their maintenance may "be computed; and that ſuch have generally "been ſufficient for the intention. In 1734, "*New York* built a fort at *Skenéctadi*, with "eight pieces of ſmall cannon, well contrived for "defence againſt ſmall arms (the only weapons "*Indians* can have) and capable of containing "above 200 men, which coſt leſs than one thou-

"ſand

" ſand pounds. The year after, another of the
" ſame model and ſize was built among the *Ma-*
" *quas* [or *Mohawk*] *Indians* for as ſmall a ſum:
" That at *Oſwégo*, by reaſon of the diſtance, coſt
" a trifle more. *Fort Moor*, in *South Carolina*,
" and *Fort Auguſta* in *Georgia*, by no juſt means
" could exceed either of the other, as they are
" not ſo well built, and are worſe planned. The
" *French* forts at *Niawgra*, *Detroit* and *Alba-*
" *hamy*, are much like them; and the number
" of private men of both nations, in each of theſe
" garriſons, are nearly equal, from 20 to 30.
" But the *French* always have moſt officers.
" *Crown Point*, as it is deſigned for a perpetual
" barrier between the *Engliſh* and *French*, as well
" as to cover *Canada* and *Mont Real* from inva-
" ſions which may be attempted on that ſide, is
" ſtronger, and built in a different manner."

What number of forces may be neceſſary on this occaſion, I will not pretend to preſcribe: But whatever it may be, they ought to be furniſhed all at once for carrying on the work in different parts at the ſame time, and preventing any attempt of our bad neighbours (for we muſt not call them enemies yet) in one place, while we are employed in ſtrengthning another. We ſhould have regular forces in the country much ſuperior to thoſe of the *French*, that in caſe of a loſs on our ſide, or recruits on theirs, our people may be quickly reinforced and ſupported. The colonies themſelves will, no doubt, chearfully furniſh the greater part of theſe forces, eſpecially if they be officered by their own people; a meaſure the more proper, as it would prevent miſunderſtandings (always fatal to military expeditions) which might happen to ariſe between officers and troops of different countries: for ſoldiers will more readily obey

their natural commanders; and this regard ſhewn, the latter will make them more zealous to repulſe the *French*, againſt whom they are highly exaſperated. They are likewiſe better acquainted with the ſituation of the country, as well as with the diſpoſition of their people, and with the manner of proceeding againſt their enemies of both kinds.

In theſe preparations the utmoſt diligence is abſolutely neceſſary, conſidering what alarming accounts arrive every day of the diſtreſſed condition of the colonies, their apprehenſions of the *French*, who are drawing out forces on every ſide, and of the little which hath been yet done, or preparations made to oppoſe them: ſomething therefore ought to be undertaken this winter, to give a check to their proceedings, whether it be by building two or three forts of our own, or demoliſhing ſo many of theirs. For, conſidering the enterprizing ſpirit and indefatigable diligence of thoſe people (which deſerve both our praiſe and imitation) if nothing can be done till next ſummer, as ſome would pretend, it will give the *French*, who are already very ſtrong, leiſure enough to fortify themſelves ſo effectually, that it may require at leaſt five times the force and expence which it would at preſent, whether we only proceed to fortify our colonies, or are obliged to enter into an open war.

IV. *The*

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The defenceleſs condition of the colonies, to what owing.

SUCH meaſures cloſely purſued and well executed, will, doubtleſs, procure a temporary relief: But, in order to make the ſecurity effectual and laſting, two things muſt be antecedently done.

The firſt is to bring about a union of the colonies among themſelves, for their mutual ſupport. And happily at laſt, the danger which now threatens them has opened their eyes, and diſpoſed them to unite: ſo that this intruſion of their neighbours, whatever it may coſt them, in caſe they can get over it, will, in the end, prove a bleſſing inſtead of a curſe.

On this occaſion I cannot forbear obſerving, that the conſternation which the preſent bold invaſion of the *French* into the country of the *Ohio*, has thrown the colonies into, ought to be a perpetual warning to them how they act for the future; ſince they muſt now be convinced that by neglecting the proper means of uniting for their mutual defence, and fortifying their out-ſettlements, as well as frontiers, they may be reduced at length to the neceſſity of ſubmitting to either a foreign or a domeſtic yoke.

A ſtate may be ruined by the ill conduct of either the people or their governors: which muſt be the caſe, when one party, led by corrupt principles, and regardleſs of the admonitions or diſcontents of the other, act wholly in conformity to their own ſelfiſh or rapacious views, and obſtinately refuſe to do what is neceſſary for the good

of the whole. It is thus that governments are overturned or nations enſlaved.

A union of the colonies has been recommended by none more zealouſly than the *American* gentlemen themſelves, who have wiſhed their welfare. Without one, they never can be ſecure from ſuch incompatible neighbours as the *French*; and 'tis chiefly to the want of this union that they owe their preſent calamitous ſituation: for, being in a ſtate of ſeparation, and each acting ſolely for its own intereſt, without regard to the welfare or ſafety of the reſt; this naturally begat jealouſies, envyings, animoſities, and even a diſpoſition to do one another miſchief rather than good. Thus at variance, as it were, like enemies among themſelves, one province beheld, without concern, a neighbour province attacked and ravaged by the enemy, and refuſed lending any aid of either men or money, under pretence, that the danger did not affect them; that the other provinces had more trade than theirs; and that every province ought to take care of itſelf.

Some of the provinces immediately dependent on the crown have refuſed to aſſiſt the charter governments, which has given thoſe colonies a kind of antipathy, and made them averſe to aſſiſt ſuch bad relations. *New York* eſpecially has been guilty of this unneighbourly and unnatural part.

" *New York*, ſays Mr. *Dummer*, in his repre-
" ſentation, has always kept itſelf in a ſtate of neu-
" trality, contributing nothing to the common
" ſafety of the *Britiſh* colonies; while the *Canada*
" *Indians* joined by parties of the *French*, uſed to
" make their rout by the borders of *New York*,
" without any moleſtation from the *Engliſh* of
" that province, and fall upon the out-towns of

" *New*

" *New England.* This behaviour was the more " unpardonable in that government, becauſe they " have 400 regular troops maintained among " them, at the King's charge, and have five na- " tions of the *Iroquois* on their confines, who " are entirely dependent on them; and might " eaſily, had they been engaged in the common " cauſe, have intercepted the *French* in their " marches, and thereby prevented the depreda- " tions on his majeſty's ſubjects of *New England.* " Solemn and repeated applications were made " to the government of *New York*, by the go- " vernors of the *Maſſachuſets*, *Connecticut*, and " *Rhode Iſland*, in their letters on this ſubject, " but in vain: the anſwer was, *They could not* " *think it proper to engage their* Indians *in actual* " *war, leſt they ſhould endanger their own fron-* " *tiers, and bring on themſelves an expence which* " *they were in no condition to provide for.*"

However, this ſacrificing of their brethren did not ſave themſelves; for the *French*, after they had done harraſſing the borders of *New England*, and deſtroying many of the inhabitants, then fell on *New York*; and that government which refuſed to ſuccour their neighbours, for fear of provoking the *French*, as they pretended, by no leſs bad a ſtep, proceeding from the ſame real cauſe, which was covetouſneſs, brought that very evil on the province which they ſeemed ſo careful to avoid: for by ſuffering the *French* to build the fort at *Crown-Point*, within their frontiers, in 1731, as hath been mentioned, they in effect gave up their chief ſecurity on that ſide into their hands. This they experienced to their coſt three years after: when being ſenſibly alarmed with the motions of the *French* and *Indians* on their frontiers, they found themſelves obliged to be

at near 12,000 pounds charge at once, to provide towards their defence; which they might have ſaved by only laying out a few hundreds to prevent the enemy from falling on *New England*, and building that dangerous fort. Ever ſince which time they have been under the greateſt apprehenſions; and none cry out louder now for aid from their neighbours, than they who ſo lately refuſed to lend them any. A juſt puniſhment which is always the conſequence of acting againſt the eſtabliſhed maxims of obligation and ſafety.

That ſame ſelfiſh ſpirit which induced them to diſregard their brethern, at length ſo far poſſeſſed them as to make them forget themſelves, and not only neglect to ſecure their reſpective frontiers, but even to ſuffer the *French* to build forts in thoſe very places where they ought to have erected them for their own ſecurity. So that it may be in a manner ſaid that all the encroachments which they now complain of were made with their own conſent.

But I cannot better ſet forth the pernicious effects of this diſunion than in the words of the Gentleman quoted before, to his friend in *London*, a few years ago. "The *Britiſh* colonies are without union, are diſconcerted, are jealous of each "other, and act on different principles as well as "intereſts. Some colonies have borne the burthens of all wars, whilſt others have had peace "and protection without expence: ſome have "even grown rich by ſupplying the enemies of "its neighbour in actual war. Very few colonies "know their own bounds. In 1731 *New England* and *New York*, for that reaſon, tamely ſaw "*Crown Point* fortified, the conſequence of which "has very lately been felt. In 1726 *New York* "and *Penſylvania* permitted *Niawgra* to be poſ-

"ſeſſed

" ſeſſed and garriſoned, and very probably will " ſuffer *Tierondoquot* to undergo the ſame fate, " as it is not known to which province it be- " longs."

That the colonies have contributed much to their preſent unhappy ſituation, is a fact acknowledged by all the *American* writers I have met with who treat on this ſubject. They charge them with jealouſies and animoſities on account of trade and private intereſt, and alledge that theſe ſelfiſh views enter into their aſſemblies, and prevent the public welfare; with not aſſiſting one another, when attacked; with ſuffering the *French* to encroach on each other, and build forts without any oppoſition; with taking no care of the public ſecurity, and even neglecting to ſecure their frontiers, tho' earneſtly recommended to them by the King. This occaſioned Mr. *Kennedy* to ſay, " I cannot help thinking, from upwards " of forty years obſervations upon the conduct " of our colony aſſemblies, and the little regard " paid by them to inſtructions, that if it be left " altogether to them, the whole will end in al- " tercation and words."

The colonies have, in reality, in many caſes, acted as if they thought themſelves ſo many independent ſtates, under their reſpective charters, rather than as provinces of the ſame empire: which conſideration neceſſarily requires a union of the parts, for ſecurity of the whole. And without doubt, in caſe they will not unite of their own accord, it is in the power of the *Britiſh* parliament to unite or incorporate them in ſuch a manner as may appear moſt conducive to the welfare of the colonies in general, conſiſtent with the privileges and immunities which they enjoy from the royal grants.

Indeed

Indeed this diſunion among the provinces has been kept up in good meaſure by a pernicious maxim, which in ſome former reigns prevailed in their mother country, like that which ſeems to prevail there ſtill, of ruling by parties, or diviſion. The bad effects of which may be ſeen in the preſent diſtreſſed and diſtempered ſtate of the colonies, by which the maxim *divide et impera*, appears to have operated more for the intereſt of the *French* than of *Great Britain*: former governments might likewiſe have had another pretence for keeping up this diſunion among the colonies, namely, the danger, in an united ſtate, of their throwing off dependence and ſetting up for themſelves. But this can never reaſonably be ſuppoſed to happen, were they ever ſo rich, as well as ſtrongly united, unleſs they were driven to that extremity, by uſage which would make *Britons* themſelves impatient of ſubjection. However, to ſuppoſe any ſuch danger at preſent, or for many ages to come, is ridiculous; ſince they can never do any thing while they want a fleet, and *Britain* has one to reſtrain them. So long as this ſhall be the caſe, if ever they ſhould revolt, it would never be with deſign to ſet up for themſelves: they would be under a neceſſity to ſeek the protection of ſome other power. A ſtep which would be much more pernicious to *Britain* than barely ſhaking off their dependency, as there could be no hopes of their recovery. And whereas in one caſe ſhe might ſtill be ſupplied from them, with their produce of ſugars, timber, naval ſtores, and other commodities; in the other caſe ſhe would be intirely deprived of thoſe rich branches of commerce, and both their wealth and power would be turned againſt her.

The

The colonies from ſome hard uſage, received in former times, had entertained an opinion that *Britain* was reſolved to keep them low, and regardleſs of their welfare. They ſeemed confirmed in this opinion by nothing more than the governors and other officers ſent among them.

In reading the hiſtory of *American* affairs, one would imagine, that at certain times the adminiſtration here had entered into a conſpiracy by that method, either to ruin the colonies, or give them up to *France:* for they employed needy perſons, generally without either principles or abilities; who, ſtudious only to make the moſt of their time, minded nothing but how to fill their purſes: too often intent likewiſe on enriching themſelves by trade, they have not only neglected the affairs of the plantations, but have encouraged meaſures prejudicial to the colonies, and therefore miſled the government here by falſe repreſentations of their condition. This was the caſe of colonel *Moor*, governor of *Carolina*, at the beginning of the preſent century, who had formed a deſign to engroſs the whole trade of that province to himſelf, by a bill drawn up for that purpoſe. On being diſappointed of his aim, he ſet on foot other meaſures, which occaſioned many troubles; and theſe were continued by the ſubſequent governors, till, on the people's petition, the charter was vacated, and the government reſumed by the crown. Indeed from trading governors a genuine repreſentation of colony affairs is never to be expected. This was the colonel *Moor*, who, on appearance of two ſmall frigates off at ſea, made a precipitate retreat from before the caſtle of St. *Auguſtin*, which he had beſieged; leaving all his tranſports, with a great quantity of ſtores, ammunition and proviſions, to the enemy

my. On this occaſion it is worth obſerving, that the *Indian* chief retired with the reſt to his *Periawgas*, and ſlept on his oars, with much unconcern. The governor's ſoldiers uneaſy to be gone, deſired him to make haſte away: but he replied "No: altho' your governor leaves you, "I will not ſtir till I have ſeen all my men be- "fore me." What more noble could the greateſt general of *Greece* or *Rome* have ſaid? Several of theſe governors, by their arbitrary proceedings and rapine, have almoſt ruined the colonies which they were ſet over: ſome have ſo provoked the people as to oblige them to ſeize their perſons and ſend them over hither; others have been recalled and proſecuted: but rarely the ſufferers reaped any advantage from ſuch proſecutions; or any of the offenders were made examples of, as they ought to have been, in terror to others.

There have been, 'tis true, bad charter as well as crown governors; of which firſt kind was *Moor* above-mentioned. But altho' their actions were much alike, there was a vaſt difference as to the conſequence; ſince the colonies were generally puniſhed for the faults of their own governors: but it does not appear that they had any amends made them for the violences and oppreſſions committed by thoſe ſent from hence.

The welfare or ruin of provinces almoſt entirely depends on the choice of governors who are ſent. Mr. *Colden* ſpeaking of the weak and deceitful counſels which prevailed in the northern colonies, about the year 1690, and which had brought the five nations almoſt to deſtruction, and ſaved *Canada* from it, expreſſeth himſelf thus: "We ſhall ſee by the ſequel how a public ſpirit, "directed by wiſe counſels, can overcome all "difficulties, while a ſelfiſh ſpirit loſes all, even "natural

" natural advantages. In the preſent caſe the " turn which affairs took ſeems to have been en- " tirely owing to one thing. The *French* in " making the Count *de Frontenac* governor of " *Canada*, choſe the man every way the beſt " qualified for this ſervice: the *Engliſh* ſeemed " to have had little regard to the qualifications " of the perſon they ſent, but to gratify a rela- " tion or a friend, by giving him an opportunity " to make a fortune: and as he knew that he " was recommended with this view, his counſels " were chiefly employed for this purpoſe *."

Elſewhere † ſpeaking of the diviſions and diſ- orders which reigned in *New York* on the revolu- tion, ſays, " that ſome imputed all the misfor- " tunes to the want of care in the choice of go- " vernors; and that the miniſtry had the ſaving " of money chiefly in view, when to gratify ſome " ſmall ſervices they gave employments in *Ame- " rica* to thoſe who were not capable of much " meaner offices at home."

The abject ſtate of the colonies in thoſe times, with reſpect to governors, was ſo glaring, that the *French* themſelves took notice of it. *Char- levoix* ſpeaking ‡ of the three faults which he ob- ſerved in the *Britiſh* colonies, two whereof have been already mentioned, ſays the greateſt of them was " the bad choice commonly made of thoſe " to whom the command either of particular " poſts, or intire provinces, was intruſted. Theſe, " continues he, were almoſt conſtantly men in- " tent on making a fortune, who knew nothing " of war, nor had ever ſo much as ſeen a battle; " and whoſe whole merit conſiſted in having pre-

* Hiſt. of the Five Nations, p. 120.
† P. 94. ‡ Vol. ii p. 197.

" cured

" cured riches by ways incompatible with the " qualifications neceſſary to ſupport the ranks to " which they were advanced; and which ſuch " kinds of perſons never do acquire."

It is to this evil conduct, which in thoſe times was purſued by the government here, that Mr. *Colden* aſcribes the jealouſies and miſunderſtandings which have happened between the people and their governors, if ſuch men deſerve the name; for he goes on, " By this means an *Engliſh* go- " vernor generally wants the eſteem of the " people. While they think that a governor has " not the good of the people in view, but his " own, they on all occaſions are jealous of him: " ſo that even a good governor with more dif- " ficulty purſues generous purpoſes and public " benefits: becauſe the people ſuſpect them to " be mere pretences to cover a private deſign. " It is for this reaſon that any man oppoſing a " governor, is ſure to meet with the favor of " the people, almoſt in every caſe. On the other " hand, the opinion which the *French* had of the " Count *de Frontenac*'s public ſpirit, and of his " wiſdom and diligence, made them enter into " all his meaſures without heſitating, and chear- " fully obey all his commands *."

The people of the colonies, finding themſelves oppreſſed by their governor, who acted as if they thought the provinces were delivered into their hands not to take care of, but to plunder and ruin, complained to their mother country; and their mother country neither regarded their complaints nor redreſſed their grievances. Want of care in the parents begat want of care in the children: and this was the riſe of the preſent diſor-

* Ibid.

ders

ders in the colonies, which by degrees have reduced them to ſuch a weak condition, that it has not been in the power of the governors, of late years, with all their abilities and endeavours, to reſtore them.

However, this deſirable work may, in a little time more, be effected, provided *Britain* continues to ſend over men of condition and integrity, capable of applying remedies to the evils, and zealous for the welfare of the colonies. It could be wiſhed alſo, to prevent any difference which might happen between the colonies and their governors about their ſalaries, that the government here would take the payment on themſelves. A fund ſufficient to defray this and ſeveral other expences relating to the plantations, might be raiſed, we are told, by only laying a halfpenny per gallon duty on the moloſſes and rum imported into the northern colonies.

There ought to ſubſiſt a perfect harmony between *Great Britain* and them. They both ought to think their intereſts to be the ſame, as they really are: and on that right principle *Great Britain* ought not only to ſtrengthen and ſupport them to the utmoſt, but encourage and promote their commerce, in as extenſive a manner as ſhe does her own. A good mother ſeldom fails to have good children. The inhabitants of the colonies do not think themſelves aliens, or the leſs a-kin to thoſe of *Great Britain*, becauſe ſeparated by a vaſt ocean, and dwelling in a diſtant part of the globe: they inſiſt that they are branches of the ſame *Britiſh* tree, tho' tranſplanted in a different ſoil; that they have not forfeited their *Britiſh* rights by that removal, becauſe they removed with conſent of the government, and ſincerely acknowledge themſelves to be ſubjects of the ſame

King:

King: That they daily extend the power and dominion of *Great Britain*, by extending their ſettlements and commerce; ſo that in ſupporting them *Great Britain* in effect ſupports itſelf, and adds to its own wealth: That their induſtry is employ'd not more for their own than their brethren's advantage, who are enriched by their labour and the valuable produce of their ſeveral colonies: that for this reaſon, they think themſelves intitled both to their love and aſſiſtance, which it is no leſs their intereſt than it is their duty, as brethren, to afford them: that in ſhort, they ſpeak the ſame language, and are of the ſame religion with them; ſo that they ought not to be thought preſumptuous, if they conſider themſelves upon an equal footing with us, or treated the worſe, becauſe they will be *Engliſhmen*.

From what has been ſaid, I think it appears evident, that for ſecurity of the cololonies, a general union is abſolutely neceſſary; and the rather, as in all emergencies or caſes of danger like the preſent, the utmoſt unanimity and diſpatch is requiſite; which yet, from the conſtitutions of ſome of the colonies, is not always to be hoped for.

Of all the colonies on the continent, there are only the *Virginia*, *New York*, *New Hampſhire*, *Carolinas*, and *Nova Scotia*, the property and government of which are in the crown. The conſtitutions of the reſt are of a mixt kind. In ſome, the government and juriſdiction only are in the crown, and the property in particular perſons, proprietors, or the people; in others, both government and property are in the people: laſtly, in ſome, both government and property are veſted in private perſons.

Out

Out of the provinces, therefore, the crown may be ſaid to have authority in only five or ſix on the continent, to raiſe money, and levy men for their defence. 'Tis true, thoſe colonies where the people have the property, will naturally be induced to defend themſelves when attacked, or in danger, becauſe the land is their own: But then as they can't be compelled to do this in the preſent ſtate of diſunion, if they ſhould be affected with the ſelfiſh contagion, which has prevailed in ſome colonies, they would help none but themſelves. On the other hand, the proprietary colonies are not likely to help either their neighbours or themſelves; for the proprietor or proprietors coveting, perhaps, to make the moſt they can of their lands, pocket all the quit-rents, without expending any thing conſiderable for the defence of the country; and, when war comes, leave the people in the lurch: either thro' unwillingneſs to part with what they had been hoarding for many years, or their not being able to aſſiſt them, having ſquandered in high living, what they ought to have laid up againſt ſuch emergencies.

This was the caſe with many of the proprietors of *Carolina*, who, in the war which the *Spaniſh Indians* made on that colony, about 1718, to revenge the frauds committed by the traders, were not able to aſſiſt the people. This obliged them to have recourſe for ſuccour to the other colonies; which not being ſufficient for the purpoſe, they applied to the government here to take them under their protection. This, joined to the arbitrary proceedings of the governors for near 20 years before, gave ſo great offence to the King and council, that in vacating the *Carolina* charter, with reſpect to all the proprietors, excepting one, they were on the point of reſuming all the *American* charters. This recent example, methinks,

ought to be a warning to the colonies, not to omit doing what is reaſonable and neceſſary for defence of themſelves, and indeed of one another.

The people of *Carolina* had certainly a juſt and lawful pretence for what they did: for, ſince the proprietors did not defend them, (whether thro' diſability or covetouſneſs it mattered not) as they were obliged to do by their charter, they had no right to juriſdiction or authority over either the country or the inhabitants; both which were forfeited to the crown, from whom they received their conditional grant.

Whether all the other colonies have the ſame demand on the crown for their defence, which the people of *Carolina*, (ſince then divided into two provinces) had on their proprietaries, I will not undertake to determine. They ſay, indeed, that they ought to be conſidered as the "liege "people of the crown of *England*, and to have "right to all liberties, franchiſes, and privileges "of *Engliſhmen*, as if they were born within the "kingdom of *England*," in the ſame manner as the people of *Carolina* were declared to be, and have, by their charter; and that ſince they pay taxes and duties, as other ſubjects of *England* do, they ought to be intitled to the defence of the government as much as the people of *England*, and to be at no farther expence on that occaſion.

This is a very delicate point, and requires to be touched with great caution: I ſhall, therefore, content myſelf with citing the opinion of a certain author on the like occaſion, who made it his buſineſs to enquire into the affairs of the colonies. "We cannot help taking notice, ſaith he, that "in every one of the governors ſpeeches there "are great complaints of the bad ſtate of their "fortifications; and as theſe complaints have

"long

" long continued, and yet remain without redreſs,
" it really ſeems high time to put thoſe affairs
" upon ſome different footing: for this nation
" reaps too great a benefit from our colonies in
" the *Weſt Indies* [*America*] to be quite uncon-
" cerned, whether or no they keep themſelves in
" a proper ſtate of defence. If the people of our
" reſpective colonies can bear taxes, and will
" not tax themſelves in a proper ſtate for ſo ne-
" ceſſary a purpoſe, the legiſlative authority of
" *Great Britain* might interpoſe: And if they
" already pay as many taxes as they are able to
" bear, which are all appropriated to other *more*
" *neceſſary* purpoſes, if any *more neceſſary* can be,
" this nation ought to aſſiſt them: But it looks a
" little odd, continues the ſame writer, that while
" our governors are moſt of them reaping their
" annual thouſands, their reſpective governments
" ſhould remain without the neceſſary fortifica-
" tions for ſcores of years."

Altho' on conſidering the premiſes, I can't ſee how the colonies can be ſecure, or long ſubſiſt, without a union among themſelves; yet the ſame principles which render a coalition abſolutely neceſſary, muſt render it alſo very difficult to be obtained. For individuals have been always found very backward to give up any thing for the good of the whole; and this is the very age of retention, in which every man's benevolence is centered in himſelf, and publick ſpirit is abſorbed by private intereſt: ſo that this affair could not have happened, perhaps, at a more unlucky time. However, in caſe a union of the colonies cannot be brought about at all, or is not likely to take place quickly; yet, if the rule propoſed in the above quotation be deemed a proper one, the whole *American* dominions may be effectually ſe-

cured againſt the *French*, notwithſtanding the unwillingneſs of any part to contribute towards the defence of the whole.

As the opinions of judicious perſons, on this intricate, as well as important, point, cannot be unacceptable, I ſhall inſert another method propoſed by a gentleman already quoted, who is very well verſed in the affairs of the colonies. "Every "*Engliſh* colony, ſays he, in the preſent diſconcerted ſtate, on the leaſt danger, ſeeks aſſiſtance "from its mother country, and encreaſes her burthen, tho' already oppreſſed. Some colonies "are rich, but ſcanty of white inhabitants: ſome "abound in wealthy people and a ſuperfluity of "every thing. Others, tho' populous, are poor, "ſcarce of proviſions, and for a century have been "ſeverely harraſſed by wars with the *French* and "*Indians*. All of them have acted ſeparately "and unconnectedly, as tho' they were not members of one body but different nations. May "it not, therefore, be worthy of *Britain* and a "*Britiſh* parliament, to conſider how theſe colonies may defend one another, and ſupport the "*Britiſh* intereſt in *America?* Would they not "in a very ſhort time be able ſo to do, if the legiſlature of *Britain* (no leſs power can do it) "ſhould oblige each colony, in proportion to its "ability, yearly to raiſe and lay by a proper ſum "of money as a common fund; ſolely applicable "to the defence of any colony attacked by *French* "or *Indians*, and to the building ſmall advanced "forts in all proper places, every where to ſecure "the new out-ſettlements, and encreaſe the *Indian* trade (ſuch as that at *Oſwégo* before-"mentioned) ſince the *Engliſh* can always ſupply the *Indians* better and cheaper than the "*French*. By doing this, and by beſtowing half

"the

" the preſents now given, in a proper manner " and place, ſhould we not abridge and ſeparate " the vaſt extenſive claim which the *French* pre- " tend to, by comprehending all the inland " parts of *North America*. under the names of " *Canada* and *Louiſiana*? Would not both *French* " and *Indians* be deterred and awed into a pro- " per behaviour, when they found that an injury " done to one colony would be reſented by all " the reſt? Would not this be performed with- " out the leaſt preſent expence to *Britain*, leſſen " what ſhe is now at, finally take off the whole, " and much encreaſe her future trade and wealth? " All proportions, and every thing neceſſary may " be eaſily calculated and adjuſted, when ſuch a " ſcheme is approved and carried into execution."

Mr. *Kennedy* aſks, why cannot the *Britiſh* colonies unite as well as the the five nations? the anſwer is eaſy: becauſe their way of living is not ſo ſimple, their condition ſo equal, and their purſuits, as well as plan, of happineſs confined to ſo few things. Their mother country was in the ſame diſunited ſtate in the time of *Cæſar*: But it ought to be remembered, that diſunion was her ruin; and that they ought to be warned by ſo home an example.

V.

The neceſſity of uſing Indians *in war, and of gaining their friendſhip.*

THE next preliminary point to be effected, is to ſecure the *Indians* in our intereſt; on account, as well of recovering and extending our trade, as of ſecuring our colonies againſt the attack either of *French* or *Indians*.

Their way of making war and fighting is quite different from the *European*. They do not draw into the open field but ſhoot from behind trees; and are exceeding dextrous both at hitting their mark and ſheltering themſelves from the enemies fire or purſuit: for, there is no room for horſe in countries overgrown with woods, which gave occaſion to this way of fighting; and there is no overtaking them on foot they run ſo ſwiftly.

Therefore, in caſe of any war, either with *Indians* alone, or where they are auxiliaries, we muſt have *Indians* to oppoſe *Indians*. They muſt be fought with their own way. Regular forces being wholly unacquainted with their way of making war can be of no ſervice againſt them: they are only of uſe to defend a fort, or to ſupport *Indian* forces againſt regular troops. Beſides, being uſed to fire from walls, they ſcorn to ſhoot from behind trees; and would rather die than go out of their own road to practiſe ſuch a low kind of military art. Not conſidering that the nature of the country, which is, as it were, one continued wood, requires that way of going to war, and that of all the methods of fighting that is beſt which is ſafeſt.

The *French* of *Canada* know the importance of *Indians* on this account, and therefore never undertake any expedition without them. A memorable deliverance taught them this caution. In 1687 the marquis *de Nonville*, governor of *Quebek*, having landed 2100 men at *Tierondoquot*, 300 of them *Indians*, with deſign to ſurprize the chief village of the *Sennekas*, whom he intended to deſtroy; was ſurprized himſelf in the woods, within a mile of the place, by 500 of that nation: who

ſtarting

ſtarting ſuddenly from the ground where they had lain flat, raiſed the war ſhout, and diſcharged their muſquets. This put his troops into ſuch a conſternation, that they began to run on every ſide; and in the confuſion fired on one another, while the *Sennekas* fell on pell-mell. So that had not the *French Indians*, acquainted with their way of fighting, come up, all muſt have been deſtroyed; and the *French*, very likely, driven out of *Canada*, for the whole force of it was employed in this expedition.

The *French*, ſince that time, make uſe of *Indians* more than ever: and ſince they make uſe of them, there is ſtill the more reaſon why we ſhould; unleſs we had men enough of our own trained to their manner of making ar

Beſides; the advantage of having the *Indians* our friends, may be inferred from the miſchiefs they have done ourſelves as well as the *French*; and the danger they have put the colonies in, both from within and without, when our enemies. Altho' the *Engliſh*, by dint of numbers, were able to ſupport the wrongs which they did the *Indians*, and either deſtroyed or ſubdued them within the colonies; yet it coſt them much blood and labour before they effected it, particularly in *Virginia* and *New England*; eſpecially this laſt colony: where made ſuch vigorous efforts at ſeveral times, and continued the war with ſo much obſtinacy, even tho' much reduced by them; that the *Engliſh*, notwithſtanding their great ſuperiority in numbers, were ſcarce able to withſtand them, and but for certain lucky incidents, might have been driven out of all their ſettlements. Thoſe who left the country, preſerve to this day their ancient animoſities; and being joined by the other eaſtern tribes, continue to harraſs the borders of the *Engliſh*,

and do them all the miſchief they can. They are now the more able to take revenge with more ſafety to themſelves; as, having a large country to retreat in, they cannot be ſo eaſily ſurrounded by the *Engliſh*, and oppreſſed by numbers as they were when incloſed within the colonies, where it would have been better to have kept them by good uſage.

Notwithſtanding the advantage gained over the *Penobſcott Indians*, in the war of 1675 before-mentioned, it was found impracticable to ſubdue them: for the *Engliſh* having neglected to build either towns or forts in the country, the *Indians* could make their incurſions into the open lands, and retire again into the woods before the army could come up with them. So that 'tis certain, ſays Mr. *Neal* *, that the *Engliſh* were ſick of the war, and glad to embrace the firſt offer of peace, which was concluded the next year, whereby they obliged themſelves to allow the *Indians* a certain quantity of corn yearly, as a kind of quit-rent for their lands.

Mr. *Neal* treats the conceſſion in this article "as not very honourable to the *Engliſh*;" as if there was any difference between taking their lands from them by force, and treating them as ſlaves, which he blames them for but a few lines before. For my part, I think nothing more honourable than to do juſtice, or make ſatisfaction for an injury done.

In 1687, the *Engliſh Indians*, to revenge ſome ill uſage, by the inſtigation of the *French*, invaded the frontiers of *New England*, and commenced a war, which all the powers of the country could not extinguiſh in ten years †.

I ſhall

* p. 26. † *Neal*, p. 53.

I ſhall produce but one inſtance more to ſhew what miſchief the *Indians* may be able to do us, when our enemies. In the war, carried on about 1718, by the *Spaniſh Indians* againſt *Carolina* (the two provinces then being in one) this colony unable to defend itſelf againſt them, either by their own force, or that of the other colonies joined with them, were obliged at laſt to crave aſſiſtance from *England*, before they could do any good againſt them, as hath been mentioned before. Does not this confirm what has been already ſuggeſted of the danger the colonies would be in for want of *Indians*, ſhould the *French* at any time invade them with their confederate *Indian* nations? In ſhort, an *Indian* war has always been dreaded, as it has always been fatal to the colonies.

All the colony writers recommend the gaining the *Indian* friendſhip, as a matter of great importance to them. One of *Carolina* ſays, that the province is much ſtrengthened by them; and that if trained to fire arms they would be very uſeful to that province, not only in caſe of an invaſion to repel the enemy, but alſo by drawing other *Indians* to the *Engliſh* intereſt, or elſe deſtroying thoſe who were not to be gained.

It muſt be confeſſed, that they are of great uſe, in either defending or invading a country. They are extremely ſkilful in the art of ſurprizing, and watching the motions of an enemy: they alway know where to find you; but you never know where to find them: they diſperſe themſelves thro' a country ſingly, or in very ſmall parties, and lie on the lurch, to pick up ſtragglers, or procure intelligence: in which they act with an aſtoniſhing patience and indefatigableneſs, beyond any thing which an *European* could undergo; remaining in one place, and often in one poſture,

for

for whole days and weeks together, till they find an opportunity to ſtrike their ſtroke, or compaſs their deſign, whatever it may be.

" Every *Indian*, ſays Mr. *Kennedy*,* is a hunter; " and as their manner of making war, by ſkulk- " ing, ſurprizing, and killing particular perſons " and families, is juſt the ſame as their hunting, " only changing the object, every *Indian* is a diſ- " ciplined ſoldier. *Soldiers of this kind are al-* " *ways wanted in the colonies in an* Indian *war* [or " when *Indians* are employed] *for the* European " *military diſcipline is of little uſe in theſe woods.*" There is, therefore, an indiſpenſible neceſſity of making uſe of *Indians* in our wars, unleſs we had men enough of our own trained in that ſort of military exerciſe.

The *French*, indeed, have a great number of ſuch people called *Courieurs de Bois*, as expert in the *Indian* way of fighting as the *Indians* themſelves, as hath been taken notice of before; and therefore might be able to do without *Indians*, altho' they make uſe of them. But this is an advantage which the colonies have not; for, altho' in the ſouthern provinces there may be a good many men, as expert in the *Indian* way of fighting, as the *French Courieurs de Bois*, yet they are under no kind of diſcipline or command, except thoſe of the conſiderable *Indian* traders, their maſters; and therefore cannot properly be conſidered as any publick force or real ſtrength. In the northern colonies *New England* being ſurrounded with hoſtile *Indians*, and having ſtill ſome within itſelf of the ſame race, neceſſity has produced rangers among the inhabitants, without whom there could be no dealing with ſuch enemies. But *New York* depending on the neighbourhood of the five na-

* In *his importance of the* Indians, p. 43.

tions for its ſecurity, and making the *French* their factors with the *Indians*, by ſelling their goods to them, had few or no rangers at all before that illicit traffic at *Albany* was prohibited, and the trade laid open in 1720; ſince which time the young men being encouraged to go among the *Indians*, the only way of breeding rangers, that province begins to be furniſhed with them. Altho' rangers are ſo numerous among the *French*, that they might do without the *Indians*, yet they not only cheriſh thoſe who live in the country inhabited by themſelves, but ſeek the friendſhip of all the nations round about them, far and near. On the contrary, the *Engliſh* do neither, eſpecially in the northern colonies: for they have not only exterminated all *Indian* nations who formerly dwelt in the countries now poſſeſſed by them, but inſtead of making friends of thoſe who live in the neighbourhood of the colonies, are at variance with them all, excepting the ſix nations and their allies, whom yet they ſeem induſtrious rather to diſoblige than keep in their intereſt; altho' they have been all along the chief, and to *New York* the only defence againſt the *French*, and their numerous tribes of *Indians*.

The ſix nations who dwell at preſent to the ſouth of the *Kadarakui* or *Ontario* lake, and from lake *Erri* eaſtward to within a little way of *Albany* in *New York*; formerly inhabited the country to the ſouth of the river St. *Laurence*, in the parts about *Montreal* and the river *Sorel* or *Richlieu*, which iſſuing out of *Corlear* or *Champlain* lake, falls into the St. *Laurence* river; and was then, as well as the lake, named after the *Iroquois*: but were forced by the *Adirondaks*, who then inhabited, as they do ſtill, to the north of St. *Laurence* river, to leave their country and fly to the lakes where they now live.

After

After this, by their good conduct as well as courage, they reduced the *Adirondaks* to a ſmall number, and by degrees conquered the *Quatoghis* or *Hurons*, the *Chiktaghiks* or *Ilinois*, and other nations as far as the river *Meſchaſebe* or *Miſſiſſippi*.

And here, becauſe ſome people thro' ignorance or ſelf-conceit (I will not ſay treachery) would repreſent theſe ſix nations, and indeed the *Indians* in general, of no conſequence to the colonies; it may be proper, before we proceed to the methods of ſecuring them, to give you the ſentiments of ſome *American* gentlemen, who have much the intereſt of the plantations at heart, and have written on this ſubject.

Mr. *Colden*, in his curious Hiſtory of the five Nations *, after mentioning that a number of *Indians* to march with an army which was to attack *Canada*, would be of great uſe in diſcovering and defeating the ambuſhers of the *French Indians*; and that by their incurſions into the enemy's country they would terribly harraſs them, and keep them from joining their forces in any great body to oppoſe the deſign, he adds, "theſe "are not the moſt conſiderable advantages which "might be gained from the affection of the *Six* "*Nations* at this time, or any time of war. For "if the inland extent of the colonies from *Nova* "*Scotia* to *Georgia* be conſidered, and at the ſame "time the numerous *Indian* nations on the con-"tinent of *America*, who may by the artifices of "the *French* be induced to make incurſions every "where: if we conſider alſo the cruel methods "by which the *Indians* make incurſions in ſmall par-"ties, from the vaſt foreſt which every where covers "the *Continent*, and which in many places is im-

* P. 193.

"penetrable;

" penetrable; it muſt evidently appear, that al-
" tho' the *Engliſh* colonies be of much ſuperior
" force in numbers of men, yet their number
" would not be ſufficient to protect their fron-
" tiers from the incurſions of the *Indians* in every
" place; and, that while their forces muſt in this
" caſe be divided and ſcattered all over their
" frontiers, it may be in the power of the *French*
" in *Canada*, to invade, with ſucceſs, any part
" of the *Engliſh* colonies. On the other hand,
" if a proper attempt were to be made by the
" northern colonies alone, without the aſſiſtance
" of their mother country, but with the aſſiſt-
" ance of the *Indians*, it would, in all appear-
" ance, be ſufficient to reduce *Canada*: but if
" the *Indian* nations can be perſuaded to join
" heartily (as from what is above related ſeems
" probable they may) it will be impoſſible for the
" inhabitants of *Canada* to defend themſelves from
" the incurſions of theſe numerous *Indian* nations,
" and from a body of regular troops at the ſame
" time. As the *French* are very ſenſible of theſe
" advantages to be gained from the friendſhip of
" the *Indian* nations, they neglect no means in
" their power to procure them; and it is to be
" hoped that the northern colonies will be no leſs
" aſſiduous in a matter on which their well-being,
" at leaſt, depends."

The ſix nations border on the provinces of *New York* and *Penſylvania*, to which they are a very ſtrong defence. " Their dependants and
" confederates, ſays another *American* writer, lie
" near the *French* ſettlements; ſome in the midſt
" of, and ſome beyond them. The wiſdom of
" the chiefs, in theſe united cantons, has gained
" them no leſs reputation than their courage;
" which indeed has ſtruck terror into the re-
" moteſt

" moteſt nations of north *America*, and forced " them to court the friendſhip and protection of " ſuch a formidable power."

" The *French* (who know the importance of " theſe people's friendſhip) are perpetually la- " bouring to debauch their faith to the *Engliſh*. " Their emiſſaries the prieſts, an indefatigable, " artful, inſinuating race, are conſtantly endea- " vouring to gain admittance amongſt them: " they aſſume all ſhapes, try every ſpring: they " magnify the power and grandeur of *France*: " they ſtudy to render the *Engliſh* diminutive and " contemptible: they foment every little occa- " ſion of diſguſt, and leave no ſtone unturned " to prejudice us in their eſteem."

" Hitherto the honour of the ſix nations, and " the experienced good intentions and probity of " the *Engliſh*, have been a ſufficient barrier againſt " all their intrigues. But it cannot be impru- " dent to countermine the intended miſchief, " by giving ſuitable encouragement to proper " perſons to converſe with the *Indians* and ſtudy " their genius. *An open-hearted generoſity wins* " *them effectually*. The temper of the *Engliſh* is " happily ſuited to this; and the additional qua- " lifications of integrity and prudence muſt, in " time, pave the way to an aſcendency in their " councils; and by this means the ſubtilty of " the *French* would be utterly defeated." As on the contrary it ſeems to gain ground among them, 'tis to be feared the qualifications of integrity and prudence have not made that progreſs in the co- lonies which our author ſo earneſtly recommends.

" One ſees, continues the ſame writer, in all " the treaties of the *Indians* with the *Engliſh*, " ſtrong traces of *good ſenſe*: a *nice addreſs* in " the conduct of their affairs; a *noble ſimplicity*,

" and

" and that *manly fortitude*, which is the conſtant " companion of integrity. The friendſhip of a " nation like this, tho' under the appellation of " ſavages or barbarians, is an honour to the moſt " civilized people. I ſay nothing of the advan- " tage which is derived from commerce with " them: and the *French* well know, by dear ex- " perience, how terrible they are to their enemies " in war."

" When we ſpeak of the five nations in *France*, " (ſays *La Poterie* in his hiſtory of north *Ame-* " *rica)* they are thought, by common miſtake, " to be mere barbarians, always thirſting after " human blood: but their true character is very " different. They are the fierceſt and moſt for- " midable people in all north *America:* at the " ſame time as *politic* and *judicious* as well can " be imagined. This appears from the manage- " ment of the affairs which they tranſact, not " only with the *French* and *Engliſh*, but likewiſe " with almoſt all the *Indians* of this vaſt *Conti-* " *nent*."

This teſtimony in their favour is the more to be regarded, as it comes from a *Frenchman*, whoſe nation in *Canada* have ſuffered greatly from time to time, once almoſt to extirpation, by the incurſions and ſlaughters made by thoſe brave people in the year 1688, as hath been already mentioned. As to the cuſtom which they have in common with a few other nations, of burning their priſoners who are not adopted by them, it ought to be conſidered as done by way of retaliation, rather than from a principle of revenge or blood-thirſtineſs; from which laſt Mr. *Poterie* has acquitted them.

The conſequence of theſe expeditions was, that the *French* were obliged to burn their two barks

on

on the *Kadarakui* lake, and abandon their fort there; that almoſt all the *Indian* nations, excepting two, deſerted their intereſt and made peace with the *five nations*: that they loſt ſeveral thouſands of their inhabitants by the continual incurſions of ſmall parties; and that the remainder not daring to plant, ſow, or even go from one town to another, for fear of being ſcalped, a famine enſued, which had like to have put a miſerable end to that colony. What muſt have become of *Canada* at this time, if only *New York* had performed her engagements to the five nations?

The five nations would have purſued their blow and quite extirpated the *French*, when the governor of *New York* ſtopt them from going on: for which that province ſeverely ſmarted ſoon after; for in *February* 1690, the *French* with their *Indians* ſurpriſed *Skenéktadi*, near *Albany*, burnt the town, murdered 63 perſons in cold blood, and carried away 27 priſoners. This war was begun by the *French*, with a deſign to deſtroy the five nations (as they were then) and laſted till the peace of *Reſwyk* in 1698, during which time the people of *Canada* were in the dreadful circumſtances we have juſt now related.

This noble ſtand and ſucceſs againſt the *French* and their *Indians* is the more remarkable, as the five nations were then divided in their ſentiments and meaſures: three of the five, the *Onondawgas*, *Kayugaws* and *Oneyots*, by the influence of Jeſuits, were diverted from proſecuting the war againſt *Canada*, and turned their arms againſt the *Virginia Indians*; the *Sennekas* had a war at the ſame time on their hands with three numerous nations, the *Utawawas*, the *Chiktaghiks* or *Ilinois*, and the *Twigtwis* or *Miyamis* *. Since then the

* *Colden*'s Hiſt. p. 90 and ſeq.

French

French have made ſeveral attempts to deſtroy or ſubdue them, by various methods. *La Hontan* ſays, that he propoſed a ſcheme to *Lewis* XIV. "for building forts on the lakes of *Canada*, "which would force the *Jorquoiſe*, [or the five "nations] either to abandon their country or "ſubmit to the *French*, who would then, as he "told the King, with their other *Indian* allies, "be able to beat the *Engliſh* out of all their "plantations." But this ſcheme was never tried; and if practicable, might not the *Engliſh*, by building forts, be able, with the aſſiſtance of the five nations, to drive the *French* out of *Canada?*

The ſix nations, from a ſmall beginning, have made themſelves formidable likewiſe throughout the *Indians* of all north *America*. By their victories and conqueſts northwards, they ſubdued the *Adirondaks*, by the *French* called *Algonkins*, the moſt powerful nation of all, when the *French* ſettled in *Canada* in 1603; together with their allies the *Utawawas* or *Dewagunhas*, the *Quatoghis*, by the *French Hurons*, and the *Nipeſerins*, not much inferior in power to the *Adirondaks*. Then turning their arms ſouth weſtward, they conquered the *Sattanas* or *Showanons*, who dwelt in the country now poſſeſſed by the five nations; the *Chiktaghiks* or *Ilinois*, as far as the river *Miſſiſſippi*; and would have ſubdued the *Twigtwis* or *Miyamis*, the moſt powerful nation at preſent in the *Ohio* country (great numbers of whom they deſtroyed) if they had not been diverted by an invaſion of the *French*. In ſhort, they brought the *Indians* under their ſubjection as far as ſouth *Carolina*; extending their dominion over a vaſt country above 1200 miles in length from north to ſouth, and 7 or 800 in breadth from eaſt to weſt.

In ſhort, theſe people are conſidered by the judicious *Americans*, both *Engliſh* and *French*, as equal, if not ſuperior to either the antient *Greeks* or *Romans*, for generoſity, integrity, juſtice, policy in government, firmneſs of mind and courage; particularly intrepidity and contempt of death, in which their behaviour, and ſinging their death ſong, in the midſt of the moſt exquiſite torments inflicted by their enemies when taken priſoners in war, ſhews them to ſurpaſs all mankind beſides.

However, the generality of our vain unthinking countrymen, for want of the *Indian* underſtanding, look on them as a deſpicable people, becauſe they are content with poverty, and do not make a figure like other nations, things for which they more juſtly hold the *Europeans* in contempt: for they rightly place the happineſs and dignity of man, in living according to the ſimplicity of nature, and cultivating political and ſocial virtues; juſtly concluding from what they obſerve in the practice of *Europeans*, that riches and parade ſerve only to make people luxurious, diſhoneſt and effeminate: nor do they ſcruple to declare the opinion which they have of us, when it comes handſomely in their way. As the *Indians* know how to be even with us in point of contempt, they would doubtleſs forgive our *American* brethren thoſe airs of ſuperiority, which they place to the account of their vanity and ſelf-conceit, if they would behave to them in other reſpects conſiſtent with the rules of juſtice and honour. But their neighbours have given them great cauſe of offence, chiefly on three occaſions; firſt by drawing them into wars, and then leaving them in the lurch. This was particularly the caſe during

during all the long war which they had with the *French* from 1687 to 1697.

" In the year 1690 they were deſerted, ſays " Mr. *Colden*, by the people of *New York*, after " they had engaged them in a war againſt the " *French* of *Canada*." They trifled with them again in 1692. At a meeting of the five nations, with colonel *Ingolſby* at *Albany* that year, one of the *Sachems* among other home things ſaid, " Bro- " ther *Corlear* (or *New York*) you deſire us to " keep the enemy in perpetual alarm.—Is it not " to ſecure your own frontiers, why then not one " word of your people who are to join us?— " How comes it that none of our brethren, faſt- " ened in the ſame chain with us, offer their " helping hand in this general war, in which our " great king is engaged againſt the *French*? Pray " how come *Maryland*, *Delaware* river, and *New* " *England*, to be diſengaged from this war? How " comes it that the enemy burns and deſtroys " the towns in *New England*, and they make no " reſiſtance? How comes our great king to " make war and not to deſtroy his enemies? " when if he would only command his ſubjects " on this ſide of the great lake to join, the de- " ſtruction of the enemy would not make one " ſummer's work."

However, the five nations being invited to join in the war, readily agreed, and making an incurſion to the very banks of the river St. *Laurence* between *Montreal* and *Quebek*, put both theſe places, with the whole country between, in continual alarms. Next year the *French*, to be revenged, ſurpriſed three caſtles of the *Mohawks*; and would have done much greater miſchief, if colonel *Fletcher*, then governor of *New York*, had not flown to their aſſiſtance. On which oc-

caſion they honoured him with the name of *Kayenguirago*, or the *Great Swift Arrow*. But as they had never received ſuch a blow in the memory of man, they were quite diſheartened. "They ſaid "their ſtrength was quite broken, by the conti- "nuance of the war: However they added, that "if all the *Engliſh* northern colonies would join, "they could ſtill eaſily take *Canada*; and that "their being ſo ill armed, was the reaſon why the "*French* had then eſcaped. The *French* (conti- "nued they) arm their *Indians* compleatly, and "furniſh them with every thing neceſſary for war, "as we find to our coſt every time we meet with "them."

In 1694, *ſoon after*, the ſix nations hearing that the *French* had received a conſiderable force from *France*, began to hearken to ſome propoſals of peace; and being queſtioned about it by Col. *Fletcher*, told him, the "only reaſon was the low "condition to which they were reduced, while "none of their neighbours ſent them the leaſt "aſſiſtance; ſo that the whole burthen of the "war lay on them alone: that their brethren of "*New England*, *Connecticut*, *Penſylvania*, *Mary-* "*land*, and *Virginia*, of their own accord, thruſt "their arms into our chain [of peace and alliance:] "but ſince the war began we have received no "aſſiſtance from them. We alone cannot con- "tinue the war againſt the *French*, by reaſon of "the daily recruits which they receive from "the other ſide of the great lake*."

Upon this Col. *Fletcher* gave notice to the above-mentioned provinces of the danger which might ariſe from ſuch a treaty; and that there was no preventing it but by the *Indians* being aſſured of more effectual aſſiſtance than they had

* *Colden*'s Hiſt. p. 167.

hitherto

hitherto received. Commiſſioners from thoſe provinces met at *Albany*, where one of the *Sachems* in his ſpeech after repeating what had been ſaid before to Col. *Fletcher*, added, " Our brother " *Kayenguirago*'s arms and ours are ſtiff, and tired " with holding faſt the chain, whilſt our neigh- " bours, ſit ſtill and ſmoke at their eaſe. " The fat is melted from our fleſh and fallen on " our neighbours, who grow fat while we grow " lean. They flouriſh whilſt we decay. This chain " made us the envy of the *French*; and if all " had held it as faſt as *Kayenguirago* it would have " been a *terror* alſo. If we would all heartily " join and take the hatchet in our hand, our com- " mon enemy would ſoon be deſtroyed, and we " ſhould for ever after live in peace and eaſe. " *Do you but your parts and thunder itſelf cannot* " *break our chain* *."

This meeting after all came to nothing; and Col. *Fletcher* not being able to give the five nations any aſſurances of a vigorous aſſiſtance, allowed them to make a ſeparate peace: which, yet in affection to the *Engliſh*, they did not. However, in 1695, the *French* re-poſſeſſed themſelves of *Kadarakui* fort; which the five nations would have prevented, had 500 men been ſent them from *Albany* as they deſired.

From this behaviour the five nations began to think that the *Engliſh* were laviſh of *Indian* lives, and too careful of their own. The *Mohawks*, ſays Mr. *Colden*, who lived neareſt them, having from ſuch behaviour, entertained a mean opinion of their conduct and courage, as well as integrity, were prevailed on by their brethren the *Kahnuaga* or *Praying Indians*, to make peace with Count *Frontenac*, which they did. It was, doubtleſs,

* *Colden*, p. 170,

from a reflection on the timid conduct of the *Engliſh* in thoſe times, as well as in theſe, with reſpect to the *French*, that when lately one of our neighbouring colonies ſent to *Onondawga*, the chief town of the ſix nations, inviting them to ſend their children thither for education; they excuſed themſelves, by alledging, that the education would not ſuit the genius of their youth; but in return for their good will, ſent them word, that *if they would ſend ſome of their youth to* Onondawga *they would teach them to be men.*

Theſe poor faithful *Indians* have the more reaſon to complain of the *Engliſh* on occaſion of ſo many diſappointments, as they were terrible ſufferers by them: for, altho' they often came off with glory, and always with honour, yet being obliged to maintain the war alone for ſo many years, not only againſt the *French* and their confederate *Indians*, but alſo againſt ſeveral other powerful nations at the ſame time, as hath been before obſerved, their ſtrength was greatly weakened; ſo that from 10 or 12,000 fighting men, which they were formerly, they are at preſent reduced to 1000 or 1500 at moſt: and as the *French* power has encreaſed while their own declined, they are become much afraid of them, and the more as they think they cannot with certainty depend on the promiſes or treaties of the *Engliſh*.

In a conference which they had not long ago at *Albaney*, they declared, "that they were almoſt "brought on their knees to the *French*; and that "unleſs they were better ſupported than they had "been, they muſt expect ſoon to be all cut off;" Was not ſuch inſincerity enough to change their affections and fidelity from the *Engliſh*; who, perhaps, wanted to have them all deſtroyed, as they almoſt were in that long and terrible war, from the

the ſame falſe policy which made them deſtroy their own *Indians*.

Their next reaſon for being offended with the *Engliſh*, were certain ſteps taken, which ſeemed to confirm the jealouſy which the *French* were always very induſtrious to infuſe into them; that the *Engliſh*, for all their fair pretences, in reality intended to deprive them of their lands, and enſlave them. Their firſt cauſe of jealouſy, on this account, was their being called ſubjects by the *Engliſh*, which at a meeting in 1684 they reſented, affirming, that they were not ſubjects but brethren*.

Not long after this; King *James*, a little before his abdication, ſent over Sir *Edmund Andros* with arbitrary powers; and he, in imitation of the *French*, changed his ſtile in ſpeaking to the *Indians*, calling them children inſtead of brethren, the term formerly uſed. This they complained of at *Albaney* in *June* 1689, and inſiſted that the old form of treating with them might be reſtored. They were much more alarmed and irritated a few years after, by the indiſcretion of Capt. *Schuyler*, who, after the peace of *Ryſwick* in 1697, being ſent to *Canada* in behalf of the five nations, by Lord *Ballamont*, then governor of *New York*, in aſſerting the dependency of the *five nations* on that province, ſaid, *that theſe people were their ſlaves*.

This was ſo aggravated by the *French*, glad of every opportunity to ſet the *five nations* againſt the *Engliſh*, that theſe *Indians*, more jealous of their liberty than ever were the ancient *Greeks* and *Romans*, in 1699 ſent their moſt conſiderable *Sachems* to *Albaney* to complain of it; and at the ſame time deputies to *Canada* to conclude the peace independently of the *Engliſh*: in ſhort, they took

* *Colden*, 65.

care on all occaſions ever ſince to aſſert their independency, declaring, that they are born free, and ſubject to neither the *French* nor *Engliſh*.

A third cauſe of diſguſt to the *Engliſh* has ariſen on account of taking their lands from them, which has been the ſource of many troubles. In 1639, 500 *Engliſh* were at one time cut off in *Virginia* by the *Indians*, whoſe lands they had taken away. The many wars carried on by the *New England Indians* were for the ſame reaſon; and tho' driven out of the country, their hatred ſtill ſubſiſts. Not many years ſince quarrels aroſe about the *Suſquehanna* lands; and now lately the grant of the *Ohîo* lands gave new diſcontent: but it is ſaid that all diſputes were terminated at *Albaney* laſt *July*, and that the *Indians* went away perfectly ſatisfied. However that be, they do not ſpare to reproach both *French* and *Engliſh* "with "uſurping the lands of ſo many *Indian* nations, "and chacing them from their own country," as one of their *Sachems* did in a ſpeech made to the governor of *Canada* in 1684.

The laſt article of complaint concerns trade; in which they always have been, and to this day, are abuſed in a moſt ſcandalous degree. "The "original treaty, or commercial contract, with "the five nations went on tolerably well, ſays "Mr. *Kennedy*, for ſome years, till the execution "of it was committed to the care of a number "of commiſſioners, moſtly *Anglo-Dutch* traders "in *Indian* goods; who together with a tribe of "harpies, called *Handlers*, their relations and un-"derſtrappers, have ſo abuſed, defrauded, and de-"ceived thoſe poor, innocent, well-meaning peo-"ple, that at preſent we have very few *Indians* left "who are ſincerely in our intereſt, or who can "be depended on. The fatal conſequences of

"this

" this management were ſeverely felt in many " inſtances laſt war, particularly in the caſes of " *Saragtoga*, *Skeněktadi*, *&c.* which could not " poſſibly have happened, had our *Indians* been " ſincerely our friends."

The frauds of thoſe handlers are not confined to the common manufactures; they have even the audacity to fruſtrate the royal bounty, and cheat them of the King's preſents. On this occaſion Mr. *Kennedy* ſays, " I believe I may ven- " ture to affirm, that the greater part of the pre- " ſents made them upon thoſe ſolemn occaſions, " ſeldom go farther than *Albaney* or *Skenéktadi*; " but are bought up by the *Handlers* for rum, and " afterward ſold to them when ſober at a dear rate."

The poor *Indians*, it ſeems, are abuſed in every thing; for altho' guns are in effect their whole dependence or eſtate, as well as ſecurity, yet it is complained, that thoſe which the *Engliſh* ſell them are the worſt which can poſſibly be made. this obliges them to go to the *French*, who take care to ſerve them well, and thus they become attached to them: for they muſt naturally think, that they who for lucre would impoſe on them in an article of ſuch importance to both their ſubſiſtence and defence, can have no true regard for them.

In the conference with Col. *Ingoldſby*, at *Albaney*, in 1692, the ſpeaker for the *Indians* tells him, in a ſneering way, " We thank you for the powder " and lead given to us: But, what ſhall we do with " them without guns? Shall we throw them at the " enemy? We doubt they will not hurt them that " way. Before this we always had guns given to " us. *It is no wonder that the governor of* Canada " *gains upon us: for he ſupplies his* Indians *with* " *guns, as well as powder.* He ſupplies them plen- " tifully with every thing which can hurt us."

At

At one time there has been powder and lead given to them, but no guns. At another time, tho' preſſed to go to war with the *French*, they complained the powder was ſold dearer to them than ever, and when they bought their guns they were not fit for ſervice. May I not ſay, as the *Indians* did themſelves, on the occaſion, "It is no "wonder the governor of *Canada* gains upon "them?" It is no leſs a wonder, methinks, how the governor of *New York* could ſtand ſo bitter a reproach.

Commerce ought to be encouraged to the utmoſt, and be freed from all clogs: but to make it thrive, as well as prevent the *Indians* from deſerting us, it will be abſolutely neceſſary to reſtrain the frauds and licentiouſneſs of traders, under the ſevereſt penalties. It is not only in *New York* that they have abuſed the trade, and loſt us the affections of the *Indians* on that ſide, but they have done the ſame in *Carolina*: for, altho' that province, which is ſurrounded with numerous *Indian* nations, had been frequently harraſſed by ſome or other of them; not more by the inſtigation of the *French* or *Spaniards*, than by the mal-practices of the *Engliſh* traders: yet, not warned by experience, or rather not regarding the welfare of the colony, ſo they gained themſelves, which is a maxim with all traders in general, they defrauded and otherwiſe ill treated the *Spaniſh Indians*, the moſt reſtleſs of them, all to ſuch a degree, that no longer able to bear it, they broke out into war about the year 1718; and falling by ſurprize, as uſual, on the out-ſettlements, cut off many *Engliſh*, who were unprovided for defence. Thus generally the innocent ſuffer for the guilty, who eſcape; and a whole nation for the villainies of a few, who go unpuniſhed.

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The war became ſo fierce, that *Carolina*, not able to defend itſelf, called in the aſſiſtance of the other colonies: but as even this would nor do, and they could obtain no ſuccour from the proprietors; the people addreſſed the crown to take them under its protection. Forces were ſent over who repelled the *Indians*, and the charter being reſumed, the King purchaſed ſeven eighths of the proprietors, and appointed a governor in 1731.

The ſix nations would, doubtleſs, put up with many things which give them cauſe of diſguſt; would the colonies but deal honeſtly by them in their traffick: but it raiſes their indignation to ſee that they take all opportunities to trick and impoſe on them. This gives them ſtrong animoſities, as well as diſtruſt. They cannot be prevailed on to believe that the men who cheat them, or thoſe who ſuffer them to be cheated, in the moſt vile and ſcandalous manner, are at all to be confided in, or can poſſibly be ſincerely their friends. The firſt thing to be done then is to remove their diſtruſt, by wholly altering the preſent way of treating them, and making ſome new laws in their favour which may ſecure them againſt any future ill uſage.

With regard to the injuries they receive from the abuſe of trade in particular, the method propoſed for redreſſing them is; to take the management of the *Indian* trade from the people of *Albany*, who are moſt of them, if not all, traders or handlers, and put it under the direction of ſome perſon of capacity and integrity, to be appointed by the King; in the nature of a *ſuperintendant of Indian affairs*, who ſhould be debarred, under ſevere penalties, from trading either directly or indirectly with the *Indians:* as ſhould likewiſe the truck-

truck-maſters or agents, to be annually choſen at the places where the goods are lodged; which goods are to be ſold to the *Indians* at a ſet rate, without any advance thereon; and the *Indians* allowed a market price for their furs. This method is practiſed in *Canada* by the *French*; and in *New England*, to the great ſatisfaction of the *Indians* there: and, why ſhould they not be as well dealt with at *New York*, where their good treatment is of far greater importance?

Tomo Chichi, when here in 1734; in behalf of the *Creek Indians*, and to prevent for the future their being cheated by the *Engliſh* traders, deſired of the truſtees for *Georgia*, that the weights and meaſures, with the prices and qualities of the goods to be exchanged for deer-ſkins might be ſettled and fixed: that none ſhould be allowed to trade with the *Indians* in that country, without a licence from the truſtees; that ſo the *Indians*, in caſe of injury or fraud, might know where to complain: that there might be but one ſtore-houſe in each *Indian* town, from whence the traders ſhould ſupply them with goods at the fixed prices. Becauſe, he ſaid, the traders had often, in an arbitrary manner, not only raiſed the prices of their goods, but alſo given them ſhort weight and meaſure; and that by their impoſitions they had frequently created animoſities between the *Engliſh* and *Indians*, which had *often* ended in wars prejudicial to both. Theſe matters were regulated according to his deſire; and both the importation and uſe of ſpirituous liquors prohibited in *Georgia*, by acts of the King and council. Why might not the ſame benefits be allowed the ſix nations, and other *Indians* who are in alliance with us? why are not the traders of other colonies laid under the ſame reſtraints? However, the making of laws ſignifies nothing, unleſs

unleſs care be taken to have them put in execution: for in 1739, when *Tomo Chichi*, and other chiefs of the *Creek* nations, came to compliment general *Oglethorp* at *Savannah*, they complained; that notwithſtanding the regulation in 34, the *Indian* traders, who came among them from *Carolina*, uſed bad weights and meaſures. He therefore deſired that the general would order them braſs weights and ſealed meaſures, to be lodged with each of their kings. The ſame likewiſe might be done for the ſix nations.

The chief reaſon why the *French* have ſo far ſucceeded in their enterprizes beyond the *Engliſh*, is, in the opinion of Mr. *Colden* *, becauſe "the "*Indian affairs* are the particular care of the go- "vernor and other principal officers in *Canada*, "who have the greateſt knowledge and autho- "rity: whereas thoſe affairs in *New York* are "chiefly left to the management of a few traders "with the *Indians*, who have no care for, or "ſkill in public affairs, and only mind their pri- "vate intereſt."

In ſhort, Mr. *Kennedy* is the more earneſt to have the method he propoſes for a remedy to take place, as "being well aſſured, he ſays, that there "is no law *which* can be contrived, or oath framed, "to bind a handler."

Should a few knaviſh individuals of one colony be ſuffered to ruin all the colonies? for Mr. *Kennedy* † rightly obſerves, "that if ever *New York*, "*Albany*, and *Hudſon*'s river, ſhould get into the "hands of an enemy, every other colony would "ſoon follow." And his obſervation ought to be the more regarded, ſince the *French* are of the very ſame opinion, as appears from their ſcheme of 1688, which was grounded on that principle.

If

* P. 35. † P. 23.

If we expect any assistance in our wars from these *Indians*, I should think that above all things care would be taken to furnish them with good fire-arms. Mr. *Kennedy* is of opinion, "that if "this single abuse was rectified, it might be suf-"ficient to keep the six nations in our interest." And cannot so much be done to save the colonies? yet something more than this is necessary to be done: for as the whole subsistence of these people depends on keeping their guns in order, a smith ought to be sent to reside among them, that they might not be obliged to travel two or three hundred miles to an *English* settlement to get a lock mended, which might occasion the loss of their hunting season. Since therefore he would be a most useful and necessary man to them, "A smith, says Mr. *Kennedy*'s friend *, is more "likely to influence them than a Jesuit; espe-"cially as they think much more of their tem-"poral than spiritual affairs." These smiths, if men of tolerable understanding, might be of farther use, as they and their sons might become interpreters; nothing being more useful and wanting in the colonies than good and honest ones. They might also be employed to supply the *Indians* with goods. In 1734 the assembly of *New York* voted an allowance for maintaining a smith among the six nations; but it does not appear that any person of that trade was sent.

"In my opinion, says Mr. *Colden* †, the go-"vernment of *New York* have, on all occasions, "been exceedingly to blame, in not having some "men of experience among the *five nations* to "advise and direct them on all emergencies of "importance. The *French*, continues he, are

* P. 45. † P. 162.

"very

" very careful of this; and the officers of the " regular troops are obliged to take their tours " among their *Indians*, while the captains of the " independent companies of fuſiliers at *New York*, " live like military monks, in idleneſs and luxu- " ry."

Since the time in which the *French* ſuffered ſo much by the incurſions of the five nations, they have endeavoured, by various methods, to draw them off from the *Engliſh* intereſt, and attach them to their own: but at the ſame time are contriving under hand how either to deſtroy or ſubdue them: and ſhould they ever fall under their power, their firſt buſineſs, in all probability, would be to cut them entirely off. For theſe people have brought on them ſo many diſgraces, and been ſuch a perpetual thorn in their ſides, that they can never ſincerely love or forgive them. The five nations, very likely, think the ſame themſelves; and this may be one reaſon why, notwithſtanding all the ill uſage they have received, that they ſtill incline to hold with the *Engliſh*.

It is a matter of the greateſt importance to our colonies not only to preſerve the friendſhip of the few nations who are in our intereſt, but alſo to endeavour all they can to gain others over. They will be of eſſential uſe to ſtop the progreſs of the *French* thro' the back countries; and ſerve as advance guards to the colonies; while ſurrounding them without, like a ſtrong wall, they will prevent thoſe dangerous neighbours from breaking into them. On the other hand, if they become our enemies, the colonies will not only loſe that ſure defence which they would prove againſt the *French* power, but joining with them they would enter together on all ſides; and in that caſe

caſe what calamities would enſue may more eaſily be imagined than deſcribed.

" What to me is moſt ſurpriſing, ſays Mr. " *Kennedy* *, that altho' there is hardly a colony " on the continent but what is a match for all " *Canada*, yet by a proper management of their " *Indians* they [the *French*] keep us all, both in " time of peace and war, in a conſtant dread and " terror." While we take care to keep the *Indians* on our ſide, they will not only keep the *French* in awe, but by their means we might, whenever we pleaſed, ruin their two colonies, by taking from them not only their trade but their country: for they could not hold out three months againſt the power of the *Engliſh*, ſupported by the *Indians*.

Some think that by uſing proper meaſures, not only the *Indians* who have deſerted us may be gained back again; but even many of thoſe nations brought over who have always been in the *French* intereſt. Both theſe things may be poſſible: but it muſt not be thought that this is becauſe the *French* uſe them worſe than we do: on the contrary, they treat them infinitely better. They do not ſell them ſpirituous liquors to deſtroy their health and conſume them; nor make them drunk and then cheat them of their goods, as our traders have done. Nor are theſe abuſes committed only in ſome of the northern colonies. I could mention ſome late pranks of the ſouth *Carolina* traders among the *Charokees*, which had involved many other *Engliſh* beſides the aggreſſors, in imminent danger of being maſſacred; and might have occaſioned the revolt of that numerous nation to the *French*; who prohibit the ſale of ſpirituous liquors among the *Indians*, (tho' ſome

* P. 3.

ſome may be conveyed by ſtealth) and in matters of trade they deal very honeſtly by them. However they may be the *gens de mauvais foy* to us; not they, but we, are the *gens de mauvais foy* to the *Indians*. What difference is there between the *French* ſeizing our lands, and our defrauding the *Indians* (I will not ſay of their lands but) of their furs? Some of the letters from *Virginia* exclaimed againſt the *Indians* for deſerting their troops in the late engagement: but can we blame them if they are treated by their *Engliſh* in the barbarous manner before-mentioned? They ſee by long experience that we make uſe of them only as tools to ſerve a preſent purpoſe: court them when we have need of them, and when the buſineſs is over neglect and deſpiſe them, cheat and leave them in the lurch. Do not we ſet them an example of inſincerity? can we expect they ſhould be more faithful and kind to us than we are to them?

The *French*, beſides uſing the *Indians* better than do the *Engliſh*, attach them to their intereſt, by conforming to their ways of living, by intermarrying with them, and by bringing them over to their religion. This, which they know to be their ſureſt game, is managed by their artful and indefatigable prieſts, who diſperſe themſelves for the purpoſe among their tribes wherever they dare venture, and have the leaſt proſpect of ſucceſs; while the *Engliſh* rather avoid than ſeek to make converts of them. A negligence which muſt prove fatal to us in every part of the world where popery prevails; that inhuman monſter which, if it had power, would let nothing live but itſelf.

If therefore the *Indians* ſeem inclined to take part with us rather than the *French*, it is wholly

out of intereſt. They know that the greater part of the goods which they buy of the *French* come from the *Engliſh*; and that therefore they can trade to more advantage with our colonies, by having them there at a cheaper rate than in *Canada*. The journey likewiſe to *Oſwego* or *New York*, is much nearer and leſs inconvenient than to *Montreal* or *Quebek*. This is the chief, if not only motive, which can incline them to an alliance with us rather than the *French*; whoſe manners and way of proceeding with them, in moſt other reſpects, (excepting perhaps the article of government) muſt needs be more agreeable to them.

Hence many are of opinion, it muſt be only when the ſeveral *Indian* nations, eſpecially the more remote, ſee they can no longer be ſupplied by the *French* with the goods they want, that they will be inclined to reſort to our colonies, and become our friends. The firſt ſtep, therefore, which to them ſeems neceſſary to be taken in order to draw the *Indians* thither, is abſolutely to prohibit that illicit trade which has been ſo long carried on at *Albany*, of furniſhing the *French* with *Engliſh* manufactures. Others on the contrary ſay, that by putting a ſtop to that trade we ſhould only oblige the *French* to fetch the ſame kinds of goods from *France* and other *European* countries, and ſo loſe a very profitable branch of trade without gaining our ends with the *Indians*. To which it is anſwered, that if this could be done the *French* would have done it before now; and that was it done, their markets would be dearer than they are at preſent; which would infallibly bring the moſt diſtant *Indians* to our colonies. This, they ſay, has been confirmed by experience of ſeveral years; and would in time

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of itſelf, ſecure as well as enrich the northern colonies. The ſix nations, who always remonſtrated againſt this trade as ruinous both to their own and the *Engliſh* intereſt, in a conference at *Albany* in 1719 alledged, that "if the *Engliſh* do "not ſupply the *French* with goods from that "place, they cannot furniſh the far *Indians* with "what they want, and hardly thoſe who live "near them: for they get but little goods them-"ſelves from *France*." This ſeems to be confirmed, in ſome meaſure likewiſe, by the letter ſent by Mr. *Vaudreuil*, governor of *Louiſiana* in 1744, to count *de Maurepas* then ſuperintendent of the marine; complaining of the benefit which the *Engliſh* reaped by the inability of the *French* to furniſh the *Indians* with the goods they wanted, either as to quality or quantity; therefore deſires an augmentation of 80,000 livres worth, and ſends a liſt of *Engliſh* trading goods for patterns. Indeed if the *French* can have the ſame commodities as eaſily from home or elſewhere, their purchaſing them from the *Engliſh* ſhould ſeem to be ſolely with a view to keep the *Indians* from reſorting to the *Britiſh* colonies; and their prohibiting this trade with *Albany*, at the ſame time that they ſeem wholly to depend on it, without ſubſtituting any other in its place, looks like a diſguiſe, tho' a very odd one, to conceal their deſign. If this be really the caſe, it would be a ſufficient reaſon of itſelf for ſuppreſſing the *Albany* trade: and ſuppoſing the *French* ſhould import goods to *Canada* immediately from *Europe*, it might be proper to conſider, whether the *Indians* gained by ſuch a ſtep would not over-balance the loſs which we ſhould ſuſtain in trade.

'Tis certain the governor of *Canada* might eaſily put a ſtop at once to that illicit trade; and

why does he not? we are told if he did the *Kahnuaga* or *praying Indians*, who ſubſiſt by it, would preſently quit the country and return to the five nations from whom they deſerted. But is it likely he would deprive the *French* company of ſuch conſiderable advantages, by letting the prime beaver ſkins be carried to the *Engliſh*, for ſake only of retaining 100 or 150 *Indians* at moſt, in his intereſt, when he has enough without them ready to ſerve him on all occaſions? The true reaſon therefore after all for ſuch conduct, ſeems to be either the impoſſibility of ſupplying the *Indians* in any other manner with the goods they want, or to prevent the northern *Indians* from reſorting to the *Engliſh* colonies: but in caſe thoſe praying *Indians*, as they are called, are really of ſo much value to them as it is alledged, why might they not be of equal value to us?

The deciſion of the point here in diſpute is of vaſt moment to the *Britiſh* intereſt, and very well deſerves the niceſt ſcrutiny of the board of trade. As it depends on a fact which is to be aſcertained only by experience, I will not offer my opinion: but this I think I may venture to ſay, that if the *Albany* illicit trade was deſtroyed, and the navigation of the lakes was made free by deſtroying the forts of *Niawgra* and *De-troite*, before-mentioned, or erecting others in their neighbourhood, we ſhould ſoon ſhare the fur trade of the north and weſtern *Indians* with the *French*; and that in caſe the *Hudſon*'s bay trade was laid open, we ſhould have it almoſt wholly to ourſelves; even altho' the *French* could get *Indian* goods from *France* or elſewhere, to put off at the ſame rates they do now: but while the company ſell their goods ſo exceſſively dear to the *Indians*, and the navigation of the lakes is ſhut up by thoſe two forts,

forts; no wonder ſo much of the fur and peltry go to the *French*, who ſell them much cheaper than the company, and ſo little to the *Engliſh* of the colonies, who ſell them one half cheaper than the *French*.

When a firm peace and friendſhip is eſtabliſhed with the ſix nations, endeavours ought to be uſed to bring back their brethren the *Praying Indians*, who, provoked by the villainous treatment (as Mr. *Kennedy* calls it) of the handlers, went over to the *French*. This was ſo long ago as between the years 1670 and 80. Theſe are converts ſettled at *Kahnuaga*, a village on the river *St. Laurence*, a little to the north of *Montreal*, and are greatly cheriſhed by the *French*, they being their principal fighting *Indians*. It is by them alſo that the trade is carry'd on at *Albaney*: and but for them in all probability the ſix nations would have been deſtroyed before now by the *French*: for they not only refuſe going to war againſt them as their brethren, but have given them intelligence of deſigns formed againſt them in *Canada*, for which and other reaſons it is judged, that by proper methods they may be recovered.

Now, the moſt proper method that appears is to deſtroy the *Albaney* illicit trade, which is their only ſubſiſtence; at leaſt, it is certain, that before they can be recovered, it muſt for that purpoſe be deſtroyed. This trade is, doubtleſs, the greateſt tie on them to the *French* intereſt; but the *French* employ them in it chiefly as ſpies, to gain intelligence how matters go in *New York*, with which province they are as well acquainted as the inhabitants themſelves; and to carry on any ſecret correſpondence with the *Mohawks*, from which tribe chiefly they are the deſerters. Mr. *Kennedy* ſays, * "they "muſt be brought back, coſt what it will."

* Conſiderat. p. 19.

Mr. *Colden*, ſpeaking of an opportunity of recovering the *Praying Indians*, loſt for want of being purſued *, ſays, "it might have been of great "conſequence: but ſuch matters, continues he, "where there is not an immediate private profit, are "ſeldom purſued by the *Engliſh* with that care and "aſſiduity, with which they are by the *French*."

How indefatigable the *French* are to gain the *Indians*, and ſet them againſt the *Engliſh*, as if their friendſhip was the *ſine qua non*, is evident from the letters of Mr. *Vaudreuil* governor of *Louſiana*, to his friends in *France* in 1744, found on board the *Golden Lyon* prize, taken by Capt. *Aylmer*, commander of the *Port-Mahon* man of war †; wherein is ſhewn the artifices which he made uſe of to impoſe on, and draw over, the *Chikeſaws*, who duped him after all.

There is the more reaſon to believe that the *Kahnuagas* might be induced to return, if what Dr. *Douglas* ſays be fact, that the *Arrſeguntookooks* and *Weweenoks*, two tribes of the *Abenakki Indians*, the moſt inveterate of all the *Engliſh* enemies, ſubmitted to the crown of *England* in a congreſs held at *Falmouth* in *Kaſko* bay, the 27th of *September* 1749. Theſe are by the *French* called the *Miſſions of St. Francis* and *Bekancourt*; and dwell on the ſouth ſide of the river *St. Laurence*, on rivers of the ſame names, one 40, the other 30 leagues above *Quebek*. ‡

If I ſay (for I own I much doubt it) theſe *Abenakki* tribes have ſubmitted, why (if proper means be uſed) may not the reſt? whoſe friendſhip, next to that of the ſix nations, is of moſt importance to the northern colonies. Theſe *Indians*, altho' ſcattered and few, like all the northern *Indian* nations (for they do not exceed 650 fighting men) having

* P. 199. † See the preſent ſtate of *Louiſiana*, 1744.
‡ *Dougl.* Summary *Amer.* Vol. II. p. 4.

having the whole country, from the borders of *New England* to the gulf of *St. Laurence*, in their poſſeſſion, would be of vaſt uſe to prevent the incroachments of the *French* in that part of the continent, and favour any attempt which we might have occaſion to make againſt *Canada*. The forts built along the river of *St. John*, and particularly that at the head of the *Kennibek*, would greatly help to compaſs this deſign: but nothing of this kind can be hoped for, ſo long as that almoſt implacable animoſity ſubſiſts, which reigns between the people of *New England* and them, on account of ancient quarrels. Some methods, therefore, ſhould be taken to make them forgo their mutual reſentments; and if poſſible (for ſome will not allow it to be poſſible) effectually reconcile them. As the *Cherokees* are a good barrier to *Carolina* againſt the *French* of *Louiſiana*, ſo might the *Abenakki*, by good management, be made a ſtrong one between *New England* and *Canada*.

After all, there ſeems but little hopes yet of ſucceeding in this deſirable end: for, inſtead of gaining over any of thoſe *Indians*, ſince the *French* began hoſtilities, we have loſt *Indians:* for moſt of the tribes on the *Okio* ſtood neuters, and the reſt deſerted as in the battle of the meadows. What has a worſe aſpect, the laſt news from *New York* brings advice that the *Mehikander* or *River Indians*, who dwelt on *Hudſon* river above *Albany*, are gone over to the *French*. This muſt be owing to either reſentment for ſome former, or ſome late ill uſage, particularly in trade. If the latter be the caſe, what can we ſay, *but that the people who are devoted to unjuſt lucre, are devoted to ruin?*

VI.

Some remarks on Nova Scotia, *and the* Ohio *affair.*

NOW we are upon *Nova Scotia*, I must take notice, that it is by this province only that the *French* can be hindered from surrounding all our colonies: for they have settled and built forts to the south of *Canada* river, in all other parts but this; from which they may always be excluded on the land side, in case the chain of forts on the river *Kennibek*, should be carry'd on to the river *St. Laurence* along the *Chaudiere*. By means of one fort built at the mouth of this last river, and another at the mouth of the *St. Francis*, or one of those between the other two, we might be able at any time to obstruct the communication by water, between *Quebek* and *Montreal*, as well as annoy them. This could be done the more conveniently, as those forts might be readily supplied with every thing, by a third to be erected, as before-mentioned, at the heads of those two rivers; which might itself be readily furnished with all kinds of necessaries from both *New York* and *New England*, by the river *Albany* and *Konnektekut* (which rise in its neighbourhood) as well as the *Kennibek*. With regard to which last, it is worth observing, that the distance from the mouth of it to *Quebek* is not half so great as that from *Boston* to *Quebek*, and but one third of that from *New York* to *Quebek*; a circumstance which ought to make us more earnest both to settle and fortify this river.

I hope we shall not be afraid to build upon our own frontiers, lest it should disoblige the *French*, who have taken the liberty to build within them. For my part, I think we ought not to forbear doing any thing which may disgust or offend them; since

ſince they have done every thing which they could think of to diſguſt and provoke us. In ſhort, to make ourſelves amends, we ought to erect a few forts within their ſettlements, none fitter for the purpoſe than the laſt-mentioned three, and then let them take their remedy: for they cannot do worſe than they have done; and, perhaps, this would be the readieſt and leaſt expenſive way to make them quit our territories and withdraw within their own.

The province of *Nova Scotia*, beſides being a ſtrong barrier againſt the *French*, as well as defence to our northern colonies, is of importance to us on many other accoonts; but on none more than that the *French* think it would be of importance to them. That they do ſo is evident from the unwillingneſs with which they gave it up at the treaty of *Utrecht*; and the extraordinary methods which they have been taking ever ſince to get it out of our hands again. This will appear alſo from the character which their writers give of it.

Denys, in his deſcription of *North America*, ſpeaking of *Acadia*, in his dedication to *Lewis* XIV. recommends it "as *the principal part of all* New "France: *the moſt uſeful, and eaſy to be peopled.*" Another writer, in a memoir publiſhed at the time of the intended conqueſt of our colonies, in 1688, ſpeaks thus of it: "*Acadia* ſo uſeful, on "account of the beauty and ſecurity of its ports, "the fertility of its ſoil, the advantage of its "mines, the abundance of its fiſh, and the faci-"lity of making the fiſhery ſedentary." To theſe may be added the vaſt plenty of excellent timber which it affords for building ſhips.

Theſe are the conſiderations which make the *French* ſo fond of *Nova Scotia*, and the ſame conſidera-

ſiderations ought to endear it no leſs to *Britain*, whoſe riches and power conſiſts in its commerce and ſhipping.

There are two expreſſions in the laſt quotation, which I ſhall take an occaſion to explain. One is what he calls a *ſedentary fiſhery*, by which is meant no more than a fixt or ſettled fiſhery; and to be ſure almoſt every part of the coaſts of *Nova Scotia* affords conveniency for ſuch ſettlements, eſpecially the coaſts of the *Peninſula* from *Cape St. Mary* to *Canſo*.

By *the beauty of its ports* is to be underſtood the great conveniency as to depth, capaciouſneſs, wood and water, in which they are to be exceeded by no country in the world. The flood in ſome of them, particularly *Port-Royal*, riſes 28 feet, which qualifies it for receiving the largeſt ſhips: and altho' that port is not ſo conveniently ſituated for trade as *Halifax* and other ports on the ſouth-eaſt ſide of the *Peninſula*, yet it is capable of holding the whole navy of *England*; and what is very remarkable as well as of great importance, is almoſt the only place in all *America*, excepting *Shegnikto* (where the ſea riſes above double that height) in which men of war may be conveniently docked.

The proceedings of the *French* in *Nova Scotia*, from its firſt ſettlement, having been treated of at large in the pamphlet above mentioned; I ſhall paſs from thence to *Virginia*, and ſpeak a few words concerning their preſent proceedings in the country of the *Ohîo*, and the title which they ſet up to it.

This river runs with a very rapid and winding courſe, thro' one of the moſt fertile and beautiful countries in the world; conſiſting moſtly of ſpacious plains covered with trees of various kinds,

ſuch as large walnut and hickery, mixed frequently with poplars, cherry-trees, ſugar-trees, and the like. So that whether we regard the fineneſs of its ſtream, or the lands thro' which it paſſes, it well deſerves the name it bears of *Ohîo* or *Hohîo*, which ſignifies the *Fair River*. It riſes from two or three little lakes at the back of *New York* province, a little to the weſt of the *Alliganey* mountains, to the ſouth of the country of the five nations, and to the eaſt of lake *Erri*. It is for the general very broad, eſpecially towards the mouth, and has a courſe of above 600 miles thro' a country ſuch as we have deſcribed, ſo many miles ſquare. Ten or a dozen large rivers fall into it, beſides an infinite number of ſmaller ſtreams; all abounding with excellent fiſh of ſeveral kinds, like the *Ohîo* itſelf, which breeds the cat-fiſh, of a prodigious ſize. Formerly divers nations dwelt along this river and its branches; among the reſt were the *Showanongs*, or *Sattcanas*, a very powerful people, who had more than 50 towns in their poſſeſſion: But about the year 1685 they were all either deſtroyed or driven out of the country by ſome of their neighbours; and the *Twigtwis*, with other nations, came and ſettled in their room, altho' ſome remains of thoſe different tribes are ſtill to be found, particularly of the *Showanongs*.

As this country belongs to *Virginia*, being within its grant, (which includes all the inlands of *America* between certain latitudes, from the *Atlantic* ocean to the ſouth ſea) the inhabitants of that province began pretty early to viſit it. Col. *Wood* particularly, who dwelt at the falls of *James*'s river, in 1654, ſent proper perſons; who paſſing the *Alleganey* mountains, entered the country of the *Ohîo*, and in ten years ſpace diſcovered ſeveral branches, not only of that river, but alſo of the *Miſſiſſippi* itſelf.

The

The *Virginians*, invited by the fertility of the country, and friendly behaviour of the *Indians*, continued their viſits thither; and altho' they made no ſettlements, yet they traded with the natives, and many private perſons went and reſided among them for the greater conveniency of carrying on that trade: eſpecially after the five nations had conquered the *Ilinois* and all this country of the *Ohîo*, as far as the river *Ilinois* and the *Miſſiſſippi*; to which the *Engliſh* became farther intitled, in right of the conquerors, who about the ſame time became allies of *Great Britain*. Mean time, the *French* having, in 1699, made a ſettlement at the mouth of the *Miſſiſſippi*, and opened a communication between that place and *Canada*, (by means of the *Ilinois* river, which enters the *Miſſiſſippi* in about the 40th degree of latitude,) began to form a deſign of joining thoſe two colonies together. They aſſigned the river *Ilinois* the bounds between them; and denominated all the country from thence ſouthward to the gulf of *Mexico*, by the name of *Louiſiana*, in honour of their King *Lewis* XIV. Their view in this was to give themſelves a title to all the country on both ſides the *Miſſiſſippi* (on which river likewiſe they conferred the name of *Louis*) and to ſeize it under that pretence, whenever they found themſelves ſtrong enough to effect it. They began in the infancy of this ſouthern colony to build forts along the *Miſſiſſippi*, and by degrees to enter into the *Ohîo*, at whoſe mouth they built a fort alſo; by which river, and the *Wabaſh*, they found a ſhorter and more convenient rout to and from *Quebek*, than by that of the *Ilinois*. Mean while the *Engliſh* continued their intercourſe and traffic with the *Indians* of the *Ohîo* country, ſo much to their advantage, that in 1716, Col. *Spotſwood* then governor

governor of *Virginia*, got a law paſt there for erecting a company to trade with them. This trade was ſettled ſo greatly to their ſatisfaction, that conſiderable numbers repaired to *Chriſtiana* fort, which was built by the company for that purpoſe. He likewiſe laid an excellent ſcheme for extending that trade, and raiſing fortifications even on the banks of the lake *Erri*: nor was there any perſon in *America*, ſays our memorialiſt of 1732, better qualified to execute ſuch a ſcheme. But, becauſe it was "managed by a company, "continues the ſame writer, it was oppoſed in "*England*, and a repeal of the law procured, to "the inexpreſſible loſs of all theſe colonies: altho' "without a company the deſign was impractica-"ble; unleſs it had been made the buſineſs of "the whole government."

If Col. *Spotſwood*'s ſcheme had been followed, the *Ohio* might have been ſettled before this, and the preſent diſtractions prevented; but, when was there ever a right meaſure taken till lately for the advantage and ſecurity of the colonies?

Things ſtood thus till about the year 1725, when the *French* being no longer able to ſupply the *Indians* of this country with the goods they wanted; the *Twigtwees* or *Miyamis* a nation independent, and much more numerous than the ſix nations, repaired directly to *New York* and *Albany*, there to trade with the *Engliſh*. This brought on an alliance with thoſe *Americans*, and a greater intercourſe of the *Engliſh* than before, invited by the trade and beauty of the country. It likewiſe begat a deſire of reviving *Spotſwood*'s ſcheme. Accordingly, in 1730, endeavours were uſed to obtain a grant from the crown of thoſe excellent lands; and propoſals made to tranſport large numbers of *Palatines* to ſettle it. But this

good

good attempt was alſo fruſtrated: perhaps, by the ſame bad policy which fruſtrated the former.

However, at length, in 1749, when it was too late, as appears by the event, a grant was obtained of 600,000 acres in this country, to certain merchants and others, of *Virginia* and *London*, who aſſociated under the title of *The* Ohîo *company*.

Mean time the governor of *Canada* diſguſted to ſee the *French* deprived of ſuch a conſiderable nation of *Indians* as the *Twigtwees*, with their trade; and conſidering too, that in caſe the *Engliſh* were once firmly ſettled in the country, that the hopes of poſſeſſing it, and even of paſſing that way to *Louiſiana*, would be entirely cut off from his nation, in the year 1750 wrote to the governors of *New York* and *Penſylvania*, acquainting them that our *Indian* traders had incroached on their territories by trading with their *Indians*; and that if they did not deſiſt he ſhould be obliged to ſeize them wherever they were found. Might not one have thought, that on ſuch warning as this thoſe colonies would immediately have taken the alarm, raiſed forces, and under their protection, with the *Indians* leave, ſet about building forts for ſecurity of their traders? inſtead of this they went on ſettling without taking any precautions for their ſecurity.

Perhaps they imagined the *French* were in jeſt: nor did this meſſage divert the *Ohîo* company from their deſign of having a ſurvey made of the country as far as the falls in that river. But while Mr. *Giſt*, employed for that purpoſe, was in his progreſs in ſpring 1751, ſome *French* parties with their *Indians* (for they do nothing without *Indians*) ſeized three *Engliſh* traders and carried them to a fort which they were then building on one of the branches of lake *Erri*; having before built another

other at the mouth of the river *Wabaſh*. On this the *Engliſh*, who were ſcattered thro' the country, retired to the *Indian* towns for ſhelter; and the *Twigtwees* reſenting the violence done to their allies, aſſembled to the number of 5 or 600, and ſcoured the woods till they found three *French* traders, whom they ſent to *Penſylvania*.

While theſe things were doing, the *French* were making preparations for building a fort on the ſouth ſide of the lake *Erri*; of which proceedings Mr. *Hamilton*, then governor of *Penſylvania*, having received advice, he laid before the aſſembly of that province the neceſſity which there was to have ſome places of ſtrength and ſecurity built on the *Ohio*, under the name of *trading* or *truck-houſes*, which might ſerve for retreats to their *Indian* traders: the propoſal was approved of and money granted for the purpoſe; but as the means propoſed for raiſing it were not complied with, nothing was done, and an opportunity given to the *French* to finiſh their ſecond fort.

Repeated complaints of theſe encroachments being made to the governor of *Virginia*; at length, towards the end of the year 1753, major *Waſhington* was ſent to the commander of thoſe forts to demand a reaſon for his hoſtile proceedings, and required him to withdraw with his forces. The commander denied that any thing like hoſtilities had been committed, but refuſed to obey the ſummons; and the officer of the near fort being aſked a reaſon for making ſeveral of the *Engliſh* priſoners, told him, "that the country "belonged to them; that no *Engliſhman* had a "right to trade on thoſe waters; and that he had "orders to ſeize every one who ſhould attempt "to trade on the *Ohio* or its branches."

At

At the ſame time that major *Waſhington* was diſpatched towards the *French* forts, a reſolution was taken to build a fort near the forks of the *Ohio*; and as the major was on his return, he met the ſtores and other materials on their way thither. But next ſpring the *French* coming down from their forts, as they had declared the year before, took that fort ere it was finiſhed, and purſuing their deſign drove the *Engliſh* quite out of the country, back into the more ſettled part of *Virginia*, in the manner as hath been related in the public papers: nor was this to be wondered at, conſidering how unprepared we were to reſiſt them.

The undertaking to make theſe ſettlements and build forts, without any force to ſupport them, was the more extraordinary, if the memorialiſt of 1732, in ſpeaking of the former attempt, hath repreſented the ſtate of things rightly. "It were truly to be wiſhed, ſaith he, that this "project was practicable: for ſuch a frontier "on that part would be highly uſeful: but as it "is preſumed that they muſt firſt aſk leave of "thoſe who will never grant it, *viz.* the *French*, "who are extremely jealous of extended ſettle-"ments, it would be in vain, under the preſent "ſtate of affairs, to attempt it."

This ſhews that the *French* had, even then, either taken poſſeſſion of the country, or at leaſt declared that the *Engliſh* ſhould not make any ſettlements in it; and that it was generally believed they were able to make good their declaration. And if it was in vain to attempt ſuch a thing at that juncture, it certainly was more in vain to attempt it at preſent; I mean without a ſufficient force, when the *French* were become con-

conſiderably ſtronger, had actually built forts in the country, and threatened to bring troops to oppoſe our deſigns.

However, 'tis probable the *French* would not have been able to compaſs their purpoſe, had not the *Indians* either ſtood neuter or deſerted our party. That they behaved in this manner, was owing, 'tis ſaid, to the building of that fort, and the *Ohîo* grant being made without their privity or conſent.

They were greatly incenſed to think, that the *Engliſh* ſhould take upon them *to diſpoſe of their lands* without any title to them, either by gift or purchaſe. If this be ſo, it is no wonder that they ſhould rather take part with the *French*, who openly declared their deſign of eſtabliſhing themſelves in the country, than with the *Engliſh*, who were clandeſtinely depriving them of their lands, at the ſame time they profeſſed friendſhip. Such dealing likewiſe ſerves the *French* another way, as it helps to confirm the ſuſpicions which they are continually inſtilling into the minds of the *Indians*, that the *Engliſh* covet their lands; and that, whatever they may profeſs with their mouths, they are contriving how to ruin them in their hearts; and thus they gain ground among the *Indians*, while the *Engliſh* loſe ground.

That the *Indians* gave no conſent, either to the grant of their lands or building of the fort, ſeems evident from many circumſtances. When Mr. *Giſt* or *Ghiſt* in 1751 went to ſurvey the country along the *Ohîo* for the company, he was very careful to conceal his deſign from the *Indians*, who were no leſs ſuſpicious and inquiſitive about it. At *Logſtown* particularly, the *Delawares* wanted much to know his buſineſs; and he not anſwering them readily, they ſuſpected he came to ſettle their lands, and made uſe of many threats:

but at length it ſeems they were pacified, on being told that he came with a meſſage to them from their king, meaning the king of *England*.

'Tis certain too from the ſpeech of *Shingis*, the half king, to the *French* commandant, which he repeated to *Waſhington* at this place, that the *Indians* aſſerted "their right to the lands againſt "both *French* and *Engliſh*: that they threatened "the *French* for daring to come and take their "land by force and build on it; declaring that "the land belonged to neither of them; and "that they had already told the *Engliſh* ſo." Major *Waſhington* ſaid nothing to contradict this; nor did he mention any thing about building a fort in the council which was held concerning the *French*; "he even concealed the real in-"tent of his journey to the *French* fort from the "*Indians*, putting them off with ſome excuſe," as if he was conſcious that to ſummon the *French* to withdraw, implied a tacit claim to the country. Neither is there in all the relation of his journey any intimation of the *Indians* conſenting to build a fort, any more than of the company's deſign to build one. The aſſembly of *Penſylvania*, indeed, were informed by one of their agents, that the *Indians* had given conſent for building a fort on the *Ohîo*: but in this they found, upon due enquiry, that they had been deceived. On calling that perſon to an account for impoſing on them, he pleaded the orders of a certain principal man: this principal man denying the fact, the other ſent up his letter or inſtructions to the aſſembly. But altho' the letter proved what he alledged, yet they did not think it any excuſe for the deception; and therefore took, what they thought, a proper method to make him ſenſible of their reſentment, by con-

fiſcating a round ſum of money, which was due to him. The ſufferer (who deſerved no leſs puniſhment for being inſtrumental in burning out a great number of ſettlers on the river *Suſquehanna*, not long before) finding he could have no indemnification from the governor, whoſe tool he had been, in revenge went and diſcovered the ſecret of the *Ohîo* grant to the *Indians*, and ſpirited them up to call in the *French* to drive out the *Engliſh*. It was from a principle of revenge alſo, in another diſguſted proprietor under the new grant, that the impoſition we are ſpeaking of came to be diſcovered. In ſhort we are told, that the preſent *French* invaſion had its riſe from the *Ohîo* company's building the ſtore-houſe at *Will's Creek*. For the *Indian* trade, which before was carried on with *Penſylvania* by the river *Suſquehanna*, was by means of that ſtore-houſe and a waggon-road, opened thro' the country, carried into *Virginia* by way of the *Potômak*: that the *Penſylvania* traders conſidering this as an injury done to them, in revenge infuſed jealouſies into the minds of the *Indians*, that the *Engliſh* were going clandeſtinely to ſeize their lands: that the clamor among the *Indians* alarmed the *French*: and that the building the fort on the *Ohîo* confirming the information which they had received of the grant, they in reſentment joined with the *French* to defeat the *Engliſh* deſigns.

This is the account given by ſome who were acquainted with the whole tranſaction: by which the aſſembly at *Philadelphia*, and ſeveral worthy members of the *Ohîo* company, were abuſed by ſuch unworthy ones.

The reader may judge from ſuch proceedings as theſe, what it is which hath loſt us the warm hearts of the *Indians*; and how difficult it muſt be to recover our credit with them, after having dealt

ſo deceitfully. Such proceedings as theſe, which tend to ruin the colonies, ought to be made known, that a ſtop may be put to them for the future.

The beſt way, therefore, to avoid conteſts and animoſities, would be to drop all ſuch claims to the lands of *Indians*; and purchaſe them gradually, as we advance in our ſettlements, which may be done at a ſmall expence. For it would be better to buy their friendſhip, tho' dear, than to loſe the aſſiſtance of people without whoſe good will we cannot poſſibly maintain our footing any where. I would adviſe this method particularly with reſpect to the *Ohio* country; for if we ſhould neglect it, the *French* may do it, in order to make the *Indians* their friends, and perplex us. It might become the *French* and *Spaniards*, or ſuch arbitrary people, to take the *Indian* lands by force, but not the *Engliſh*, who ſhould be as tender of the liberty and property of other nations as they are jealous of their own.

This miſtaken, not to ſay unjuſt, way of proceeding with the *Indians*, ſeems to ariſe from a notion that we are intitled to the poſſeſſion of all their lands, in right of our diſcoveries: whereas thoſe diſcoveries give us no more real right to any part of *America*, than the diſcovery of our coaſts by an *Indian* would give thoſe of his tribe a right to *Great Britain*. The diſcoveries of one nation ſerve only to exclude any other from ſettling in the parts ſo diſcovered by them: So that this ſort of argument can be of force only with *Europeans* againſt *Europeans*, who make uſe of it to ſupport their ſeveral pretenſions. It is in this ſenſe only therefore, that either the *French* or we can pretend any right originally to our *American* ſettlements; and in this ſenſe I am to be underſtood, in examining the *French* claim to their

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American poſſeſſions in general, and to that of the *Ohio* country in particular.

VII.

Exorbitant claims of the French *examined; and an expedient propoſed to prevent future diſputes.*

THE *French* claim the country of the *Ohio*, as part of *Louiſiana:* which name Mr. *De la Salle*, in his paſſage from *Canada* down the *Miſſiſſippi* in 1683, gave to the lands on both ſides of it, from the river *Ilinois* to the gulf of *Mexico*. They claim it likewiſe, as being the firſt who diſcovered and entered the mouth of the *Miſſiſſippi* in 1699, under Mr. *Iberville*. If 'tis true that they firſt ſailed down the *Miſſiſſippi*, yet the *Engliſh* were the firſt who diſcovered and entered the mouth of it. This they did one year ſooner than the *French*, on the following occaſion. Dr. *Daniel Cox* reſolving to revive a claim which he had to the lands of *America*, from 31 to 36 degrees, granted in 1630 by King *Charles* I. to Sir *Robert Heath*, under the name of *Carolana*; in 1698 ſent two ſhips under captain *William Bond* (late ſtore-keeper of *Fort George* in *New York*) to take poſſeſſion of the country: and as the eaſtern coaſt was already ſettled by *Engliſh*, deriving under ſubſequent grants, they had orders to find out the mouth of the *Miſſiſſippi*, (which *La Salle* had in two voyages ſought for in vain) and entering into it make a ſettlement there. The ſhips went, and having diſcovered the * river, one of them paſt up it above 100 miles; but as the other ſhip deſerted her, they made no ſettlement. However they took poſſeſſion of the country on both ſides

* Captain *Bond* brought from thence ſeveral curious draughts which he had made of the coaſt and river, and which are ſtill in being in the poſſeſſion of captain *R. Riggs*.

of the river in king *William*'s name; and left in ſeveral places the arms of *Great Britain* affixed on boards and trees, for a memorial thereof: but while the proprietor was applying in *England* for a new grant, Mr. *Iberville* the next year found the mouth of the river, and entering it made a ſettlement there. *Charlevoix* allows, that three ſhips were ſent from *England* on the diſcovery of this river, and that one of them did enter the mouth of it: but pretends † that this was in *September* 1699, and that there was then actually a *French* fort, whoſe commander *Bionville* ſtoped her paſſage. However he ſays the *Engliſh* claimed the country, ſaid they had been there above 50 years before, and would return to drive them out.

If therefore priority of diſcovery gives a right, the *Engliſh* are intitled to all the country in queſtion: for they not only firſt diſcovered the mouths of *Miſſiſſippi*, but travelled over the countries on the eaſt ſide of it, particularly that thro' which the *Ohio* and its branches paſſes for many years together, a long time before *La Salle* ſailed down the *Miſſiſſippi*. Colonel *Wood* of *Virginia*, in the year 1654, ſent one Mr. *Needham*, who ſpent ten years in this employment, as we are informed, in the deſcription of *Carolina*, by Dr. *Cox*, who had his journal. Alſo in 1674 captain *Botts* made another progreſs thro' the ſame country. And ſurely travelling over and viewing a country with a view to ſettle it, muſt give a better title to it than ſailing down a river, even ſuppoſing *La Salle* had navigated it before the *Engliſh*: but that is not likely, ſince the latter were acquainted with both it and the adjacent countries long before that adventurer had any thoughts of the voyage.

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† Vol. II. p. 259.

Wherefore, ſuppoſing the *Engliſh* had no other right or claim to theſe countries than what they derive from the facts above-mentioned, they have a far better title than the *French*, who want to invert the order of things; and ſince they were not the firſt diſcoverers, will ground their claim on being the laſt. This prepoſterous method ſeems to have become a rule with them: for they follow the ſame in their pretended claim to all north-*America*, which they ground on the diſcovery of *Verazzani* in 1524, twenty-ſeven years later than that of the *Cabots* in 1497; and now they would have the diſcoveries of *La Salle* and *Iberville* to take place of both. But the *Engliſh* not liking to confound things, and put the cart before the horſe, are reſolved to adhere to the old eſtabliſhed cuſtom, and found their pretenſions on the diſcovery of the *Cabots*, becauſe it was antecedent to all the others.

Altho' our kingshave made grants of lands in north *America* no lower down than the lat. of 29 degrees, yet it ſeems evident even from the confeſſion of the *French* themſelves, that the *Engliſh* are intitled to the whole, as far as the cape of *Florida*. *Peter Martyr* counſellor and hiſtoriographer to the emperor *Charles* V. relates from the words of *Cabot*, whom he entertained in his houſe for ſome time; that he ſailed along the coaſt of *America* ſo far to the ſouth and to the weſt, that he had the iſland of *Cuba* (which lies to the ſouth of *Florida*) on his left hand. *Cabot* in his letter ſays he ſailed ſouthward: but as he does not mention the *preciſe* degree of latitude to which he ſailed, the *Spaniards* pretend that he paſſed no farther than the 38th degree. Yet *Antony Golvano*, a perſon noted for his integrity, and governor of *Ternata*, one of the *Molucco* iſlands; in a hiſtory which he wrote of diſcoveries about the year 1550,

reciting the common opinion adds, that ſome ſay he *ſailed as low as the cape of* Florida *in the lat. of* 25 *degrees.* The *French* for the general do not diſpute the extent of *Cabot*'s diſcovery: on the contrary, their authors of moſt reputation carry it to the end of the peninſula of *Florida.* *Thuanus* in particular, their celebrated hiſtorian, in his forty-firſt book, ſpeaking of the firſt diſcovery of *Florida*, ſays "it is a matter in diſpute; for "that the *Spaniards* aſcribe the glory of it to "their countryman *John Ponce* of *Leon*, who "gave that name to it, becauſe he landed there "on *Eaſter*-day: but, continues *Thuanus*, it is "more certain, what many affirm, that *Sebaſtian* "*Cabot* had been there before him in the year "1496." Accordingly *Richelet*, a late author, who publiſhed a tranſlation of the hiſtory of *Florida* at *Paris* in 1709, in a note at chap. 3, fairly acknowledges that *Florida* had been diſcovered by *Cabot* before *John Ponce* of *Leon* ſailed thither. Now this was in the year 1512, 15 years after *Cabot*'s diſcovery: and as *Ponce* landed in that part which according to *Herrera* is properly the country called *Florida*, extending from the Cape oppoſite to *Cuba* for 100 leagues northward, (that is from 25 to about 30 degrees of lat.) conſequently *Cabot*'s diſcovery will comprize not only all what *Verazzani* diſcovered, from 34 to 56 degrees of lat. or the whole of what his countrymen affect to call *New France*, (as the author of the *conduct of the* French *with regard to* Nova Scotia hath juſtly obſerved) but likewiſe all the continent to the ſouth of 34 degrees, as far as the cape of *Florida*, which includes a great deal more than the *French* lay claim to by the pretended diſcovery of *La Salle* and *Iberville.* In ſhort, the *French* have no title to any part of *North America* in right of a diſcovery; not even to *Canada*, in which they intruded

truded by connivance or neglect of the *Engliſh*. The only title which they ever had being by ceſſion made by us in treaties; and that title they have forfeited by their preſent infractions.

But, whether ſuch diſcoveries give the *Engliſh* a better title or not to the country in queſtion, or whether they derive any right from the conqueſts made by the *five nations*, whom *France*, by the treaty of *Utrecht*, has acknowledged to be the ſubjects of *Great Britain*; yet, certainly the *French*, by that acknowledgment, not only have no right to it, but they alſo violate that treaty by laying a claim to it; much more by entering it in a hoſtile manner to aſſert that claim; ſince, by the 15th article of it, *France* obliges herſelf not to give any hindrance or moleſtation to the *five nations*, or the other nations of *America*, who are friends to the *Engliſh*.

If a nation hath a right to countries by poſſeſſion, the *Engliſh* have a ſtronger right to the *Ohio* country, or thoſe to the weſt of *Virginia*, as far back as the *ſouth ſea*, than to any other part of their dominions. They have, if I may ſo expreſs it, a double right to all that vaſt tract of *America* from ſea to ſea lying between the 36th and 44th degrees of north latitude: for they not only diſcovered it on both ſides of the continent; but had formal ceſſions of it, and took poſſeſſion a great number of years before the *French* thought of ſettling in the *Miſſiſſippi*, or even knew there was ſuch a river. By this double poſſeſſion, I mean the diſcovery and poſſeſſion of *Virginia* on one ſide of the continent, and of the kingdom of *New Albion* on the other ſide, in the *pacific* ocean or *ſouth ſea*, lying under the ſame parallels of latitude.

This country was not only firſt diſcovered by Sir *Francis Drake*, in 1578, but the King made a formal

formal ſurrender of it to the crown of *Great Britain*, and Sir *Francis* took formal poſſeſſion of it, ſetting up the arms of *England* as a memorial. Let the *French* ſhew ſuch a title as this to any of their ſettlements in *North America*.

This tract, therefore, from ſea to ſea, between *Virginia* and *New Albion*, ought at leaſt to be deemed indiſputably ours, as we are intitled by the double claim. Shall they, after another nation hath diſcovered both extremities, or ſides of a region, thruſt in between and ſeize all the middle part, under pretence that they found it open and unſettled? If this be allowable, what objection can they have to our entering into the middle of their ſettlements, and fixing ourſelves in any place: not only on the *Miſſiſſippi*, where their ſettlements are ſo far aſunder, but alſo wherever we can find the leaſt vacancy between two towns or plantations of theirs, tho' at ever ſo ſmall a diſtance from each other? Let them conſider, if private property can be ſecure upon ſuch rapacious principles; and if one man may not intrude into the poſſeſſions of his neighbour, to the confuſion of all right and title to the lands?

The *French* pretend non occupancy of *North America* from ſea to ſea, becauſe they found the *Miſſiſſippi* unſettled by the *Engliſh*. All the continent was granted as low down as 29 degrees; and nearly all the ſea coaſt ſo low down divided into colonies, and all the ſea coaſt or eaſtern parts ſettled. If any part of land granted or farmed be ſettled, is not that ſufficient to ſecure a right to the whole? Is every farm granted in *France* ſettled in every part? is it not enough if a houſe be built in ſome part of it? and, ſince *North America* ſhould be conſidered as a great farm, or number of *Engliſh* farms, why ſhould not that which is a law in one caſe be a law in the other?

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Does any power diſpute with *England* her right to the countries to the north and weſt of *Hudſon's Bay*, altho' ſettled only in two or three places at the bottom of that bay? Does not *France* pretend a right to the countries on both ſides of the river *Miſſiſſippi*, as far as its ſource, tho' ſettled in very few places, meerly, by right of diſcovery? why then will ſhe not allow the ſame right to *England*?

The river *Miſſiſſippi*, by means of its wide ſtretching branches, embraces, as it were within its arms, all the middle and moſt valuable parts of *North America*. On the eaſt, all the rivers proceeding from the weſt ſide of the *Appalachean* or *Alliganey* mountains, fall into it, ſome of which, as the *Ohio*, have a courſe of at leaſt 1000 if not 1200 miles (reckoning the windings) while the length of ſuch as riſe on the eaſt ſide of thoſe mountains ſcarce exceed 300. So that ſuppoſing we were to yield to them all the country to the weſt of thoſe mountains, or which is the ſame, to make thoſe mountains the boundary between the *French* and *Engliſh* dominions; what a vaſt ſuperiority they would have of us with reſpect to extent of territory, (even ſuppoſing they were to be bounded weſtward by the *Miſſiſſippi*,) will appear on a bare inſpection of the maps. For the ſpace between the *Atlantic* ocean and the *Appalachean* mountains, is ſcarce one third of the country bounded on the north by the great lakes and river *St. Laurence*, and on the weſt by the *Miſſiſſippi*: ſo that in caſe the *French* are ſuffered to poſſeſs, beſides what they have already uſurped, all the country within thoſe bounds between the ſaid mountains and that great river, which amounts to more than two thirds of the whole, they will be maſters of a dominion larger than all *Europe*: But, when it is conſidered that the *Miſſiſſippi* itſelf and ſome of its branches, as the *Miſſouri*, extend ſtill farther within the body

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of *North America* on the weſt ſide, than thoſe which fall into it in the eaſt, the immenſeneſs of the power which may one day ariſe from the poſſeſſion of ſo vaſt a region, ſhould be enough to frighten the nations, either *Engliſh* or *Spaniards*, who are to be their neighbours; and, who therefore ought to join in putting an early ſtop to its growth.

I mention theſe things, becauſe it is ſaid that commiſſioners are going to meet for ſettling *American* limits. This was to have been done in 1719, but *France* then declined it, with a view to extend her boundaries as far as ſhe could before ſhe began to treat; that ſhe might be in a condition to make the larger demands, and to put us to defiance, in caſe they were not complied with: and, as ſhe hath been obliged to unmaſk a little before ſhe was fully prepared for a rupture, ſhe will, doubtleſs, endeavour to amuſe us here as long as ſhe can with fair declarations, and offers to adjuſt matters amicably, to gain time for ſecuring what they have already gotten from us, and farther advancing their ſcheme. But 'tis preſumed our miniſters are too well acquainted with *French* artifices, to be diverted one moment from proſecuting the proper meaſures to make them withdraw from all our frontiers, under pretence of a negotiation. King *William*, of glorious memory, in his declaration of war againſt *France*, takes notice, that *Lewis* XIV. had invaded his dominions in *America*, ſpoiled his ſubjects of their goods, ſeized their forts, burnt their ſhips, impriſoned ſome of his *Engliſh* ſubjects, and cauſed others to be inhumanly killed, as if he had been the greateſt enemy; "and yet was ſo far from declaring himſelf "ſuch, that at the ſame time he was negotiating "here in *England*, by his miniſters, a treaty of neu- "trality and good correſpondence in *America*."

I did

I did not put negotiation among the methods of recovering what the *French* have ſurreptitiouſly deprived us of (if that epithet can be applied to what was done before our eyes) as long and dear experience has ſhewn we can get nothing that way from our dextrous neighbours. Beſides, after controverting the ceſſion of *Nova Scotia*, made in the moſt explicit terms imaginable by the treaty of *Utrecht*, to what purpoſe can treaties with them ſerve us? The *French*, if hard preſſed, make treaties: but if they are obliged to give up any thing which they have a deſire to keep, or don't care to part with, they endeavour to recover it afterwards by colluſion or force. Both theſe methods they have uſed with regard to *Nova Scotia*, and the country of the *Ohio*.

On the other hand, as they have gotten a kind of poſſeſſion of all the country, and ſecured their footing by forts, it ſeems difficult to conceive how limits can be ſettled to the ſatisfaction of both parties: for the *French* will ſcarce be prevailed to give up amicably even thoſe territories on which they have encroached: and the *Engliſh*, for their better ſecurity, ought perhaps to have ſomewhat more: For, ſince the *French* declare their views to be incompatible with thoſe of the *Engliſh*, and have avowed it by the encroachments which they have made on our territories, contrary to the moſt ſolemn treaties and engagements; there ſeems no way left to prevent eternal diſputes, but to ſeparate them by certain natural boundaries; which, being fixed and permanent, can neither be controverted nor eaſily forced, ſuch as rivers, lakes, or mountains.

I am inclined, for your particular amuſement, to give you my opinion in what manner the limits ought to be ſettled on this ſide of the *Miſſiſſippi*, between the *Britiſh* colonies and *New France* or *Canada*,

Canada, conſidering theſe two names as equivocal and convertible terms. The line ſhould begin at the mouth of the river *St. Laurence*, and be drawn from thence thro' the middle of its ſtream to the lake *Katarakui* or *Ontario:* from thence to be carried thro' the length of the ſaid lake to a place on the north-weſt ſide called *Tejaiagon*, and ſo by the carrying place to a river falling into the lake *Taronto.* Thro' the ſame, and thence by the rivers and lake *St. Mary* of the *Hurons*, into the *Quatoghe* or *Huron* lake: thro' this lake and thro' the mouth of the *Miſhigan* lake (to the ſouth of the iſle called *Miſhillimakinak*) down the ſame, to a little river on the weſt ſide; and thence over land to a ſmall lake, into which falls the river *aux Renards* or of *the Foxes:* up this river and thro' the lakes to the carrying place, into the lake and river of *Wiſkuſing*; and down the ſame, thro' the middle of the ſtream, to the river *Miſſiſſippi.*

This bounding line, I think, cannot be juſtly objected to: for, firſt our northern colonies, by right of their grants as well as diſcovery, all extend as far at leaſt as the river *St. Laurence*; eſpecially as we have a right by the treaty of *Utrecht*, as before-mentioned, to the country of the *Iroquois* or *five nations*, which originally was about the lake *Champlain* and *Richlieu* river; called on that account by the *French* themſelves, as well as the *Dutch*, the *Iroquois* lake and river. Beſides, this country belongs to us by the ſubmiſſion (if fact) of its preſent inhabitants the *Areſiguntikooks* and *Weweenoks* to the crown of *Geeat-Britain*, at *Albany* in the year 1749. Then the country of the *Quatoghi's* or *Hurons* between the lakes *Ontario*, *Erri* and *Quatoghe*, with the country between the *Erri* and *Miſhigan*, to the ſouth of the *Quatoghe*: and alſo the country of the *Chiktaghiks* or *Ilinois*, between the lake *Miſhigan* and river *Miſſiſſippi*, were all conquered by the *five nations*;

nations; in right of whom we claim them, in virtue of the ſaid treaty. So that we could not take in theſe conquered countries without drawing the line in the manner we have done. According to which partition we leave our neighbours all to the north ſide of the river *St. Laurence*; we divide with them the lakes *Ontario*, *Hurons*, and *Miſhigan*: we keep to ourſelves the lake of *Erri*; and give them that very great one called the *Upper Lake*. This may compenſate for any little of the country to the north of the river *Ilinois*, which for the ſake of making natural boundaries, we may, in the opinion of the *French*, have taken more than our due, on account of the *Iroquois* conqueſts: nor is it our intention that they ſhould be debarred the free navigation of any of the lakes, but that it ſhould be open tu both nations; only neither of them ſhould build forts on any part or parts of thoſe lakes, excepting ſuch as ſhall fall to their reſpective ſhares.

In like manner may the limits be fixed between *Canada* and the *Hudſon Bay* colony, as well as between the ſouthern provinces of the *Engliſh* and *Louſiana*, on this ſide of the *Miſſiſſippi*: if rather the *French* ought not to relinquiſh all to the eaſt of that river, on account of ours being the prior diſcovery, and confine themſelves to the weſt ſide; where the boundaries may be carried on, for adjuſting the claims of both parties to the countries on that ſide of the great river, and beyond its ſprings to the north and weſt, as far as the *South Sea* coaſt, where the *Engliſh* have already one ſpacious country called *New Albion*.

For drawing up the agreement care ought to be taken to deſcribe the boundaries with the greateſt exactneſs and preciſion; by ſpecifying the courſe, ſituation, and different names of the ſeveral rivers, lakes, mountains and other places; in ſo diſtinct and

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accurate a manner, that no room, if poſſible, may be left for objection or diſpute. To do this the more effectually, the line ſhould be ſurveyed; and the latitudes obſerved with the greateſt accuracy at the moſt remarkable places, by perſons ſent from each court. Then maps ſhould be drawn, ſigned and delivered to each other by the reſpective commiſſioners, as counter-parts of deeds, that there might be no pretence for cavil. If the lands in diſpute are not worth ſo much care, they are not worth contending for.

It ſhould likewiſe be agreed by both nations to aboliſh the uſe of all names on either ſide, which claſhed with their reſpective intereſts ſo ſettled, and had been before employed to keep up the title of one nation to lands or territories belonging to the other. Thus, as it may be preſumed, that *France* will acknowledge the right which *Great-Britain* has to her *American* colonies, on the ſcore of priority of diſcovery as well as long and actual poſſeſſion, and will quit claim to the ſame; it will be proper that ſhe ſhould forbear giving to them, or comprehending them under, the name of *New France* or *Canada*, which ſhould ſolely be confined to the countries agreed by ſuch treaty to belong to her, and be in her diviſion. In like manner *Great-Britain* ſhould ceaſe to give the name of *Britiſh* colonies to any lands or countries acknowledged by the treaty to belong to *France*. And the geographers and hiſtorians of each nation ſhould be obliged, under certain penalties, to conform themſelves to this regulation; in order to remove all prejudices, errors and doubts from the minds of people, with relation to the dominions of each nation, and their reſpective juſt boundaries.

I am, &c.

10 *Dec.*
1754.

SECOND LETTER.

SIR,

SINCE I wrote you my long letter in *December* laſt, I have received ſeveral more letters, remarks and tracts relative to the colonies, from correſpondents perfectly well acquainted with the affairs of *America*; particularly two, whoſe obſervations I ſhall at preſent communicate to you. The firſt contains a general view of the *Britiſh* plantations on the continent, with a curious calculus of the number of whites inhabiting each of them. The ſecond animadverts on various points, worthy the attention of our miniſters; particularly thoſe which reſpect raiſing a fund, on terms agreeable to the inhabitants of the colonies, ſufficient for carrying on the preſent war, and for their future defence. I ſhall give you their ſentiments in different articles.

I.

General view of the Britiſh *colonies, and number of inhabitants in each.*

BRITAIN the political parent of her colonies (like a natural one, who intends to raiſe a progeny for advantage, ſtrength and power) in their infancy ſhould indulge, nouriſh and ſupport them. As they encreaſe and become capable of helping themſelves and benefiting their mother country, they ſhould be taught the obligation they owe her: That all their particular and hereditary rights and privileges, are derived from her: that they are bound to obey her laws; and that reſtraints laid on them are intended for mutual advantage. Their produce and induſtry ſhould be encouraged

and directed to the good and ſervice of both. They ſhould be governed by the laws of *England* in general, and by their own allowed particular ones: their force ought to be united to ſtrengthen their parent, and aſſiſt each other; and if invaded by a ſuperior power, they ſhould be effectually protected.

Colonies thus prudently and legally managed, would rejoice in their ſituation, and flouriſh: would add numbers, ſtrength, and riches to the general common-wealth; and enable this kingdom to meet the enemy in the gate. But, can any government or miniſtry act properly with regard to colonies, unleſs they know their ſtate, by the numbers of people they contain, on which the whole depends? The colonies on the continent of *America* are by ſome leſſened and depreciated: eſteemed the occaſions of unneceſſary and expenſive wars; depopulators and weakeners of *Britain*. By others they are aggrandized and over-rated monſtrouſly beyond truth. Towns are magnified and multiplied; the inhabitants made incredibly numerous; and their power averred to exceed that of large *European* kingdoms. Such falſe repreſentations may occaſion the deſtruction and loſs of the colonies (if not more.) To what can ſuch extravagant exaggerations tend? what can they produce but inattention to their preſent circumſtances; neglect or delay of relief? They may likewiſe raiſe and inflame a jealouſy, already kindled in the minds of many; from which ſource a harſh government, and the bad conſequences attending it, hereafter may reſult.

Nova Scotia, the firſt colony *Britain* poſſeſſed on the north-eaſt part of the continent, has ſhifted the property between the *French* and *Engliſh* ſeveral times. The firſt made the greater progreſs

in

in ſettling this country; and it is ſaid at preſent to contain upwards of 15,000 ſouls, improperly called neutral *French*. The *Engliſh* by great expence and encouragement, according to the laſt accounts, have in *Halifax*, *Lunenburgh*, and other places, about 5000 men, women, and children; and theſe are all the ſubjects whom this government compriſes, excluſive of the military forces.

Altho' the province of *Main* interferes between *Nova Scotia* and *New Hampſhire*; yet, as it is annext to the *Maſſachuſets Bay*, *New Hampſhire* is mentioned as the next colony. The whole government is but one county: *Portſmouth*, a ſtragling incontiguous town, is the capital. With the addition of territory and people it received from the *Maſſachuſets Bay*, the number of inhabitants in 1742, were 26,000 whites, beſides 500 negroes. The late war was prejudicial to the trade and cheked the natural increaſe of this colony, which has not been countervailed by foreign increaſe: Therefore at preſent 30,000 ſouls muſt be the utmoſt amount of its inhabitants at preſent.

Maſſachuſets Bay, a few years ſince, was of larger extent and had more inhabitants than at preſent; ſome towns and a large tract of land being adjudged to *New Hampſhire* on one ſide, and ſome ſettled towns to *Rhode Iſland* on the other. It is divided into 11 counties, in which are 153 towns. The names of ſo many towns have miſled ſtrangers as to the number of people. Many of them are but inſignificant pariſhes; and when in the middle of a town perhaps you may not ſee three houſes. The property of all the lands in this colony are by charter in the people. The general court, as their truſtees diſpoſe of them on ſettled conditions. Grants are generally made of

four, five, or ſix miles ſquare; which is always called a town, and a name given it in the grant. A few inhabitants ſettled within its limits may ſend a repreſentative to the general court. When 80 are qualified to vote, they muſt ſend one or be fined. When 120 are qualified, they may ſend two repreſentatives; and a ſmall freehold qualifies. In 1749, thro' poverty, or paucity of inhabitants, *fifty-eight* of theſe towns refuſed to ſend members. *Newberry*, *Ipſwich*, *Salem*, *Marblehead*, *Charleſtown*, *Cambridge*, and poſſibly a few more have the appearance and contiguity of towns: the reſt conſiſt of houſes built on each man's plantation. Each of theſe diſtricts has a form of town-government. *Boſton* is the capital of the whole. In 1722, by an order of the ſelect men (magiſtrates) of the town, the number of ſouls was taken: it then contained 10,670. By a like order in 1742, there were found in it 1719 dwelling-houſes, 166 ware-houſes; 16,382 white people, of whom 1,200 were widows; and 1514 negroes. Together with the province, this town ſuffered much by expeditions and preſſes in the late war. A general ſmall-pox has gone thro' it ſince; and much of its trade is diverted. For theſe reaſons its increaſe can't be very great from that time; and at preſent it is difficult to allow it 20,000 inhabitants. The colony in 1735 contained 35,427 white males from 16 and upwards; in 1741 they were 41,000. From that time there has no real numeration been made; but the aſſembly, in a meſſage ſent by them to governor *Shirley* in 1747, declare, that 3000 men are a 12th part of the militia. Upon the whole, from the loſſes ſuſtained by preſſes, privateering, taking and garriſoning *Louiſburg*; by decay of trade and by deſertions occaſioned by the extraordinary increaſe

creaſe of taxes, more than in other colonies ; (the poll, the faculty, the perſonal eſtate of all who reſide here but a few months, being taxed, and lately an univerſal exciſe on all liquors taking place) therefore 220,000 ſouls muſt be a very ſtretched aſſignment for this colony.

Rhode Iſland and *Providence* plantations, with the additions from the *Maſſachuſets Bay* are divided into four counties; which comprize 24 townſhips. By an exact cenſus taken in 1748, there were in this colony 28,439 whites, 3077 negroes, and 1257 *Indians*. *Newport* the capital in 1749, contained 5335 whites, 1105 negroes, and 68 *Indians*. So that allowing for the increaſe of the colony from thoſe times, 35,000 white inhabitants are full as many as can be aſcribed to it.

The colonies of *Connecticut* and *Rhode Iſland* above-mentioned, are the only colonies who, as it were, govern themſelves. The people annually chuſe their governors, council or aſſiſtants, and aſſemblies. The crown appoints no officers in either, but judges of admiralty, and thoſe of the cuſtoms. Their limits are confined by other colonies; and, as all their lands are private property, they can admit but little foreign increaſe. Five counties and 68 towns are comprehended in the colony of *Connecticut*. It has no particular capital. *Hartford*, a good inland town : *New London*, and eight or nine more, make a pretty figure for their ſize, to thoſe who ſail thro' *Long Iſland* ſound. But it would be very difficult for any perſon who travels thro' this colony to find a market in any of its towns. 18 of them are too ſmall and poor to ſend repreſentatives to the general aſſembly. All males from 16 to 70 pay a poll tax; and their militia from 16 to 50, in 1749, were 16,000. Allowing them a very large num-

ber for exempts and increaſe, one hundred thouſand will more than tantamount the people this colony contains.

The advantageous ſituation of the city of *New York*, in the colony of that name, marks it for the capital of the *Engliſh* governments on the *American* continent. The number of inhabitants in this colony, in 1732, was taken by the conſtables of every town, pariſh, or diſtrict; and they were found to be near 65,000. At the ſame time the houſes in the city were counted by the alderman of each reſpective ward, and they were found to be ſomething under 1500. Since that time the town has encreaſed in wealth and inhabitants. Many families removed to it from *Albany*, and the frontiers, in the late *French* war: yet, by loſſes from the *Indians* and *French* in the expoſed back ſettlements; by the *Carthagena* expedition, enliſtments, preſſes, and privateering, the natural encreaſe of the colony was in ſome meaſure retarded by that war. It has received little foreign encreaſe ſince; and the redundance of *Long Iſland*, forced out by the barrenneſs of its inland parts, moſtly remove to *New Jerſey*. So that allowing to the city as many inhabitants as are allowed to *Boſton*; and ſuppoſing the whole colony at preſent to be 100,000, that number will be fully adequate.

Altho' the proprietary colony of *New Jerſey* is divided into twelve counties, it has but a few inſignificant towns; *Amboy*, *Brunſwick*, *Trent-town*, *Burlington*, and *Elizabeth-town*, are all which can bear even the name. *New York* on the eaſt, and *Philadelphia* on the weſt, draw off the produce, and ſupply it with other neceſſaries. A curious author who informed himſelf of the ſtate of this, and the other colonies, ſays it might contain, in 1749, nigh 50,000 ſouls. The litigated uncertain titles

titles to lands, occaſioned by the iniquity of the proprietors, has, without doubt, prevented its encreaſe: 60,000 inhabitants muſt therefore be a ſufficient allowance for it.

The rapid encreaſe of the colony of *Penſylvania* has occaſioned various opinions about the number of its inhabitants. Here is no poll-tax, no militia-rolls to compute by. The city of *Philadelphia* its capital is the only competitor with *New York* for ſuperiority. Both colonies produce in general the ſame things; both have vaſt quantities of fine uncultivated lands: but when the great run of foreign encreaſe is over; (and the emigrations of the *Germans* into other colonies ſhew that it won't long be confined to *Penſylvania*) 'twill ſtand no chance in competition. One ſingle circumſtance, if there was no other, namely, that the river or harbour of *Philadelphia* is frozen up *communibus annis* nigh three months, muſt give *New York* the preference. In 1749, the houſes in every ward of this city were counted exactly by a ſet of curious gentlemen, the united ſum was 2076 private ones, and 11 houſes of worſhip. In the deſcription written under a very handſome proſpect of it, taken in 1753, the number of houſes are ſaid to be nigh 2300. It is therefore certain that it can't far exceed *Boſton* or *New York* in people.

By ſome 100,000, by others 125,000 fighting men are affirmed to be in the colony; a number far exceeding the four governments of *New England*. A late pamphlet penned to ſhew the miſapplication, or rather non-application of the great numbers and ſtrength of *Penſylvania*, at this critical juncture, ſays it contains 220,000 ſouls, half of whom are *Germans*. An enquiry into the ſtate of this colony was made by order of King *William* a little before his death, and the inhabitants at

that time were ſcarcely 14,000. By an agreement ſettled between Queen *Anne*, in the laſt year of her reign, and the then proprietor, all the property and rights he had were to be ſurrendered to the crown for 13,000 l. The deeds were drawn and 2000 l. of the money paid; but the proprietor died (it is ſaid) the day appointed for his executing them.

The *Germans* were firſt ſent to *America* by the bounty of this nation, under the protection of Queen *Anne*. Every thing neceſſary was provided for them. They were convoyed to *New York* there to be ſettled on the crown lands; and if this intention had been executed, the *French* in *Canada* had been for ever effectually confined to their proper bounds: but by the villainy of thoſe in power, this national charity and benefit was defeated. Theſe *Germans*, cheated, abuſed, and deceived in the grants of lands aſſigned them, and made the property of avaritious deſigning men, were forced to ſeek new habitations. They found their way thro' the woods to good lands in the colony of *Penſylvania*. Here they were uſed well, and grants made them *bona fide*. They repreſented the fraudulent uſage of one government, and the juſtice of the other to their brethren in *Europe*; which determined all future *German* emigrants to prefer this colony. The ways and means of tranſporting themſelves, was not found out, by any conſiderable numbers, for ſome time: but the perſecution at *Thorn* in *Poland*, obliged them to look for an aſylum. From that time a proper canal of conveyance has been found; and thouſands have gone over yearly.

From 1728 to 1729, 6200 foreigners of all ſorts arrived at *Philadelphia*. In 1750, 4317 *Germans* arrived, and about 5000 in 1754. The

Spaniſh

Spaniſh war interrupted this tranſportation: the *French* war almoſt ſtopt it: So that upon an average, if 3000 *Germans* were imported annually for 30 years paſt, in all 90,000; and 30,000 be added to them for their increaſe from the different times of their arrival; and 10,000 be deducted for the diſperſion into other colonies, the computation of 110,000 *Germans* for this colony may be right; and that they are half of the people is not diſputed. The 220,000 are ſuppoſed to be in the five countries of proper *Penſylvania*, to which add 30,000, a large number for the three lower counties; then the whole of the inhabitants of the colony and its juriſdiction, will ſtand at 250,000.

The colony of *Maryland* has been compared to *Virginia*, for number of white inhabitants, on account of its receiving moſt of the tranſported convicts; but this compariſon can hardly be true. *Virginia* from priority of ſettlement, equality of ſoil and ſituation, and by a far ſuperior extent of country, muſt needs exceed it. Neither of them have any large towns; but thoſe in *Virginia* are more in number, as well as more populous, than thoſe in *Maryland*. By governor *Dinwiddie*'s report of the militia in *Virginia*, the inhabitants ſhould not exceed 70,000: but as this account has, thro' the courſe of it, made large allowances for exempts of all ſorts, theſe two colonies, *Maryland* and *Virginia*, are by us ſuppoſed to be on a par for people; and to each of them are allowed 85,000 *Whites*: beſides, *Negroes* are very numerous in both.

The counties of North *Carolina*, in lord *Granville*'s diſtrict, are inhabited equivalent to the neighbouring parts of *Virginia*. The counties to the ſouthward and the parts next to South *Carolina*,

lina, are but thinly peopled. *Edenton*, *Bath*, *New-Bern*, *Johnſton*, (a county town with one inhabited houſe) *Beaufort*, *Wilmington* and *New Brunſwick*, in any other country would be called villages of little or no note: however, this colony has more white inhabitants than South *Carolina*, whoſe number ſome have raiſed to 45,000.

South *Carolina*, a colony extremely advantageous to *Britain* at preſent, by its productions of rice and indigo, probably will in time be more ſo by ſilk; but has not a ſufficient number of *Whites* to the *Blacks*. In 1739 before the great fire, *Charles-Town* the capital, had 450 dwelling houſes, with 800 warehouſes and kitchens. In 1742 the province militia were 5500: the ſlaves 49,000. By its vicinity to St. *Auguſtine* and the *Havannah*, as well as for want of proper protection, this country ſuffered extremely by the *Spaniſh* and *French* wars: ſo that, if they had continued, a few years would have determined the fate of the planter and merchant. Since the peace it has more than recovered its former circumſtances: the town is increaſed and better built, and may now be able to count 600 houſes. One benefit it received from the war: neceſſity obliged the planters to attempt indigo, rice being too bulky to pay the then high freight. They now make it fit for any market; and it is hoped, by a longer continuance of the bounty, will be able in a few years to ſupply *Britain*. But as the preſent militia do not exceed 5000, the number of ſouls in this moſt improveable colony cannot be eſtimated at more than 30,000.

Georgia as yet is ſcarce eſtabliſhed; however 6000 people may at preſent inhabit it.

This account of the number of the *Britiſh* ſubjects, men, women and children in the above-

men-

mentioned colonies, is not the production of whim and conjecture. Militia rolls, poll taxes, bills of mortality, returns from governors, late hiſtories, and pamphlets publiſh'd in the colonies, as well as actual numerations, are the authorities on which it is built: but as none of theſe come quite up to the preſent time, large additions are made to each colony for its late increaſe. If the computation for the reſt of the colonies is to be regulated by the cenſus of *Rhode Iſland* in 1748, which makes its inhabitants 28,439, (and ſeems to have been taken with great preciſion and exactneſs) the number of *Whites* in the colonies, in general, is here over-rated, as *Maryland* certainly is. Theſe 13 colonies extending from *Cape Kanſo*, the moſt eaſtern extremity of *Nova Scotia*, to the ſouthern limits of *Georgia*, the ſpace of 1500 miles along the *Atlantic* ocean, contain 1,050,000 ſouls. This is the number, this the ſtrength, which by a late author is preferred, and affirmed to exceed any power or ſtate in *Europe*, excepting the *Germanick* body, *France*, and perhaps *Britain*: Theſe the towns which he compares with *Briſtol*, and others in *England*; when *Briſtol* alone contains more people than all the capitals of theſe colonies put together.

I ſhall cloſe this account with a word or two concerning the militia of the plantations. All the colonies, *Nova Scotia*, *Penſylvania* and *Georgia* excepted, have a militia, conſiſting of the gentlemen, merchants, yeomen, freeholders, and others in each colony; who have conſented by their repreſentatives to be inrolled and trained for the defence of the particular colony or corporation to which they belong. The militia laws of the ſeveral colonies differ from each other; nor can the laws of one colony extend to or operate in another,

another, any more than the laws of *London* can at *Briſtol*, or *vice verſa*. Such is the militia of *America*: out of whom it would be as difficult to form an army to march to the unappropriated frontiers, as it would to make the gentlemen, *&c.* of *London* to march to oppoſe an invaſion in any remote part of *Britain*. Looſe idle people, thoſe without property, are the only people who muſt compoſe a ſtanding army in *America*, as they do in *Europe*: but the number of theſe cannot be very great in a part of the world where property is ſo eaſily acquired; and where conſequently there are many maſters and but few ſervants.

II.

In what time the people of the colonies double themſelves; and how a fund may be raiſed in them ſufficient for their defence.

MY other correſpondent, who computes the number of people in the colonies on the continent to be a million, (altho' I ſhould think 900,000 their amount to the full) ſpeaks to a point which the former has not touched upon. He has taken into conſideration the increaſe of the plantation inhabitants, and how often they double themſelves. This event, by his computation, however large it may ſeem, he ſays, for certain happens every 20 years; and that altho' the eſtimation of their increaſe cannot be made from that either of great cities or well inhabited countries in *Europe*, yet there are other principles from whence a tolerably exact calculation may be raiſed. Any man may have land given him in North *America* for fixing himſelf and his family, particularly in *New England*; which province he thinks has the advantage

vantage in almoſt every thing over the other provinces; eſpecially as to healthy climate, plenty of natural productions, trade, navigation and fiſhery; good laws, liberty, and few taxes. In this land ſuch a perſon may with eaſe plentifully ſubſiſt a family, ſo that he is not afraid to marry; and if he looks ſo forward as to conſider how children, when grown up, are to be provided for, he is not diſcouraged, as he ſees more land is to be had either for nothing or at very eaſy rates. This makes marriages more general, as well as more early in life, in North *America*, by three to one, than in *Europe*. But ſuppoſing they are only two to one; this conformable to the computation uſed in *Europe* of one to a hundred, will give two marriages for every hundred perſons: ſuppoſing alſo that in *Europe* from three to five births are the iſſue of a marriage; as theſe marriages are later in life, from ſeven to ten births may be allowed to a marriage in the colonies; and as theſe marriages may be computed to happen one with another, at 20 years of age, it may be ſeen how ſoon the people there are doubled; many years under 25: but ſuppoſing they did not double in fewer years than 25, conſider how much their increaſe will exceed ours in 100 years.

But ſo great is the country of North *America*, that notwithſtanding this increaſe, yet till it is fully ſettled (which will require ſeveral ages) labour cannot be had cheap: for no man will be a ſervant whilſt he can be a maſter; that is, can get land eaſily and ſettle for himſelf: ſo that labour is as dear at preſent in *New England* and *Penſylvania*, as it was thirty or forty years ago; notwithſtanding the number of people in the latter (according to the *Brief ſtate of* Penſylvania lately publiſhed) has been increaſed by the arrival of

100,000 foreigners. Hence the danger apprehended by ſome of North *America* interfering with *England* in branches of trade which depend on labour, muſt be at a very great diſtance. Inſtead of being terrified with this bugbear, it ought to be conſidered that as our colonies increaſe, the demand for *Britiſh* manufactures will increaſe, in a market where foreigners cannot interfere with us: and if by proper laws this trade be kept to ourſelves, *England* will ſcarce be able to ſupply her plantations, even tho' her whole trade ſhould be confined to them. Ought not this ſingle conſideration to remove our apprehenſions, and, induce us to act, like a good mother, not ſo much to reſtrain manufactures in our colonies?

No labouring man in any part of *Europe*, who knew the advantages of living in our colonies, would work for others for ſix pence and twelve pence *per* day, when he can get much more than double that ſum on his own land in *America*, which he may have given him. This is ſo well known in *Germany*, that all the laws which can be made there are not able to reſtrain thouſands from going over yearly to *Penſylvania*, to the great benefit of that colony and many others; notwithſtanding the pamphlet juſt before mentioned has repreſented both them and the quakers in a very untrue light.

What has been ſaid on this occaſion by the gentleman who wrote theſe remarks, more fully accounts for the difficulty mentioned by the former at the cloſe of his, of forming an army out of the militia of *America*; and in how wrong a light that matter is univerſally underſtood on this ſide of the water. For altho' the people of the colonies are properly all militia, and obliged to defend their reſpective territories, yet thoſe of one

one province cannot be compelled to march out of it, or to defend any other frontiers than their own. If they aſſiſt their neighbours, the motion muſt be voluntary; and as, for the generals, they are maſters of families, and obliged to obey none but their natural leaders, choſen by their own aſſemblies, they muſt be dealt with mildly, not with military rigour. This is the reaſon why they may be averſe to put themſelves under the command of officers ſent from hence; and why I have in my firſt letter recommended placing ſome of their own over them.

This gentleman earneſtly recommends ſeveral things as neceſſary for the ſecurity of the colonies which I have mentioned in that letter; as the augmenting ſome of our forts already built, particularly that of *Orwêgo*; the building of two veſſels to be kept on the *Kadarakui* or *Ontario* lake, and opening the *Hudſon Bay* trade. Theſe meaſures he ſays, if purſued, "would at once get us "into the direct fur trade with the *Indians* "(which we are now forced to carry on in a "ſmuggling way, and at ſecond-hand with the "*French* traders) and in ſhort ruin *Canada* with-"out fighting."

In the mean time, as things now ſtand he is of opinion, that we ſhould greatly diſtreſs them, if all the colonies would follow the example of the *Maſſachuſets*; which is to keep publick ſtore-houſes on their frontiers, and to ſupply the *Indians* with goods at the firſt coſt: "for the private traders, "ſays this gentleman, often cheat them, and treat "them ill; which drives them over to the "*French*." He likewiſe recommends building new forts in proper places; and above all one at the head of the river *Kinnebek*, a ſpot which he has long

long had his eye upon, as the moſt convenient imaginable, for the purpoſes already mentioned in Letter I. art. 3. In ſhort, he ſays, " it is the " very beſt ſtroke which at preſent can be made " againſt the *French*, and ſuch as will ſtrike a " terror into the gates of *Quebek*. This fort he " would have garriſoned by one independent " company of 100 men, to be raiſed either here " or in *New England*, or elſe ſent from the regi- " ments at *Halifax*. If our government here " would but ſo far countenance and ſupport this " undertaking as to maintain ſuch a number of " men, in caſe of an attack, he is ſure that the " whole force of *New England* would chearfully " join to defend it: nay, he makes no doubt but " that the *New England* people would build the " fort, provided it was furniſhed with guns, " powder and ball from hence."

He judges this propoſal may be the more readily complied with, as he is of opinion, " that from " henceforth ſoldiers muſt always be kept in the " colonies, as well to defend them againſt the " *French*, as to prevent their ſmuggling trade ſo " prejudicial to *England:* alſo, becauſe they ought " to be ready at hand to be ſent on any occaſion, " either to aſſiſt our ſugar iſlands, or to invade " the *French* or *Spaniſh* iſlands. He likewiſe " thinks that it is neceſſary to begin to uſe the " people of *North America* to ſoldiers, which " may by degrees introduce diſcipline among " their *militia:* and no time ſeems to him more " proper for it than this, while their thoughts are " taken up with military affairs and they are pre- " paring for war. Some time hence when their mar- " tial ſpirit ſubſides, and calmer diſpoſitions take " place again, the ſending ſoldiers among them

" may

" may not be ſo well reliſhed." 'Tis certain, that almoſt any thing may be brought about by well timing it.

This gentleman proceeds to conſider the number of ſoldiers neceſſary for putting on the *American* eſtabliſhment. " There ought always, con-
" tinues he, to be two regiments in different
" parts of *New England*; one in *New York*; an-
" other in *Penſylvania*: one ſmall regiment or a
" few companies in *Maryland:* a large regiment
" in *Virginia*; laſtly, one to be diſtributed among
" the two *Carolinas* and *Georgia*. Theſe regi-
" ments ought to be raiſed in and at the expence
" of the ſeveral governments, and the taxes
" (which he propoſes) will, in a few years, pay
" for ſupporting them: in the mean time what-
" ever they may fall ſhort, muſt be ſupplied
" from hence. His ſcheme requires likewiſe
" that arms, ammunition, and cloathing for
" ſome few years, ſhould be ſent to them: and
" that the chief officers of all ſorts, unleſs ſome
" very few, ſhould be appointed out of the na-
" tives of the reſpective provinces, when the re-
" giments are raiſed."

On this occaſion my friend propoſes a thing which may ſeem as ſtrange, as new, to ſome peo-
" ple. This is to " raiſe a regiment out of the
" *French* neutrals mentioned in the preceding ar-
" ticle, to be commanded by their own officers;
" a thing which he is convinced might be
" brought about with proper management."
The only queſtion is, how far they may be depended on, as they are papiſts, and ſeemingly in cloſe union under hand with the reſt of their nation? as appeared from their behaviour in the late war: However, in caſe ſuch a regiment was

raiſed for a trial, the fear of endangering the ſafety of the reſt of their countrymen ſettled in *Nova Scotia*, might be a check upon them; and in caſe they ſhould turn tail or deſert, it would be a good way of getting rid of them. However, their poſts might be aſſigned in ſome other province, and at a diſtance from any *French* ſettlement.

What ſeems to have led this gentleman to make ſuch a propoſal, is the great inclination which he obſerves in the *French* ſoldiers to deſert and ſettle in our colonies, where they can live with more eaſe and liberty than in the cold and barren country of *Canada*. On this occaſion he ſpeaks of a thing as being actually done, which in my former I have given a caution againſt, ſuppoſing it had never been intended; namely, the ſurrendering deſerters on each ſide. "An agrement, "ſays he, which our officers at *Halifax* in *Nova* "*Scotia*, have been duped into by the *French*." "Some of our men, continues he, may indeed "deſert: but for one the *French* would have "from us, we ſhould have 100 from them. "Theſe too would gladly ſtay and ſettle in our "colonies; but none of our deſerters would ever "ſtay long with the *French*. Nine tenths of "all the *French European* ſoldiers, or others ſent "to *Canada*, might be induced to come over to "our plantations. In ſhort, the beſt and only "inhabitants which the *French* have to depend "on, are the *Indians*, and the breed they have "from the *Indian* women and *French* ſoldiers; a "meaſure, ſays he, which we ought to encourage "in our colonies."

After having laid down his plan, my correſpondent turns his thoughts on the means for carrying on the war, (which he ſeems to think inevitable

vitable) and keeping the colonies in a good condition of defence. With regard to this point he propoſes three things: firſt, that the duty on all ſugars from our ſugar iſlands, which is now paid in the iſlands themſelves, and (as Mr. *Pelham* ſaid in the *Houſe of Commons*) now raiſes but a trifle, ſhould be made payable in *North America*; to which might be added a duty of one penny *per* gallon on molaſſes, and two-pence *per* gallon on all rum imported into *North America*; or elſe a tax not exceeding twenty ſhillings to be laid on every thouſand acres of land. None of theſe taxes, he aſſures me, would be much diſliked in *North America*, from whence he has lately received ſome propoſals to the ſame purport: but is of opinion that they ſhould be paid by way of exciſe, or by the purchaſer, and not by the importer; that the merchants might not be diſtreſſed.

The tax on ſugar (tranſlated as above) and that on molaſſes particularly, would raiſe a large ſum annually, and be an encreaſing fund. And there can be the leſs objection to theſe, becauſe they ariſe chiefly from *French* produce: for the duty on ſugar, as it ſtands at preſent, being paid in the iſlands, encourages the inhabitants to get it from the *French:* and to my correſpondent's "own knowledge, not one twentieth part of "the molaſſes, imported into *North America*, is "*Engliſh*. So that one penny *per* gallon would "be a tax chiefly on *French* produce; and the "importer pays as much as that in order to get "it run, or elſe compounds with the port officers "to permit its being entered as from our *Engliſh* "plantations;" and this likewiſe he knows to be fact, particularly at *Rhode Iſland*. The fund raiſed

from the duties laid on the above-mentioned commodities, our correſpondent is poſitive would be ſufficient to anſwer all the exigencies of the ſeveral *American* governments, particularly the governors ſalaries, after being fixed here, ſhould be firſt paid out of it; then thoſe of all their port-officers: The reſt to be applied for carrying on the war, or maintaining ſoldiers.

But in order to reap the full advantage of ſuch taxes, it will be abſolutely neceſſary to deſtroy the illicit trade which all the colonies have run more or leſs into; but none ſo much as *Rhode Iſland*, which has carried it on to the higheſt pitch, and in the moſt audacious manner.

At this noted place for ſmuggling, all ſorts of *French* as well as *Dutch* produce and manufactures are imported in the moſt public manner; and from thence exported to all parts of *America* as *Engliſh* produce, ſo much that in one year 14 ſail of veſſels have arrived there directly from *Holland*; and many veſſels do the ſame to *New England* and *New York*. This is well known to every individual in thoſe countries; and whilſt their governors are ſo dependent on the people, and the port officers make ſuch immenſe profit by ſuffering it, he cannot ſee how it can well be prevented, but by laying ſome ſevere penalties on the tranſgreſſors, and keeping ſome ſmall ſloops of war with ſoldiers, particularly at *Rhode Iſland*, to protect the port officers in doing their duty. But as things now ſtand thoſe officers would riſk their lives in attempting it; for there is ſcarce a man in all that country who is not concerned in the ſmuggling trade.

I have before me a particular piece written by the author of the preceding tract, on the illicit trade

trade of the colonies, particularly that of *Rhode Iſland*, and the means of ſuppreſſing it. Running or ſmuggling is there ſanctified with the name of *naturalizing* foreign goods; and in their more than hoſpitable and free ports, the moſt forbidden commodities receive the benefit of *naturalization*. But to purſue this ſubject would carry me too far.

To return to our correſpondent's letter. He ſays an entire ſtop ought to be put (as it eaſily might) to the trade from *Cape Briton* to our colonies; for from thence all ſorts of *French* goods to an immenſe value, are yearly imported by our northern *American* veſſels to every part of that continent. He likewiſe takes notice, by way of prevention, in caſe a war ſhould break out, of a wicked practice ſet on foot laſt war in North *America*, of ſupplying the *French* iſlands with all ſorts of arms, ammunition and proviſions, by veſſels which by management they procured to be licenſed as cartels; and with only one or two *Frenchmen* (for whom they have given as far as 40 *l.*) would go backwards and forwards between the *French* iſlands and North *America*, thus keeping on a conſtant trade during the whole war: ſo that there have been no fewer than 20 of them ſeen at a time in one port of *Hiſpaniola*. This fraudulent and pernicious practice ought to be prevented by ſome law made here for the purpoſe; and no veſſels ſuffered to go as cartels, with fewer than 50 or 100 priſoners: or rather they ſhould be obliged to ſend all their priſoners to *England*.

Thus, Sir, I have made you up a ſecond letter out of the remarks of two public-ſpirited gentlemen, zealous for the *Britiſh* glory and proſperity of the colonies. As you are one of the ſame cha-

character, and curious to enquire into the affairs of the plantations, (a diſpoſition which is become pretty general in the nation) I ſend them to you, believing they will be at leaſt as acceptable to you as thoſe contained in my former letter.

I am, *&c.*

14th *March*
1755.

FINIS.

ERRATA.

P. 9. l. 7. after *Kadarakuì*, for *on* r. *or*.
P. 63. l. 17. for *half-penny*, r. *penny*.